Blogs » Politics » Chinese Investors Sue CFIUS Over Rejection of Wind Farm Acquisition
Blogs » Politics » Chinese Investors Sue CFIUS Over Rejection of Wind Farm Acquisition |
- Chinese Investors Sue CFIUS Over Rejection of Wind Farm Acquisition
- The Horrific Cost of China’s Breakneck Development: Cancer Villages
- Protests Mark Historical Anniversary
- Japanese Cars Banned from Hunan Road
- Diaoyu Islands Are Xinhua’s
- Mobilizing the Chinese Education Movement in Malaysia
- U.S. Files W.T.O. Case against China
- You might be right, but you’re wrong with that tone of voice
- Chinese Student in Japan Makes Viral Call For Peace: Don’t “Close the Last Door to Exchange”
- China Cuts Drug Prices
- China Car Makers Cut Corners to Success
- Nationalism and the China-Japan Island Disputes
- Sensitive Words: Trials, Looting and Liver Cancer
- Translation: 15 Feel-Good Internet Stories From China
- Postcard from demonstration at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing
- Check out the EO Podcast
- The Daily Twit – 9/18/12: National Day of Humiliescalation
- Wang Accepts Charges as Trial Ends
- Hairless Apes Fighting Over Coconuts: the Islands Dispute Heats Up
- THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTION: Causes and Consequences
| Chinese Investors Sue CFIUS Over Rejection of Wind Farm Acquisition Posted: 18 Sep 2012 09:43 PM PDT
Wow, this is big news (if you're into this sort of thing). When it comes to foreign investment, there is perhaps no hotter topic these days than Chinese outward direct investment. Yes, the number and size of these deals is still relatively small, but unlike other commercial areas, Chinese ODI is actually growing. These days, that's huge. And if one were to write a short list of issues effecting Chinese ODI to the U.S., one of the top destinations, it would be national security review. That's been on the agenda for almost a decade now, gaining the most prominence when CNOOC had to pull out of the deal to purchase UNOCAL. While only a few deals have been formally nixed by CFIUS, quite a few others have been quietly abandoned when the investors ascertained that the politics just weren't lining up the right way. In particular, when certain members of the U.S. Congress want to kill an M&A deal, it gets done. I've always wondered what would happen if some of these companies called the bluff of the U.S. government, saying essentially "You're going to torpedo my deal? OK, tough guy, I'm going to force CFIUS to not only formally reject the deal, but also justify it." No one has really tried to do this before, and the underlying statute here does exempt the president's actions from judicial review. But what about the decision of CFIUS itself? Maybe this lawsuit will shed some light on how all this works. That would be nice, although it's a longshot. For the record, the deal in question here involved two Chinese national investors and some small wind farm projects, but it sounds like the real money behind the deal comes from Sany, a ginormous machinery company headquartered in Changsha:
So why did CFIUS ultimately decide that not only should the deal be unwound, but that it would attach conditions on Ralls' ability to transfer assets to third parties, including equipment made by Sany? No one knows, or at least they're not saying so in public. Ralls is now suing CFIUS on several grounds, including a classic "regulatory taking" complaint:
I've read the initial order handed down to Ralls, which is all of four pages and doesn't say squat. This is unfortunately how CFIUS works. They find a national security issue and then can kill the deal without explaining exactly why, with the decision normally not even subject to judicial review. There are shades here of China's prosecution of individuals under the auspices of the ill-defined law concerning "State Secrets." It's possible that CFIUS' problem here is with Sany and its equipment, or perhaps it's just the nationality of the investors – heck, maybe there is actually a reasonable argument here. Who knows? However, as these are wind-farm projects, I'm finding it very difficult coming up with a national security angle to this whole thing. And if there isn't one, then I naturally start thinking that a domestic U.S. company or industry is being somehow protected by this decision. Wouldn't be the first time. Do I know for sure this is protectionism? Not at all. The point is that this looks odd on its face, and it would be nice to have more information. It's possible, for example, that if Ralls knew what the hell the problem was, it could assist in suggesting a mitigation plan. It already voluntarily complied with the orders of the U.S. Navy. Can you imagine what would have happened if last month, MOFCOM, instead of issuing an approval, had announced that it was rejecting Wal-mart's acquisition of Yihaodian outright, with absolutely no justification whatsoever except for an oblique reference to "national security"? Heads would have exploded on Capitol Hill. The U.S. government complains about transparency in China and other nations all the time (for good reason), but it might be a good idea to back that up with a bit more transparency at home. I would really like to see this suit move forward, but it's unlikely. Although Ralls did file a federal case, the decision now rests with President Obama (it's rare that these cases go to the president), who now has until September 28 to uphold CFIUS' decision. If he does, the courts may not review it. If he does nothing, the deal would go ahead. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| The Horrific Cost of China’s Breakneck Development: Cancer Villages Posted: 18 Sep 2012 08:18 PM PDT Follow the spread of China's development and you'll find a shadow in its wake: Cancer villages. These are the places where the price for China's dizzying pace of development is highest, where cancer rates have skyrocketed in the last two decades and almost no family is without a victim. Officially and unofficially, the Chinese media have reported 459 "cancer villages" (癌症村) throughout China. They have been reported in every province and autonomous region, with the exception of Qinghai and Tibet. Once a rare disease, cancer is now the biggest killer in both urban and rural China; mortality rates have grown 80 percent in the last 30 years.  The map of cancer village concentration that got Weibo users talking. Via Weibo The cancers in these villages are unusual for developed countries: Esophageal, intestinal, of the liver, rectal–all cancers of the digestive tract. That's because most villages still have no running water and rely on rivers and groundwater for everything from drinking and cooking to farming. Unfortunately, most factories are built by river banks, and industrial wastewater has polluted much of the country's water systems, with 40 percent of rivers and 55 percent of groundwater unfit for drinking according to a 2012 government report. As the map at right shows, many cancer villages are clustered by the Yellow, Yangtze, and Hai rivers. Netizens corroborate this chilling story. "I am from Taizhou [in Zhejiang province, on the Yangtze River], and recently there really has been a lot of cancer," writes @海角天涯1999 on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter. "My father's generation says that the river water was once drinkable; then it could only be used for laundry and swimming; and later it was fit only for cleaning toilets. Now it can only be used for dumping trash, and the smell along the banks is very bad … Recently the groundwater has also been severely polluted, and it too is no longer drinkable, but farmers still use it to water their crops. Eat the crops, and die from poison. Don't eat it, and starve." Paradoxically, over 86 percent of cancer villages are found in China's wealthiest east coast provinces. But they are located in the poorest counties there. Slowly, people are realizing that China's miracle economic growth may be coming at too high a cost. @小兔和她的朋友们 writes, "Chinese people really do sell their lives for money, but the money earned does not necessarily buy back life." Reflecting on the value of a life, @南京的唐唐 comments that "Chinese people all live for GDP," and @冀叟123 writes that "For GDP, there is no river or land that cannot be polluted." Originally published in a 2010 article in the U.S.