Blogs » Politics » Gold Mooncakes Smell of Corruption
Blogs » Politics » Gold Mooncakes Smell of Corruption |
- Gold Mooncakes Smell of Corruption
- Forensic Expert Explains Challenge to Heywood Story
- Photo: Megaphone, by Christopher Cherry
- Drawing the News: Evil Kungfu Panda and More
- Paranoia and Superiority, the Twin Symptoms of Neo-Imperialist BS
- With Bo Purged, Netizens Call For Fuller Reckoning of the Past
- With Bo Xilai’s Ouster Official, Chinese Netizens Ask What (Really) Happened
- New Caledonia: Political Tension Grows Over Rights to Nickel Mines
- How China’s “Reincarnation Party” Takes Aim at Online Censors
- Bo Xilai Expelled from Party, Will Face Criminal Charges (Updated)
- The Daily Twit – 9/28/12: It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like National Day
- 18th Party Congress to Begin November 8th
- Labor NGOs: Growing Pains
- China Bashing, Yet Another Reason the Republican Base Doesn’t Like Mitt Romney
Gold Mooncakes Smell of Corruption Posted: 28 Sep 2012 10:50 PM PDT As the Mid-Autumn Festival coincides with a backlash against conspicuous luxury goods, Xinhua's Hu Tao and Yuan Ruting note a whiff of corruption emanating from gift sets of solid gold mooncakes:
Another set of mooncakes recently drew attention for the virulently anti-Japanese slogans with which they were decorated. As Victor Mair wrote at Language Log, these included "the strange incitement to 'Bite Little Japan to Death!' [which] may have been inspired by the morbid thought that, with each bite of a mooncake, patriotic Chinese should imagine that they are biting 'Little Japan(ese)'." On Thursday, Tania Branigan explained the mooncake tradition at The Guardian, including measures already taken against excessively lavish gift sets:
© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Forensic Expert Explains Challenge to Heywood Story Posted: 28 Sep 2012 10:27 PM PDT This week, senior forensic scientist Wang Xuemei published a blog post challenging the official explanation for the death of British businessman Neil Heywood. Gu Kailai, whose husband Bo Xilai will now face charges related to the case, was said at her trial to have poisoned Heywood with cyanide, but Wang declared that the evidence did not support this conclusion, asking "who had the most to gain from Neil Heywood's death?" The original blog post was quickly removed, but a cached version survives. On Friday, Wang put up another post explaining why she had spoken out. From a partial translation by Josh Chin at China Real Time:
© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Photo: Megaphone, by Christopher Cherry Posted: 28 Sep 2012 07:00 PM PDT © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Drawing the News: Evil Kungfu Panda and More Posted: 28 Sep 2012 05:29 PM PDT This week, Drawing the News showcases political cartoons on the anti-Japan protests, CCTV's attempt at populism and official corruption: Artist: Rebel Pepper (via Over the Wall) Rebel Pepper comments on the vigor of recent anti-Japan protests following Japan's purchase of three of the Diaoyu Islands. He notes that the mob's reaction to Japan mirrors perennial anger with the "Old Monk" (the Dalai Lama). When pro-Tibet demonstrations hounded Olympic torchbearers in 2008, Heilongjiang provincial websites were instructed to direct patriotic discussions at the "Dalai clique's secessionist forces."