-based Environment magazine, the map attracted attention on Weibo after being shared by @环保董良杰 under the title "Cancer Villages: Made in China." The image comes, of course, at a time when Chinese social media is immersed in the ongoing furor over Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. Yet the story of the cancer villages and environmental pollution is far more real and painful for millions of ordinary citizens than the ownership of a few faraway islands. Observers have pointed out this irony. "The nationalist youth have all gone off to attack the Diaoyu Islands. No one cares about the poor mess at home," wrote @暂无名2 in response to the cancer maps. @乡下宁宁 asked, "Not many people care about these [environmental] issues–do they think they can all move to the Diaoyu Islands?" Indeed, anti-Japanese sentiment is potentially useful for the Chinese government, as an alternative vent for frustrations and anger that may otherwise explode over more volatile problems at home. In recent years people have become more willing to take to the streets to demand environmental justice and oppose factory construction, as they have done in Shifang, Sichuan province and Qidong, Jiangsu province in 2012, not to mention Dalian, Shenyang province and Haimen, Guangdong province in 2011. Meanwhile, public outcry over the Beijing city government's failure to monitor air quality for PM2.5, the smallest and most hazardous particulate pollutants, largely took place over Weibo and other online social media platforms. Enabled by and amplified over social media, these protests are a sign of China's growing environmental consciousness and burgeoning unwillingness to tolerate air and water pollution. As @冀叟123 writes, "This is a serious, difficult question that requires collective action to solve and completely eradicate all kinds of pollution sources–to be like Shifang and Qidong, to protect the earth, sky, lake, and rivers that we rely on for survival, to let the fields slowly recover from the accumulated heavy metals, and give the earth a respite." [Chinese] Given the growing wave of environmental awareness, it is likely that there will be more debate and protest online–and offline.  Via Weibo Footnotes (? returns to text)
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| Protests Mark Historical Anniversary Posted: 18 Sep 2012 06:59 PM PDT September 18, known as the "Day of National Humiliation," marks the anniversary of the "Mukden Incident" in 1931 which precipitated the Japanese invasion of northern China. With anti-Japanese sentiment in China already high from Japan's planned purchase of the disputed Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, protesters again took to the streets in force on Tuesday. But according to reports, authorities took stronger measures to prevent violence and looting than on previous days. From the New York Times:
The same New York Times report describes the scene at the protest at the Japanese embassy in Beijing:
CNN reports that several Japanese manufacturers have temporarily closed operations in China during the protests:
In Hunan, Japanese cars were banned from the road to avoid any accidents or vandalism in case protesters targeted them for attack. Business Week looks at the market implications of the protests for Japanese car makers, and says it may prove to be a bigger disaster for them than last year's tsunami:
On his New Yorker blog, Evan Osnos writes about the protests in Beijing, and the role of the government in encouraging and also controlling them:
While protesters' anger toward Japan was virulent and often violent on the streets around China, Chinese netizens took a more satirical view by mocking the official media's coverage of the issue. © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| Japanese Cars Banned from Hunan Road Posted: 18 Sep 2012 06:11 PM PDT With Hondas set alight and Toyotas smashed at recent anti-Japan protests, one city in Hunan Province is taking a bold step to protect vehicles from destruction. Ding Daoqin reports on Weibo:
Via CDT Chinese. © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | 3 comments | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| Posted: 18 Sep 2012 04:17 PM PDT Last week, writer Lang Yaoyuan wrote on his verified Sina Weibo account that not a single publication in Liaoning Province dared publish a citizen-produced "protect the islands" advertisement. The Liaoning Daily explained that it "must thoroughly adhere to Xianhua News Agency's manuscripts." Many netizens complained, "Even patriots have to be examined and approved." Others joked that "the facts prove the Diaoyu Islands belong to Xinhua."
Other Weibo users took Lang's complaint further:
Via CDT Chinese. Translation by Irene Hsiao. "Netizen Voices" is an original CDT series. If you would like to reuse this content, please follow the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 agreement. © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| Mobilizing the Chinese Education Movement in Malaysia Posted: 18 Sep 2012 04:07 PM PDT Memo #174 By Ming-Chee Ang – angmingchee [at] gmail.com The Chinese education movement in Malaysia fought for the survival of Chinese vernacular schools within the Malay-dominated education system since 1951. Today it is one of the most influential political entities among Chinese-speaking Malaysians. It is playing a critical role in influencing votes to support a movement-friendly political alliance in the next general election.  Foundation stone of the Chinese education movement at the movement headquarters in Kajang district, state of Selangor, Malaysia. The movement represents a significant voting bloc, with supporters at the school, local, state, and national levels, linked through interpersonal bonds and inter-school networks. Political parties need the support of all ethnic groups to secure victory in elections, and Chinese votes comprise 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the total electorates in most constituencies. Ahead of the upcoming 13th general election, competition between the National Front government and the People's Alliance coalition provided an opportunity for the movement to pursue its goals and protest issues such as the shortage of Chinese school teachers. The National Front government responded and included movement representatives in a special committee in April 2012. The committee made procedural changes, such as removing teachers without Chinese language qualifications from senior positions within Chinese schools, and increasing the number of special training courses for Chinese school teachers. The limited power of the special committee did not satisfy all and the movement's leading organization, the United Chinese School Committees Association, withdrew. This significant blow to the negotiation process received mixed responses from Chinese communities nationwide. Albeit risky to adopt such open and high profile confrontation, this strategic approach effectively pressured the government. The Chinese education movement endured within Malaysia's semi-democratic system for the past six decades by successfully manoeuvring a fiercely contended electoral process. Victory in a general election provides significant symbolic legitimacy, even in semi-democratic Malaysia, allowing the movement to negotiate and demand compromises. So far, the National Front government has responded to the movement's demands and approved the first independent Chinese secondary school in Pahang. It also allocated special funding to Chinese schools nationwide. These compromises are the best indicators of the government's level of frustration and desperation to win the general election. Dr. Ming-Chee Ang is a political scientist and a senior analyst at the Penang Institute, Malaysia. If you enjoyed this memo, subscribe to our e-newsletter for free and receive new memos 2+ times per week via email. Links:
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| U.S. Files W.T.O. Case against China Posted: 18 Sep 2012 03:54 PM PDT Amid the U.S. presidential campaign, the Obama administration has filed a W.T.O. case against China over automobile subsidies. From Keith Bradsher at The New York Times:
Mark Landler further discusses the delicacy of handling U.S.-China economic ties in an election year. From The New York Times:
Meanwhile, China has also taken to the W.T.O to fire back. From Tom Miles and Michael Martina at Reuters:
See also a previous W.T.O case against China under the Obama administration, via CDT. © Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| You might be right, but you’re wrong with that tone of voice Posted: 18 Sep 2012 05:50 PM PDT Now, I generally know better than to go sticking my neck out on issues like this, but I actually agree that China should be in control of the Diaoyu islands. The problem is that I was tempted to side with the Japanese after witnessing the disgusting display of mindless nationalism over the weekend (which in some cases included calls for wiping out all Japanese, and seemed to be state-sponsored). Hidden behind the calls for boycotts and sanctions, and the embarrassing claim based on the policy of "first come, first serve," (which can be found in legal texts between "Dibs" and "Finders keepers") makes it seem like this entire issue is nothing more than a ploy to drum up support for the Party. Or, that perhaps the islands really do belong to Japan, since the Chinese papers keep referring to them as having been "stolen" and that the Japanese gov't "buying" them from the owners is "illegal," which make China's current assertions seem dubious. However, People's Daily does have a very calm explanation of China's claims over the islands, but they last stated the rational case in 2010.