Artist: Kuang Biao Anti-Japan protesters can be as viciously patriotic as they wish, but they are not permitted to inject any domestic issues into their list of demands. The dispute is a convenient distraction from the evergreen problems of poverty and corruption in China. "Patriotic fervor" won't improve people's lives any more than a little Chinese flag will help a beggar on the street. Artist: David 8th Generation (via AmazeNews) CCTV's flagship evening news show, Xinwen Lianbo (News Simulcast), just announced an updated format which will include more "people's voices" (民生) in its reporting. David 8th Generation (@大家画大卫8世) drew this cartoon to "congratulate" Xinwen Lianbo on the change. The eye at the top represents the show's current programming. The format change will not open anyone's eyes. Artist: Sinking Stone "Watch Brother" Yang Dacai lost his job after smiling at the scene of a horrific truck crash and brandishing multiple luxury watches. Consciously or not, he is now pulling other officials down with him. Sinking Stone imagines a sinister Kungfu Panda, ready to pounce from his perch atop a government stamp and then hightail it to the U.S. with his green card. "What goes around comes around," reads the caption. "Who doesn't own a few watches?" Artist: Dashix "Subconsciously striking you is like swatting a fly!" exclaims the cartoon version of Liaoning police officer Zhang Yan. Zhang and a crew of construction workers battled a farming family at the scene of a forced demolition in the town of Panjin. One villager, Wang Shujie, allegedly set himself on fire and rushed at Zhang with a sickle. Zhang then says he "subconsciously fired his gun" six times, killing Wang. Cradled in Zhang's broken arm, Rebel Pepper will have none of it. Irene Hsiao contributed translation. © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Paranoia and Superiority, the Twin Symptoms of Neo-Imperialist BS Posted: 28 Sep 2012 05:04 PM PDT Imperial overstretch, also known as Imperial overreach, is a hypothesis which suggests that an empire can extend itself beyond its ability to maintain or expand its military and economiccommitments. The idea was popularised by Yale University historian Paul Kennedy in his 1987 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. An Overstretched Empire feels the pressure of its own inadequacies from all directions. Thus, it feels that it's always the Strongest, and yet never Strong enough. The Overstretch causes a kind of internal bipolar self-identity, from which it views the rest of the world as inferior and yet simultaneously with great fear.
The Duality of Imperial Overstretch compels a true empire to continue to seek the source of its inadequacies to control/destroy them, endlessly, like a compulsive obsessive mental basket case, even when it is apparent to itself that such efforts are pointless and counterproductive. Why? Because to acknowledge its true bipolarity of inadequacies, is to acknowledge that both its identities are false and morally unsustainable. The true identity of a nation is usually that it is no more exceptional than any other nation, all subject to rise and fall of history's whims. It is this humble reality, that the West failed to learn when its Imperialist era collapses, because they barely acknowledged the falseness of their 1 bipolar imperialist identity, the STRONG ego, but desperately clung onto the other Paranoid fear of not strong enough through the Era of the Cold War. Thus, when the Cold War passed, the strong EGO identity returned with a vengeance. The West "won" the Cold War. They were Superior again! And still simultaneously paranoid again!! Bipolar, Neo-Imperialist, AGAIN! No more evident of such bipolarity is in the 1980′s US fear of Japan's rise of economic power, and today's fear of China's resurgence. In public and in private, the West simultaneous fear and ridicule the rise of the "other". No more evident of such is in the coverage of China in the Western media, where similar sets of facts can mean completely opposite things. For example, if a bunch of protests occur in China, depending on the situation, it can be interpreted (or reinterpreted) as either that (1) the Chinese government is completely losing control of its population, or that (2) the Chinese government is brutally and inhumanely efficient in controlling its population (planned protests). Another example, by above example, it can be interpreted (or reinterpreted) as either that (1) the Chinese people yearn to be "free" and cannot be controlled, or that (2) the Chinese people are mindless "drones" so easily controlled. How can 2 completely opposite conclusions be concluded from the similar sets of facts by the Western media?? Because they depend on which bipolar neo-Imperialist identity is looking at the facts. Consequently, how the West reacts to the rest of the World is either of Paternalistic Condescension (along with denigrating "conditions" attached), or Militant threats. There is no balance in this. No Smart or Balanced hard power vs. soft power. It is just two sides of the same Imperialist "value". The trouble with dealing with such Bipolar Psychopathic powers is, No one, not even the Empires, can predict which side will be in charge in the next minute.
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With Bo Purged, Netizens Call For Fuller Reckoning of the Past Posted: 28 Sep 2012 03:25 PM PDT The widely-publicized Party expulsion of Bo Xilai has not just made China's netizens angry; it's made them tired. Commenters have called for a final reckoning with the awful legacy of Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution in hopes of ending China's ongoing legacy of sensational political strife. One post by liberal columnist Zhao Chu @赵楚 on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter drew recent attention. In his post, Zhao urged netizens to look at the complete picture of Bo's rise to power, attributing three factors to his earlier success: "Bo Xilai has totally failed, but people should reflect. Bo didn't just fall out of the sky. He climbed up the ladder step by step, his wife, family members, and lackeys did so many bad things for more than 10 years, this is not happenstance. A political environment that has never fully reckoned with the Cultural Revolution or Chinese history, a law that lacks a strong supervisory voice [and faces] strong pressure from dictatorial methods; [and a central government that has lost its authority and gives local government too much power]; this overall situation has provided the fertile soil giving rise to Bo." [1] A number of users responded in agreement, calling for a "reckoning" or "clearing" of the "poisonous legacy" of the Cultural Revolution. @无码的视界 alluded to the sensational trial of the Gang of Four which signaled the end to China's Cultural Revolution, remarking, "I hope this is the last of court politics. If the system is not changed, the Cultural Revolution could return at any time." Other netizens observed rhetorical similarities between the charges against Bo and those commonly leveled during the Cultural Revolution. @小费同学Fernando pointed out that "the wording is the same as during the Cultural Revolution…the techniques are exactly the same." Not all netizens were weary of the purges yet, ironically because many Weibo users seem to believe that (those purge-happy) Cultural Revolution sympathizers and Mao-era leftists remain rife within the Communist Party. As @十立方concisely put, "Although internal conflict is no cause to celebrate, I'd also like to see Cultural Revolution enthusiasts kicked out." His tweet echoed a trend of comments on Weibo in which users continue to believe that Cultural Revolution sympathizers and Mao-era leftists remain within the Party. @宋希荣 argued that the Chinese government needs to take a more proactive approach to weeding them out, tweeting: "If we let such a person into power, returning to the era of the Cultural Revolution is not really far off." Tying Bo Xilai to the reemergence of leftist protesters during the anti-Japanese demonstrations of the past two weeks, user @若尔盖天边外 believed the current social climate proves "the need to completely eliminate every kind of national remnant of the Cultural Revolution."[2] In light of these recent resurgences, many netizens feel a need to collectively acknowledge the hardships of the decade lost to the Cultural Revolution. Understanding and moving past it is the only way China can move forward, says @Famously-anonymous: "If we don't completely clear the history of the Cultural Revolution, there is no way that we can reform." @Vertigo- supported this by writing, "If we don't thoroughly reflect on the Cultural Revolution, then all the efforts we put into the development of China will be like dancing with shackles." What now seems certain is that any official who attempts to revitalize the political fervor and broad social changes that characterized the Cultural Revolution will meet a swift end. Alluding to Chongqing reforms under Bo Xilai, such as the "Sing Red and Strike Black" campaign, which focused on crime-fighting and the restoration of Mao-era songs and slogans, @南腔北调AB tweeted a reminder for future officials to be cognizant of the social climate before trying to implement sweeping changes: "Bo did not see the current social trends, he attempted to restore the power of the Cultural Revolution. The inevitable result was a fall from power." @左健_腐草 agreed, writing that Bo Xilai "deserved it." Although many netizens took Bo Xilai's downfall as an opportunity to repudiate the Cultural Revolution, the fact that they felt the need to do so decades after it had been declared a disaster proves that its legacy continues to permeate Chinese society. In part, its memory is kept alive on the Chinese Internet, even though most netizens hail from the post-Mao era. As @飞上蓝天390 simply put, "The seeds of the Cultural Revolution are profound."[3] Footnotes (? returns to text) |