Unfortunately, People's Daily, Global Times, and seemingly every other newspaper (but Caixin, which toed the line), has lost their ability to reason coolly this time around, and are now in the process of trying to contain the firestorm they have ignited.  The current banner of People's Daily, which doesn't seem to be promoting a peaceful solution So why is it that the Party has a fairly reasonable claim that could be argued to the international crowd, and yet they seem to prefer throwing eggs and running military drills to practice capturing islands? Perhaps, the Party isn't trying to win any of the foreign countries over to their side, if they were the protests would involve a lot less profanity and genocide, and a touch more English. Instead they are simply interested in winning over their own people – even if it means losing the bigger battle over the islands. Filed under: Current Events Tagged: Cairo Declaration, China, Diaoyu Island, Japan, Okinawa Prefecture, Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, United States   | |||||||||||||||
| Chinese Student in Japan Makes Viral Call For Peace: Don’t “Close the Last Door to Exchange” Posted: 18 Sep 2012 07:44 AM PDT Tensions are only worsening between China and Japan as the two nations vie for control of what the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese the Senkaku. Protests have flared across many cities in China as (mostly young) Chinese smash Japanese-made cars, trash Japanese stores and restaurants, and harass those who appear to be Japanese.  Futenma airport in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture. Via gcsn.com.cn Meanwhile, there are about 100,000 Chinese studying abroad in Japan. How have they been treated, and what dangers are they facing? According to a recent viral essay by a Chinese netizen who says he is studying abroad in Japan, the answers are: Fine, and none. With over 18,000 comments and over 75,000 retweets on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, this story has clearly resonated with more than just one observer. Tea Leaf Nation translates. An Urgent Letter Home from a Study Abroad Student in Japan At 11 o'clock at night, back in my room after meeting up with another Chinese exchange student, I logged on to [Chinese chat service] QQ, and there was this message from my older brother: "Call Dad back, it's urgent! Look at the news, and call back as soon as you can, whatever the time is!" My heart jumped, because I thought something had happened at home. I hurried up and made the call, and as soon as the phone was answered and my father heard my voice, the first thing he said was: "How are you doing over there? The situation in China right now is anxious because of the Diaoyu Islands…" On the phone, I kept reassuring my father, and trying to get my family to calm down, I said I haven't come across any inconveniences in Japan. Only after I had talked at length did my father feel at ease enough to hang up the phone. I thought of the 100,000 Chinese students abroad in Japan right then. In light of the current anxious situation, every parent would definitely be concerned, worried that his or her own child in Japan would encounter "inconveniences." And what's more, they would have trouble sleeping at night if their children happened to suffer a beating, wondering… Will we make our child come home this time? It's completely normal for parents back home to have this kind of concern. Not only is every television station, big and small, repeatedly broadcasting about the Diaoyu Islands, but everywhere "anti- Japanese travel" demonstrations are happening, with "smashing cars" and violent beatings of supposed "Japanese." The whole country is enveloped in a state of extreme restlessness and unease, amidst an atmosphere prone to violence. Parents worrying about their child in Japan feel a kind of terror in this type of environment. Then what is, really, the condition of Japan? I will speak from my own sense of the matter. I am in Okinawa, and here's my analysis of the China-Japan Diaoyu Islands conflict: Japan has always grouped the Diaoyu Islands under its management of Okinawa. In other words, when it comes to the Diaoyu Islands, comparing Japan's territory to Okinawa, regardless of the intervening distance or the land it technically belongs to, Okinawa is really the place with more reasons to care. It is also important to note that if a China-Japan military clash emerged over the Diaoyu Islands, Okinawa would be the front line, the place where the conflict would probably be fought out, and it would directly impact and threaten the lives of the Okinawans. The Okinawans are the ones who should be paying attention, but in actuality they're not! Yesterday morning, I had a temporary job handing out fliers on the street. The content advertised a Chinese language study course run by a Chinese person, specifically aimed at those Japanese who want to learn Chinese. I handed out the fliers from eight o'clock to 10 o'clock in the morning in Kokusai Street (国际通), the most bustling section of road in Okinawa, and a place that people headed to work must traverse. There were seven of us, and we handed out a conservative estimate of over 1,500 fliers, and in that time we didn't come across a single Japanese who gave us any "inconvenience." In fact, there was an old woman who specifically came back to pick up an extra flier, saying she wanted to bring a copy to someone else, too. If right at that moment, back in my country, a Japanese were handing out Japanese study fliers on Wangfujing [a major shopping street in Beijing], would the result be like this? I went to the car dealer very early this morning to learn to ride a motorcycle, and out of over a hundred people, I think I was the only foreigner. Of course, to the teacher showing me how to practice, it was clear I was from China. Before I went, I was nervous, worried that the Japanese might give me a hard time and not let me pass the test smoothly. I actually thought about it a lot, and they really didn't treat me like those "compatriots" in China who treat people [differently] based on what country they are from. There was nothing special about how they acted toward me. There were a few times when obstacles came up because of the language exchange, but they personally gave demonstrations, and in the end I smoothly passed the test. During this time, something happened. I noticed something in particular: 12 o'clock to one o'clock in the afternoon was rest time, so I sat resting in the hallway at the car dealer, and the TV happened to be broadcasting the Diaoyu Islands conflict, and in detail reported the number of our Chinese "fishery boats," the navigation paths, etc. Simultaneously, they were broadcasting pictures from our country's anti-Japanese travel demonstrations. This was important news related to a territory dispute, but I realized not even a few of the Japanese around me were watching this news. Even those Japanese who I was watching the news with didn't express any ideas or opinions about it from start to finish. I couldn't fathom it. If this piece of news were playing in a Chinese restaurant, a group of people would long ago have started commenting one after another and haranguing. But here, nothing! Okinawans, do you mean to say you don't care about politics, don't care about the present situation, don't care about something happening right next to you? Of course that's not the case. At my university, you can often see an enormous bulletin board, and it's covered with organizations rallying students to participate in "anti-American military base" protests. Data shows that currently, of the 50,000 American soldiers stationed in Japan, half are stationed in Okinawa. This year, as of September 9, a seaside park in Ginowan (宜野湾), Okinawa prefecture held a large-scale gathering rarely seen in recent years with 100,000 participants. The activity's aim: Opposing American military deployment of the MV-22 Osprey at the Futenma (普天间) airport in this city. The demonstrating masses demanded cancellation of Osprey deployment and even the shut down of Futenma airport. What everyone knows, however, is that the American military's deployment of the MV-22 Osprey is obviously related to the sustained anxiety surrounding the China-Japan situation in recent days. There's no way the Okinawans don't know this, so why do they oppose it? And furthermore, they want to shut down the airports. In the course of this, if by chance there are hostilities, it won't help them at all. Have you ever seen a country's people in large-scale gatherings actually demanding military airports to be shut down while they face the flames of war, the smoke of gunpowder? And yet, this is exactly what Okinawans are doing! There is only one reason: They are worried this kind of airplane threatens their safety. What do we make of the hundred thousand Okinawans confronting American military bases in large-scale demonstrations? At our university, I have already come across quite a few Japanese students who have been to China. Once they know I'm from China, they all "show off" and use Chinese to give a self-introduction, and then in stilted tones say China's food is delicious, and so spicy! They do this in a very friendly way. Last Wednesday night, I was chatting with a Japanese student visiting from Tokyo, and in March he had gone to Shanghai University to study Chinese for a month. At the dining table, we chatted straight from nine at night to one in the morning, and I asked: "How did your impressions differ before you went to China and after you left?" He said: "There were major differences. After I went, I realized China was fun, that I really liked China, that I want to go back to travel." That is exactly what he said to me. Saying this, I just want to remind my comrades: Beating up ordinary Japanese back in China just closes the last door to exchange among our people.     | |||||||||||||||