With Bo Xilai’s Ouster Official, Chinese Netizens Ask What (Really) Happened Posted: 28 Sep 2012 12:24 PM PDT The purge is on. Bo Xilai, a former Chinese power-broker whose family's rise was torpedoed by a weakness for bribery, backstabbing, and killing people, is now out—or as the Chinese might say, "ao te" (奥特)–of China's Communist Party. On China's Weibo platforms, the country's major online gathering places for speech and debate, the Bo-related comments have come rolling in. On Sina Weibo, a search for recent tweets mentioning "Bo Xilai" returned nearly 7 million results. Prominent users across the platforms have demanded (but likely won't get) more information, searching available sources for clues. Liu Jian, (@刘坚), Editor in Chief of the Economic Observer, wrote: "From Dalian to Liaoning, from Liaoning to the Ministry of Commerce, from the Ministry of Commerce to Chongqing, Bo Xilai brought disease wherever he went. What does this approximately 20-year career track show? [If] Bo Xilai was poor at managing people, [does that not mean] that every level of government was also imprudent in managing Bo? Does this type of phenomenon not require reflection? Shouldn't we seek out who's responsible?" [1] Meanwhile, the acting editor of the Open Times @吴铭 recalled an incident that now seems to have foreshadowed the brash Bo's fall: "According to information from Hong Kong's Wenhui News, on the morning of January 10, Bo Xilai met with 18 reporters in Chongqing. A reporter from China Central Television asked, 'If your role were to change at the 18th Party Congress, how would you ensure that Chongqing continues to reform in the direction that you've set?' Bo Xilai quickly answered, 'I am a short-sighted person, I generally don't plan for anything six months away.' Everybody laughed. [2] Speaking of foreshadowing, enterprising reporter Shi Feike (@石扉客) scoured the recent Bo-related press release by Xinhua, China's officially-sanctioned news service, to look for clues about the case and its future. His post was originally shared on Tencent Weibo, but netizens soon made sure to share it on Sina as well. Shi's argument is a bit of inside baseball, but it provides a fantastic glimpse of just how much, well, tea leaf reading is required in Chinese politics. Tea Leaf Nation translates: 1. For a major case at the ministry level, as throughout the cases of [fallen Politburo members] Chen Xitong and Chen Liangyu from the last 20 years, there have been three or four organizational processes: Suspension; a halt to one's duties on the political and central commissions; being sent to judicial organs for processing; trial. Most of the internal discipline and control measures occur in the first two of the aforesaid phases, with arrest and criminal punishment measures occurring in the last two. The Bo case has naturally not been an exception. 2. The Bo case is currently in step three of the aforementioned four processes. The Xinhua release is 1,339 characters, which exceeds the August 1997 release on Chen Xitong at only a few hundred characters as well as exceeding the July 2007 release on Chen Liangyu [which was] at 1,032 characters. 3. It's not just that the number of characters exceeds the other two releases; there is a qualitative difference in the level of severity. In addition to the usual [declarations] about problems with one's work methods and organization running counter to Party discipline, the release discloses two things about Bo's suspected crime: One is the crime, the other is the clues. 4. Let's start with the suspected crime. The release already confirms the three crimes of abuse of power, bending the law to selfish ends, and accepting bribes, the first two of which have already appeared in the trials of Wang Lijun and Gu Kailai, the third of which needs to be distinguished and examined. Look closely at this phrase in the third paragraph of the release: "Taking advantage of his power in order to benefit others, receiving enormous bribes from others directly and through family members; taking advantage of [Bo's] power, Bo Gu Kailai used the influence of Bo Xilai's position to benefit others, and this family member accepted enormous [amounts of] property from others." 5. This is an incomprehensible sentence; looking at the punctuation … it says that there are two matters, but the words "taking advantage of power" and "benefiting others" appear twice in a row, and the logic is tangled. My view is that the first phrase refers naturally to Bo [Xilai]'s taking bribes, this is beyond doubt. The second phrase has a comma, making things even more confusing, but if I try to [turn the meaning of this phrase into a normal sentence] what I get is: "Bo Xilai took advantage of his power, his wife Gu Kailai took advantage of the influence of Bo Xilai's position, and the husband and wife together sought to benefit others, then Bo Guagua [Bo's son, who lives in the United States] accepted enormous amounts of property on the outside." 6. Translating this again, this release–which has been vetted over and over again–is trying to emphasize two levels of meaning: The first is that Bo [Xilai] took bribes himself, the second is that Bo [Xilai] and his wife [Gu Kailai] conspired together for their son's benefit. How did they conspire? What were they conspiring to get? (Note the difference between the terms "enormous amounts of property" and "enormous bribes.") There is foreshadowing buried in this release, it remains to be seen [what it is] in the next [Xinhua release] within another year. 7. And now for the crimes. "The investigation also uncovered clues that suggests his involvement in other crimes." I believe that this sentence in the release holds yet more subtle foreshadowing. What could be a more serious crime for a ministry-level government official to commit than accepting bribery, abuse of one's powers, and bending the law for selfish ends, and is inconvenient for the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China to investigate directly? I think that murder, rape, leaking national secrets, treason, and subversion are all possible. There are many precedents for this. 8. The aforementioned crimes sound unimaginable, so ridiculous as to be unbelievable. In fact, since February 7 of this year, Chongqing has been a veritable forest of equally unbelievable rumors. Each of the three releases [from Xinhua] are full of vivid details that are all true. 9. This release is undoubtedly the blueprint for further charges and trials. According to the verdicts already outlined in this blueprint, Bo will be sentenced to far more than the 10 years or more I predicted, probably receiving life in prison or a suspended death sentence. Of course, I still do not believe that he will be sentenced to death, as this would break the unwritten rules of the past 30 years that once you enter the bureau, you cannot be killed, and once in the committee, you cannot be convicted of a crime. 10. One possibility is that this: Bo will receive a suspended sentence, which Gu has already received, and the second season will begin; Bo Guagua will begin the process of [getting] legal assistance (China and the U.S. do not have an extradition treaty). In this case, there's really nothing you can do. Who said government wasn't cruel? Sometimes even money can't save you. 11. In the aforementioned fourth stage in item one, as for the time gap between the third and fourth, for Chen Xitong it was one year and for Chen Liangyu it was nine months. According to the precedent of the cases of these two Chens, the final stage of the Bo case should wrap up around the time of the Two Meetings. If it's on the faster side of things, it might be before the 2013 New Year, and everyone will be able to see [Xinhua's] [next] release. … 12. From Chen Xitong to Chen Liangyu to Bo Xilai, the pace gets faster and faster. The crimes pile up as well, and the details become more abundant. The explanations become more imaginative. Who says China hasn't made any progress in the past twenty years? At the very least, officials have made great strides. Footnotes (? returns to text) |
New Caledonia: Political Tension Grows Over Rights to Nickel Mines Posted: 28 Sep 2012 08:35 AM PDT Claudine WERY writes [fr] that political tension grows between independentist and non-indenpendentist political parties in New Caledonia over the exploitation of Nickel mines. Non-independentists accuse the other party to strike deals with China and South Korea that they are not authorized to pursue. A referendum on gaining independence from France is scheduled between year 2014 and 2018. Written by Rakotomalala · comments (0) |
How China’s “Reincarnation Party” Takes Aim at Online Censors Posted: 28 Sep 2012 07:21 AM PDT We often refer to Sina Weibo as "China's Twitter" here on Tea Leaf Nation, but the analogy is not a perfect one. Weibo has many innovative features that Twitter lacks, and offers even more premium services for paying users. What most distinguishes the online culture of Twitter's Chinese counterpart, however, is the scope, scale, and nature of censorship present in the system. Sina employees may delete posts, block keyword searches, disable key features, suspend users' posting privileges, or, as in the famous case of Weibo celebrity Zuoye Ben, delete accounts. Account deletion is one of the harshest forms of censorship on Sina Weibo, as it not only silences expression but severs genuine connections between users who have dedicated a large portion of their free time to sharing and storing the details of their lives online. This threat, in turn, brings about a degree of self-censorship that is impossible to quantify, but also inspires unique and creative ways to comment on controversial issues. In the event of Weibo account deletion, however, netizens still have a solution: re-registration. The process is known in Chinese as "reincarnating," or joining the "Reincarnation Party." A quick keyword search for "Reincarnation Party" (转世党) on Sina Weibo returned this recent comment, posted by @西门不暗: "'Dissidents can't be dissidents forever; we are dissidents because we don't want to be dissidents,' – Aung San Suu Kyi. This one is for Sina Weibo's Reincarnation Party." Wrote another self-professed Reincarnation Party member, "[We] post…100,000 times a day against authoritarianism; each post is retweeted 30 times, for a total of three million posts." Despite the pervasiveness of censorship, netizens continue to post, repost, register and reregister, speaking out against government-backed censorship. So persistent and pervasive is the Reincarnation Party that it has its own entry in Baidu Baike, Baidu's answer to Wikipedia, which defines the group as "those users who register new IDs after having their accounts deleted or posting privileges revoked for long periods of time. They add a number to indicate how many times they have reincarnated, such as 'Life2'[二世] or 'Life3'[三世], after their original names to protest [the censorship]." Reincarnated users are thus easier to find, since a search for their original names will yield their new account, while other users have registered hub accounts solely to assist reincarnated users reconnect with their followers. Baidu Baike's entry on the Reincarnation Party also notes that "This group has become a headache for Sina, since the company cannot deal with the problem effectively. On December 16, 2011, the Beijing municipal government issued new regulations requiring all groups or individuals creating Weibo accounts to use their real names, but only time will tell how effective the real-name registration policy is at controlling the Reincarnation Party." Indeed, despite much hand-wringing in China-watching circles, Sina's real-name policy has been implemented only sporadically. Even Sina has admitted that it simply has not been able to comply fully