| Posted: 18 Sep 2012 09:26 AM PDT The Chinese government has set new price regulations for pharmaceutical drugs. This new price cut comes amid the country's attempt to overhaul the health-care system. The Wall Street Journal reports:
This is only the most recent price cut in pharmaceutical drugs. According to Business Week, China has cut prices more than 20 times since 2000:
As the government continues to cut drug prices, there has been some concern over the impact on drug companies' profit margins, but drug companies with higher diversification in the pharmaceutical market will be less affected. From Reuters:
See also China's Battle for Drug Safety, via CDT. © Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| China Car Makers Cut Corners to Success Posted: 18 Sep 2012 09:19 AM PDT As the presence of cars in China grows, foreign automakers have tried to tap into the market's increasing demand. Despite the recent slump in auto sales as consumers wait for discounts, Chinese automakers are cutting corners to achieve success. From Reuters:
China's safety protocol does not require a certain number of crash tests for domestically produced cars, which results in the lasting popularity of foreign cars among consumers. While Japanese car makers, such as Nissan, have experienced a dip in sales due to the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and Anti-Japan Protests, other automakers have been reporting profits in the Chinese market. According to Yonhap News, Kia Motors, a South Korean automaker, ranks 7th in China's market:
© Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| Nationalism and the China-Japan Island Disputes Posted: 18 Sep 2012 07:59 AM PDT  Professor Yinan He, an expert on Sino-Japanese relations, offers her assessment on the ongoing crisis over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In the past week mass protests against Japan's nationalization of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have swept Chinese cities across both coastal and inland areas, unprecedented since 2005 when many Chinese took to the streets to oppose Japan's revision of history textbooks that whitewashed its wartime aggression. Since then, the damage has been slowly mended thanks to years of painstaking diplomatic efforts on both sides. But in no time things have been pushed back to square one—or even worse. Both long-standing historical grievances powered by nationalist indoctrination and the emerging shift of power in the region account for the new escalation of tension. It all seems to have started in April when the hawkish governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, made a bid to purchase the islands. The central government then stepped in with a nationalization deal. But attentive watchers of Sino-Japanese relations can find deeper roots of the recent crisis. One may point to the previous flare-up two years ago as a trigger for Ishihara's move. In that incident Tokyo attempted to prosecute the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that collided with Japanese Coast Guard ships near the islands, but ultimately submitted to Beijing's high-handed diplomacy. A more profound cause of mutual animosity is the decades of nationalist preaching in both countries about a traumatic war they fought from 1937 to 1945, as explained in my book. In an effort to salvage the weakened legitimacy of the Communist regime, patriotic propaganda emphasizing Japanese wartime atrocities and heroic Chinese resistance have since the 1980′s replaced the tired communist ideology. It fueled victim consciousness and a sense of entitlement toward Japan among the Chinese. Meanwhile, with its economic miracle stunted and political reform stagnating, many Japanese politicians played to nationalist groups in order to boost national confidence and win popular votes. While pacifism and the Japanese feeling of war guilt used to keep anti-Chinese nationalism marginal, the old culture has gradually faded, much due to people's anxiety about an increasingly powerful and assertive China in East Asia. When an ancient feud is inflamed by new fears, overreactions occur. Not only are the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China the largest and vandalism the worst since the two countries normalized relations in 1972, but Chinese surveillance ships also entered Japan's claimed territorial waters near the islands, hiking the danger of a military clash. Should armed conflicts erupt, the U.S. would have to intervene based on its alliance commitment to Japan, which is about the last thing that Washington wants to do at the moment. But given Japanese public sentiment and oppositional pressure, backpedalling is hardly conceivable for Tokyo. Beijing's hands are equally tied, as it faces the dilemma of either appearing soft-kneed if it suppresses mass protests too harshly, or suffering damage to China's social stability and international image should the chaos drag on. The timing is also highly sensitive as China's leadership transition is pending in an upcoming party congress. How to resolve the crisis would be a critical test for both the outgoing leaders concerned with their legacies and new leaders keen on demonstrating their credentials. Restraint is what is needed for all parties, but it will have to be exercised on the condition of saving face for both Beijing and Tokyo. Symbolic gestures for domestic consumption aside, concrete actions must be taken immediately in order to quell the extremists at home. Back in 2005, Beijing was able to end the three-week-long anti-Japanese demonstrations without event, a decent record that can be replicated. And Hong Kong activists who landed on the islands in mid-August have been told that their ship was not fit for a repeat journey. Further provocations can also be prevented by an explicit pledge by Tokyo to prohibit landing by Japanese nationals and to refrain from developing infrastructure on the islands. Still, a fundamental solution to the island disputes and other outstanding problems between China and Japan is to confront the monster of xenophobic nationalism that has fed on historical myth and that has been emboldened by the uncertain future of the region. Wise leaders of a rising China and of a Japan wishing for a rebound should not let emotional prejudices eclipse their larger shared interests. | |||||||||||||||
| Sensitive Words: Trials, Looting and Liver Cancer Posted: 18 Sep 2012 08:49 AM PDT As of September 18, the following search terms are blocked on Sina Weibo (not including the "search for user" function): Other:
© Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| Translation: 15 Feel-Good Internet Stories From China Posted: 18 Sep 2012 07:43 AM PDT All hope isn't lost. With China making headlines for bridge collapses, violent protests, and greedy or indifferent officialdom, it's easy to forget the thousands of kind and decent gestures that occur in every country, every day. Recently, user @揭露社会黑与白, which literally means "uncovering society's black and white," tweeted the following series of images and explanations. Many of these stories are not new, having made the rounds on the Chinese Web for months. Yet the collection of images quickly went viral, garnering over 24,000 retweets. Perhaps what some commenters said is true: Chinese society "needs these real sentiments" right about now. Tea Leaf Nation translates selected images.     | |||||||||||||||
| Postcard from demonstration at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing Posted: 18 Sep 2012 05:37 AM PDT  | |||||||||||||||
| Posted: 18 Sep 2012 05:48 AM PDT Over the past several weeks updates to this blog have been regrettably sparse. I've been laying the groundwork for two long-term From now on I'll be hosting a regular podcast at Economic Observer where I chat with people doing interesting work in China. It will be a bit different than the content on this blog. In keeping with EO's general content, most guests will be business-related; from execs at multinational corporations down to mom and pop startups (whom I find equally interesting). But I'll certainly have occasional politically and socially-oriented guests. For instance, I've already recorded an episode with Daniel Bell, where I ask what was up with those recent op-eds in NYT and CSM. The premise will usually be to explore how these people ended up in China and how they've tried to navigate China's consistently inconsistent market. But it's also meant to look at the wider industries/fields that the guests are part of; altogether lasting about 15-20 minutes. In the first episode I speak with an internet security consultant turned Beijing's first microbrewer. We talk about the countless roadblocks involved with setting up shop, whether the dream is dead for young people trying to do business in China's increasingly foreigner-unfriendly market, and finally discuss China's wider alcohol industry. That episode and all future ones can be downloaded here. Some of the other tentative guests I've lined up are a green urban planner, a film director who's done a US-China co-production, the man who oversaw the NBA's expansion in China from 2003-2008 and is now trying to bring Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) to the country, and a guy who started a magazine, a guitar shop and plays in a Beijing Beatles cover band on the side. As you might imagine, I'm not an expert in any of these fields. I don't intend to make podcasts that are figure-heavy or full of content that would only interest businessmen. I'll try to make them smart, but accessible and story-oriented. As I mentioned, I'm also in the early stages of another big China project, but I'm a LONG ways away from announcing that one. As far as this blog goes, I'd love to pretend like the frequency of updates won't be affected, but it already has been. This is a one man operation, so I hope you'll understand if there's a slightly less steady stream of updates for a while. Anyways, thanks for reading (and hopefully listening). Now back to your regular sociopolitical speculation…   | |||||||||||||||
| The Daily Twit – 9/18/12: National Day of Humiliescalation Posted: 18 Sep 2012 05:09 AM PDT Once again today, the news was almost completely dominated by the spat between Japan and China over some real estate out in the ocean. The added twist was that today was the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident, which precipitated Japan's occupation of China, which lasted until the end of World War II. Put that together with the ongoing territorial dispute, and you've got the potential for some scary shit. However, as it turns out, the government kept a pretty good lid on this volatile situation. They didn't exactly discourage these protests, but from what I can tell, the property damage and violence has been kept to a minimum. No idea where this is going after today. For now, here's a fairly long list of mostly "naked" links for you. With a few exceptions, no descriptions are needed, as most of these reports overlap in their coverage of today's protests and the underlying dispute. Diplomat: For China and Japan: The Perfect Distraction? — a discussion of the political context in both China and Japan, raising a classic "wag the dog" scenario. NPR: China Ratchets Up The Rhetoric In Island Spat With Japan — audio report filed by Beijing correspondent Louisa Lim. Guardian: China-Japan row over disputed islands threatens to escalate Sydney Morning Herald: Storm intensifies as China threatens Japan with sanctions Economist: Rising tensions in the East China Sea - Avoiding escalation Foreign Policy: Dangerous Waters Reuters: Anti-Japan protests reignite across China on occupation anniversary MarketWatch: More Japanese firms suspend China operations — The chatter about these protests and what they mean for foreign invested companies in China is going to go on for months. Some multinationals will definitely be reassessing risk, and not just the Japanese firms. Financial Times: China/Japan row: business feels the heat Bloomberg: Protests to Hurt Japan Car Sales in China, Dealer Group Says Guardian: Japan and China: ghosts of the past Reuters: Chinese firms wave the flag to cash in on Japan tension — Eyebrows were raised today when China search giant Baidu went full nationalist, with a Diaoyu Islands doodle and a special mini-site with a game and other information. Next Web: Baidu explains its Diaoyu doodle: Planting a digital flag is better than throwing rocks — Baidu responded to questions with some pretty good spin, although I'm not sure how persuasive it will be, particularly to their business partners in Japan. Wall Street Journal: Net Neutrality? Baidu Plants its Flag on Disputed Islands. In other news: If it wasn't for the Japan protests, the press would have been all over the trial of Wang Lijun, former police chief who flirted with defecting to the U.S. and who, by accusing Gu Kailai of murder, brought about the downfall of Bo Xilai. His trial, which was closed to the public yesterday, finished up with an open hearing today. Guardian: China concludes trial of flamboyant police chief The Age: Police chief's dash for freedom triggered a landslide – Narrative of the facts behind Wang's overnight trip to the U.S. consulate and struggle with Bo Xilai by John Garnaut, whose reporting from Chongqing on this story has been superlative. Business Insider: The 12 Politicians Battling For Control Of China — Here's a user-friendly primer on China's top politicians, a good way for newbies to prep for the upcoming Party Congress. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| Wang Accepts Charges as Trial Ends Posted: 18 Sep 2012 02:52 AM PDT After a secret proceedings in the trial of former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun started a day early on Monday, John Garnaut of The Sydney Morning Herald reports that the trial of Bo Xilai's one-time right hand man in Chengdu ended around lunchtime on Tuesday:
Garnaut adds that Wang may avoid a death sentence after cooperating in the investigations of Bo and his wife, Gu Kailai, who last month was found guilty of murdering British businessman Neil Heywood. In a separate piece filed today, Garnaut recounts what we know about Wang's February dash to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, and ponders whether the trial will reveal any more details:
China Daily has more on today's trial:
Read more about Wang Lijun, Bo Xilai, and Gu Kailai via CDT. © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us  | |||||||||||||||
| Hairless Apes Fighting Over Coconuts: the Islands Dispute Heats Up Posted: 18 Sep 2012 01:25 AM PDT
On the other hand, there is the nationalism aspect to all this, which has culminated in the numerous protests all over the country against Japanese diplomatic missions and, to a lesser extent, commercial establishments. This has been going on for a few days now, but today we may have reached peak activity. Keep in mind that all this stems from a disagreement over a bunch of wet rocks in the ocean to which we can't even refer by a single name at risk of offending someone. If you're new to this topic, let that sink in. We're already at the point where diplomatic relations between China and Japan have been seriously affected, businesses have been hurt, some people have been physically assaulted, and even the stock market has taken a hit. All because of some "islands" that probably won't even be around much longer if climate change continues apace, ironically because of a lack of international consensus on solutions. Doesn't say a lot for us hairless apes, does it? As the British poet Ray Davies wrote:
Indeed. What is nationalism, after all, but tribalism writ large? We human beings, despite leaving the hunter-gatherer lifestyle and congregating into political entities with millions of others, have found it quite difficult to shed our old monkey ways. Granted, I'm no fan of nationalism. I find it inexplicable that anyone would express "love" for a nation just because they were born/grew up/lived there. A simple twist of fate, certainly no reason to develop such a deep-seated emotional attachment. An intellectual preference for a certain form of government or legal system, maybe. An enjoyment of a specific climate, geography, language or cuisine, perhaps. But a "love" for a nation state? I don't get it, but that's what tribalism is all about I suppose. It doesn't have to make sense. We should probably separate nationalism from patriotism, though. I think history has shown that the former has been a whole lot of trouble. Ask Europe how the whole nation-state experiment is working out for it. Patriotism is slightly different, though. Actions stemming from patriotic sentiment may be good or bad. Soldiers defend their countries because of patriotism. Individuals devote their lives to public service to better the lives of their fellow citizens. Even some of those Olympic athletes we all enjoyed watching last month in London were motivated by patriotism. All well and good. At the same time, though, patriotism has given us things like war crimes, censorship and the utter stupidity of Freedom Fries. And now, because of a dispute over the ownership of these rocks, some folks are expressing their patriotism by burning Toyota automobiles. That's just swell. I do sympathize with the tribal instincts of individuals, which after all are hard-wired. Only a few generations ago, we were swinging from the trees in our little monkey social groups, and we have a long way to go before we can eradicate, through education, the anthropological baggage of tribalism and racism. But when it comes to the decisions of groups, that's another thing entirely. People have irrational thoughts and, on occasion, do stupid things. Nations, corporations and other artificial entities should be held to a higher standard. You'd think that with the collective wisdom of hundreds of millions of individuals, nation states would avoid things like unjustified wars, genocide, or fighting over small stones in large bodies of water. But alas, nations often cater to the lowest common denominator, often deliberately angering their rivals to score cheap political points at home. Why did Japan purchase some of these islands last week? Why did China establish an administrative office on a different set of islands (another dispute), deliberately signalling its incorporation of that territory? Hell, for that matter, why are Obama and Romney stuck in a China bashing contest? Monkey see, monkey do, particularly when all the other monkeys are susceptible to populist stump speeches. There are plenty of folks out there who derive pleasure from seeing their "team" win. Works the same way with sports and international relations. And even if you wouldn't normally consider yourself an ardent nationalist, that's where peer pressure comes in. The last piece of the puzzle is naked opportunism. When governments appeal to patriotic sentiment, or when politicians publicly profess their love of the nation, there's usually a reason for it, an ulterior motive. Otherwise, why for example would China and Japan waste so much time, energy and resources on some rocks and fish? Writing in The Diplomat about the motivation behind all this, Trefor Moss observes:
What their particular goals are is up for interpretation, but all you have to do is go out on the street here in Beijing and watch hundreds of folks shuffle along outside the Japanese Embassy to know that the mind games are working. And what are we to do with the actions of entities like Baidu, China's number one search engine? For whatever reason, Baidu, despite having operations in Japan, thought it was in their best interest to plant its flag firmly in the nationalist camp today. As was reported on the Shanghaiist blog:
Far be it from me to criticize a business decision, but I'm not sure how this is going to help Baidu break free from the image of it as a limited, China-only company. When push comes to shove, you gotta stick with your troop. By the way, "troop" is the formal term for a group of monkeys. So where do I come down on this dispute? Which troop deserves to keep all those juicy coconuts? I guess at the end of the day, my opinion keeps shuttling between "wearily amused" and "annoyed" that this is even happening. The unfortunate part of all this, however, is that no matter which dominant male monkey ends up on top of the palm tree flinging his feces triumphantly, the rest of us down on the ground have to deal with the fallout. After the past few days of these uncomfortable displays of knee-jerk nationalism, perhaps Tokyo and Beijing will realize that this dispute needs to end. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTION: Causes and Consequences Posted: 18 Sep 2012 12:58 AM PDT Picking up where this story left off last week (Sept. 13 post), two reasons stand out at first glance for pan-democrats' failure to do better in the September 9 Legislative Council (Legco) election. One is the compound effects of their own error-filled campaigns, for which they have no one to blame but themselves; the other is the near flawless performance orchestrated by their pro-Beijing opponents. The latter's success story is especially ironic since elections are the stuff of pan-democrats' dreams and ideals whereas their opponents have taken up the task only out of necessity, as a survival strategy given the Basic Law's "eventual universal suffrage" mandate that resulted from the pre-1997 Sino-British negotiations. THE PRO-BEIJING JUGGERNAUT This success story has been in the making since pro-Beijing candidates first came out to contest elections in the 1990s, but their achievement in mastering all the tricks of the electioneering trade did not become apparent until the 2004 Legislative Council election when pro-Beijing forces were able to hold back the tide of voters still angry in the aftermath of 2003. Organization, coordination, and discipline make up the formula that pan-democrats cannot and do not want to emulate because it derives from a unified command structure that violates the values they espouse. But propelling that formula is a clear sense of mission: the pro-Beijing camp knows where it's going and what it wants, namely, "one-country, one-system" full integration for Hong Kong with the mainland by 2047 at the latest. The aim is pursued in many ways most notably via the cross-border movement of money and people. Less apparent is the arena of government and politics: from above, with Beijing jealously guarding its power of appointment for all Hong Kong's leading officials; and from below, via people power and elections. Pan-democrats mistakenly assume they still have a lock on this basic level because they once did. But they do no longer and if they can't get their diverse acts together in time for the next 2015/16 election cycle they seem set to lose their shrinking vote-count majorities as well. As for their opponents, the pro-Beijing camp not only knows where it's going but thinks it has learned how to get there as well, by winning as many District Council and Legislative Council seats as possible. This goal has now been partly achieved with majorities on all 18 District Councils, won through a skillful emphasis on livelihood issues and the a-political provision of social services for target constituencies, plus alliances with conservative neighborhood-level groups and leaders. The 2010 political reform package was designed to build on this basic foundation of the pro-Beijing camp's success by using it as a platform for indirect election to the Legislative Council, which is the next target. Besides all the funding they can possibly use, the resources necessary for this ambitious task are also already in place, beginning with the discipline provided by a still unacknowledged "underground" communist party branch. Its above-ground electoral wing is the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), which has grown rapidly in recent years to its present 20,000 members making it by far the largest political party in Hong Kong. Added to this mass-based political party is a genuine grassroots organization with a history to match dating back to 1949. This is the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) that claims 300+ affiliated unions with about 300,000 members. But unlike the existence of the local communist party branch, and the provenance of the 2010 District Council "takeover-from below" political reform strategy, plans for the September 9 election were no secret. DAB vice-chairman Horace Cheung spelled them out at an open academic forum last spring (Aug. 29 post). He said they saw how the Democratic Party used proportional representation to win more seats with fewer votes than the DAB in 2008. He also told how the pro-Beijing camp meant to turn the tables by using the same strategy, which is exactly what they did. The DAB and FTU ran multiple coordinated lists in all five electoral districts, but they did so with care … not randomly on a whim like pro-democracy free-lance candidates are prone to do. Candidate lists were positioned to maximize gains while minimizing "wasted" excess votes. Their only miscalculation within Hong Kong's five election districts was New Territories East where pan-democrats performed better than expected. In that district two DAB lists won but the FTU list lost and so did an allied candidate whose campaign did its best to hide her Civil Force/DAB affiliations. The Geographic Constituencies: 5 districts, 35 seats, 67 lists, 216 candidates
Otherwise, instead of running only one-DAB list per district and hoping the transferred second votes would be enough to win two seats, the DAB ran two or three lists in three of five districts, with one each in two districts. Its FTU ally picked up the blue collar/clerical vote with one list in each of four districts. The DAB/FTU mix was so finely balanced that only the one FTU list in New Territories East failed to win a seat. None won two. The FTU had actually planned to contest in all five districts but calculated beforehand that its list could not win in Kowloon West without endangering a close ally, incumbent Pricilla Leung Mei-fun. She was one of the two ostensible independents that Ming Pao Daily "outed" on August 27 and 28 (Sept. 7 post). Her poll numbers fell sharply in the days following but soon revived. The second outed contender was Paul Tse Wai-chun in Kowloon East where the pro-Beijing camp rallied to campaign for him on street corners and ensured the even distribution of votes between their lists and his that guaranteed his victory. Besides making the right decisions beforehand based on past voter support and turnout in different districts, the even distribution of votes as Election Day nears has also been honed to an impressive degree. First are the pre-election tracking polls. Conventional wisdom has it that the 25% of respondents who regularly refuse to answer are most likely supporters of pro-Beijing candidates. The idea is not to show their hand so as to keep their opponents guessing and make it harder for them to warn their supporters. Next is the practice of voting late. Polls are open all day, Sunday, from 7:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m., but some 20% of the total turnout is registered after 6:30 p.m. The significance of this late voting trend was suggested by tea-table gossip among pro-Beijing partisans shortly before Election Day. Their advice: wait for a late afternoon phone call and vote afterward, the call being messages circulated from those who are doing the calculating. By 6:00 p.m. they can estimate who has enough votes and who needs more. Pan-democrats have long blamed exit-pollsters for passing on this information and, as in past elections, advised voters not to answer their questions. But pro-Beijing camp volunteers have also long been well organized with their phone numbers and message banks. These contain the names of thousands on union membership and various service lists. They can easily monitor their voter base themselves without the surreptitious aid of professional pollsters staked out in key constituencies. The clearest case of such apparent messaging on September 9 was with the three pro-Beijing candidates among the six lists vying for the new District Council-based super seats. Ultimately, the three pan-democratic candidates won as did two of the three pro-Beijing candidates. The final tracking polls had indicated that the three pan-democrats were probably safe and so was pro-Beijing unionist Chan Yuen-han, the FTU's "queen of votes." That left the two DAB candidates, Starry Lee Wai-king and Lau Kong-wah running more or less neck-and neck … until the calls and messages reportedly went out, late-in-the-day, to sacrifice Lau for Lee. She won: 277,143 to Lau's 199,732, and she benefited from a big vote count even in his New Territories base. There might be many reasons for the final decision that might have been made by the pro-Beijing camp's central command decision-making committee. Among them is that Starry Lee is younger, outgoing, well-spoken, and provokes far fewer negative reactions among non-loyalists than the older abrasive Lau who is widely disliked. If a political choice had to be made between these two dedicated loyalists then it would have to be made in her favor. PAN-DEMOCRATS: RADICALS, RADICAL MODERATES, MODERATES, AND ALSO-RANS Amateurs at the helm are an endearing feature of young democracies; amateurs who refuse to change their ways after opponents turn professional are courting disaster and pan-democrats are now well on their way. Although they don't stand alone in this respect, two men stand out as being more responsible than others for pan-democrats' losses on September 9 and the District Councils debacle last November. But the immediate consequences of their mistakes are not the only cause for concern. More important is the failure to acknowledge reasons and explain them to the voting public. The two men are Albert Ho Chun-yan who has just resigned as chairman of the Democratic Party to accept responsibility, and Raymond Wong Yuk-man, founding father and guiding force of People Power. Albert Ho and the Democratic Party. In terms of immediate consequences, the Democratic Party suffered the worst blows leaving it with only four Geographic Constituency seats. As for Albert Ho, however, his greatest failure is that he still seems not to understand how and why he led his party to its greatest ever defeat. Certainly he did not understand, at the time, that his compromise decision on the June 2010 political reform package would lead to any such negative result. On the contrary, when they were debating the package, during the months before, when party elder Szeto Wah was still alive, they all agreed that the lure of 10 more seats added to Legco was worth the compromise. The 10 new seats, five in the directly-elected Geographic Constituencies and five in the Functional Constituencies, was part of the reform package. Democratic Party leaders argued that the party could not continue as it was and needed the extra seats to give younger members a chance to contest and win seats. Probably not until the combined blows of the last two elections did party leaders and followers finally grasp that they were no longer in a position to benefit from the new seats. Nor did their intellectual and political back-up group, the Universal Suffrage Alliance, do them any favors. Its members seemed not to appreciate the difference between indirect and direct elections and continued to keep pressing for "universal suffrage" promises when they should have been demanding definitions. In the end, Beijing did give a promise … expressed in terms that could just as easily be used to describe the mainland people's congress system with its "universal suffrage" grassroots direct elections (and indirect elections at all levels above), controlled by the communist party's organization everywhere from the bottom up. In fact, the indirect election plan being offered in the Hong Kong government's original political reform package, with DAB backing, was just such an arrangement: for indirect election from the DAB-dominated District Councils into Legco. Officials also acknowledged that the objective was to phase out all the traditional Functional Constituencies and replace them with indirectly elected District Councilors. When asked why the full implications of the government's reform package were not being debated and explained to the public, Democratic Party vice-chair Emily Lau Wai-hing drew a complete blank. In the end, when she and Albert Ho struck their deal for a universal vote to elect the five new District Council functional seats, they did not bother to explain even to other leading members of their own party that only District Councilors would be allowed to contest these seats. Enter Raymond Wong Yuk-man who took it upon himself to teach Albert Ho a lesson. Raymond Wong and People Power. He was not alone. "Don't curse the Democratic Party; teach them a lesson at the ballot box," proclaimed the lead editorial in a leading Chinese-language newspaper the day after the July 1, 2010 anniversary march. The Democratic Party's contingent had been vilified by participants and onlookers throughout the march. That ballot box lesson has just been administered although the convoluted path it took has probably done more to strengthen the pro-Beijing opposition than anything else, which was presumably not Raymond Wong's intention (despite dark rumors about his "real" motives). His first step was to break with "Long Hair" Leung Kwok-hung and his League of Social Democrats (LSD) colleagues when they baulked at breaking with the hard-won "coordination mechanism." Pan-democrats had finally agreed, in 2003, not to stand against one another just for the fun of it in District Council constituencies where the only beneficiaries would be their pro-Beijing and/or conservative opponents. This agreement lasted, with difficulty, through two election cycles … until Wong decided to break it for last November's District Councils election. He split with the LSD, set up People Power, and parachuted his energetic young followers into constituencies all over town … with the sole aim of "teaching the Democratic Party a lesson." All his parachuters naturally lost and the DAB's need to elect suitable territory-wide known names to contest the five new District Councils Functional Constituency seats further motivated its campaigns last November. Its supporters turned out in large numbers, for example, to elect Lau Kong-wah and Chan Yuen-han who parachuted back into districts they had once served. Defeated along with Raymond Wong's novices in the partisan upsurge they provoked were several big-name democrats including the Civic Party's Ronny Tong and Tanya Chan. That left pan-democrats with few choices of their own to contest the five new seats. Then, still not having learned his lesson or seeing no lesson to learn, Raymond Wong's People Power ran candidates in all five Legco election districts on September 9. These included two where their chances of doing harm to like-minded others were greater than their chances of winning. His strategy cost pan-democrats one seat in Kowloon East, and arguably another onHong Kong Island as well. Wong's initial vow not to contest the new District Council Functional seats came to nothing since he had no candidates to run. His subsequent call to cast blank ballots for those seats had little impact. Winners and Losers. Results in the five Geographic Constituencies nevertheless illustrate the full impact of the Democratic Party's defeat. Except for its four candidates who won (down from seven in 2008), all other victors had opposed Albert Ho's 2010 compromise decision. These like-minded others are now being differentiated as "radicals" (People Power and League of Social Democrats) and "radical moderates" (everyone else). The Democratic Party's decline was especially apparent in New Territories East where one legislator, Andrew Cheng Kar-foo, quit the party immediately in June 2010. He did not stand again but campaigned for like-minded candidates in the district. Virtually the entire New Territories East branch of the party also quit in 2010 and set up their own group, the New Democratic Alliance or NeoDemocrats. Its leader, Gary Fan Kwok-wai, won a seat in the district. So did a member of the newly established Labor Party, Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung. And so did People Power candidate Raymond Chan Chi-chuen who will be Hong Kong's first openly gay legislator. New Territories East is also home to the Civic Party's Ronny Tong and the Democratic Party's Emily Lau, plus Hong Kong's original radical, "Long Hair" Leung Kowk-hung, who won more votes than anyone else in the district: 48,295. Overall among pan-democrats, the "radical moderate" Civic Party emerged the biggest winner together with its Professional Commons ally. Margaret Ng successfully transferred her legal Functional Constituency seat to a safe pair of Civic Party hands. His competitor, who had boasted of collecting 800 nominating signatures from lawyers in the constituency, won 1,970 votes to Dennis Kwok's 2,528. In the Geographic Constituencies, the Civic Party won a seat in each of the five districts but these victories were marred by two bad miscalculations that did not help its candidates and did harm to others. These miscalculations followed from the risky strategy of trying to win two seats for the price of one. It worked in 2008 when the popular Audrey Eu was listed second with the aim of giving new-comer Tanya Chan a boost. In 2008, both women won. This time both lost despite raising an 11th hour emergency distress signal to get out the vote. Supporters did respond and their two lists received 70,000 votes each on Hong Kong Island and in New Territories West … not enough for a second seat in either case but way more than enough for one, which contributed to the poor pan-democratic seat-count in both constituencies. Had there been a DAB-style central command guiding hand, that 11th hour distress signal would not have been sent. The strategy nevertheless did succeed in propelling two newcomers into Legco, which is an ongoing Civic Party aim. The new names are college professor Kenneth Chan Ka-lok and Kwok Ka-ki. Dr. Kwok is a past medical Functional Constituency legislator who joined the Civic Party two years ago in a gesture of support for its strong stand on political reform. Also on Hong KongIsland, Labor Party vice-chair, Cyd Ho, again came from behind and retained her seat. But pan-democrats were hard hit in the constituency (winning three seats of seven total), not only by the Civic Party's miscalculation but also by the intrusion of too many candidates. Perennial candidate Dr. Lo Wing-lok ran a lackluster independent pro-democracy campaign that accounted for 17,000 votes. Both People Power and LSD also ran candidates and together siphoned off another 20,000 pro-democracy votes. To the extent that pro-establishment candidates venture outside their natural Functional Constituency habitat and try to contest direct elections, they exhibit the same fractious tendencies as pan-democrats. Only the communist party, it seems, has the organization and discipline necessary to run efficient winning election campaigns in Hong Kong! LEGCO STALEMATE For all that effort, the balance in the new council (27 pan-democrats of 70 total) will be much like the last (24 of 60 total), and the overall result will likely be just as dysfunctional. Pan-democrats retained their so-called veto-proof one-third minority, for whatever it's worth. But their opponents are also far from unified … except when it comes to opposing pan-democrats' political initiatives. On labor and livelihood issues, pro-Beijing unionists are more likely to vote with pro-democracy labor legislators than with others in the combined pro-Beijing/pro-establishment camp where middle class and big business interests prevail. It is also not quite the whole truth to dismiss Legco as a powerless platform for debate and protest within an executive-led system. Councilors cannot table bills and motions on their own and if they do receive permission, the two-house voting mechanism kicks in. This means a majority of BOTH Functional Constituency AND Geographic Constituency legislators, VOTING SEPARATELY, are needed for passage. That mechanism has worked to defeat virtually all pro-democracy political initiatives. Nevertheless, legislative approval is needed for all government bills, which can be subjected to indefinite delays while debates and committee-stage negotiations continue. People Power's recent filibustering performance is only the most extreme example of Legco's nuisance value in the administration's eyes. But that value can also be useful in promoting pro-democracy causes. That means there is a legislative cost to pay for pan-democrats' amateur electioneering habits that until now seems not to have bothered them too much. DAB chairman Tam Yiu-chung rubbed salt in the wounds during a post-election victory lap through his New Territories West constituency where pan-democrats' mismanaged campaigns cost them seats. Tam said he plans to table a motion that would ban filibustering in the next Legco. All he needs is one more vote in his half of the chamber where pan-democrats will occupy 18 seats and pro-Beijing/pro-establishment legislators 17 (see table, Sept. 13 post). If pan-democrats cared a little more about their camp as a whole and a little less about its individual parts, they could have won four more seats to use in blocking such efforts: two in Tam's New Territories West constituency, plus one in Kowloon East, and another on Hong Kong Island. Probably, until recently, pan-democrats thought they had time to entrench their "Hong Kong values" before what all agree is to become one-system full integration by 2047. The government's new compulsory political education course for all school children has provided a wake-up call and the September 9 election provided another. Pro-democracy voters have, in any case, now delivered their verdict and among their choices all but the Democratic Party's legislators are politicians who seem likely to stand up and stay standing as pressures grow. Specifically, they have all identified the need to block political education and Article 23 national political security legislation as their bottom line in safeguarding Hong Kong's essential core value freedoms of political expression. But lucky for Hong Kongers who care about such things that they have learned the value of feet-on-the-ground as a fall-back line of defense for use just in case their politicians and legislators fail to protect them. |
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