with the government's demands. The company made efforts to codify the process of singling out individual users for censorship in May, but implementation remains uneven. The real-name registration policy traces its roots back to the early 2000s, when China's Internet censors first began to cut their teeth on the popular online communities known as BBS forums; the restrictions led to a sharp drop in the sites' popularity. When Tsinghua University's popular BBS fell victim to these new restrictions, some users held an online memorial service, saying the rules had killed the site's culture. Perhaps Sina fears that complete enforcement of the unpopular policy will be the beginning of the end, with users who left BBS forums for Weibo fleeing Weibo for the next big social network. For now, the cat-and-mouse battle between the censors and the censored continues on Weibo. Netizens' willingness to keep posting and reincarnating shows their confidence in their ability to circumvent censorship, and their conviction that doing so serves an important purpose. As Wu Wei (pen name Ye Du), vice president of the Independent Chinese PEN Center (and six-time reincarnater according to his Weibo handle) remarked, "Every single reincarnation spreads freedom, dignity, and knowledge of right and wrong a little further; each one shows just a bit more the truth behind the 'moral superiority' of officials. That is how freedom comes into being: bit by bit." There are no widely available studies on how effective the Reincarnation Party is at disseminating information. A recent Harvard study by Gary King and others showed that China's censorship is far from straightforward. There is no single set of rules, no single method for removing unwanted content, and in turn there is no single solution to the problem. The phenomenon of the Reincarnation Party may not defeat online censorship all by itself, but it provides one window into the way ordinary netizens are pushing back creatively against the silencing of expression. |
Bo Xilai Expelled from Party, Will Face Criminal Charges (Updated) Posted: 28 Sep 2012 05:30 AM PDT Together with the long-awaited announcement of a start date for the 18th Party Congress, Xinhua revealed on Friday that Bo Xilai has been expelled from the Party and will now face criminal prosecution:
The trial of Bo's former sidekick Wang Lijun triggered renewed speculation that Bo would face criminal charges last week. A lengthy Xinhua account of the trial described a dramatic encounter between the two men and implied that Bo had failed to act on knowledge of his wife's crime; furthermore, Wang was said to have earned a reduced sentence by cooperating with other investigations, of which Bo seemed a likely target. Bo's fate is not unprecedented, as Michael Forsythe wrote at Bloomberg News:
The news about Bo was released on Friday evening at the start of the week-long National Day holiday, and announced with a cursory recitation of Xinhua's report in the number two slot on the Xinwen Lianbo evening news. Top billing went to the 18th Party Congress start date: at The Wall Street Journal, Jeremy Page commented on the timing of these two major stories
For background on the case, see past coverage on CDT, and also The Bo Xilai Scandal: Power, Death, and Politics in China, a $1.33 Kindle ebook by The Financial Times' Jamil Anderlini. Updated at 06:01 PST: China Real Time's Josh Chin has rounded up some initial reactions from Sina Weibo, including the following:
On Twitter, meanwhile, Liu Xiaoyuan weighed in (via TIME's Austin Ramzy):
At the Associated Press, Christopher Bodeen presented a range of views on the political motives behind Bo's toppling:
Updated at 14:36 PST: Edward Wong at the New York Times weighs in with more about the accusations against Bo:
Meanwhile on Sina Weibo, netizens seemed especially taken with one particular accusation:
© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us |
The Daily Twit – 9/28/12: It’s Beginning to Look a Lot Like National Day Posted: 28 Sep 2012 04:21 AM PDT Yes, the air is crisp and cool, and you can almost taste the nationalist fervor as the holiday week approaches. Officially, Saturday will be a work day, then the holiday will run from Sunday to the following Sunday, October 7. Eight days of fun and patriotic contemplation. I will be holding down the fort here at China Hearsay's Beijing headquarters for the duration, but that's only because my wife hid my passport somewhere and I'm afraid to travel in-country when a billion other people might have similar plans. Speaking of nationalism, you may not have heard that China and Japan are in the midst of what academics are calling a game of nationalist chicken (well, they should be calling it that) in the East China Sea. Seems that no one wants to give up on anything resembling a feral goat-infested rocky outcropping (h/t Barbara Demick). I'm sure we can all understand that. After weeks of "I'm sure they'll come to a solution" chatter among experts, I definitely got a "Holy shit, they might start shooting at each other" kind of vibe out there today. That's probably not a good thing. Here's some stuff to read: Morning Whistle: China tells UN that Japan "stole" its islands — Oh no, they didn't. In front of Ahmadinejad and everyone? Damn, that's cold. Probably not a good way to get Japan to negotiate. I wonder what the news is over in Japan? Let's check in with the Asahi Shimbun to see if there's any glad tidings: Noda vows no compromise as Japan, China dig in on islands row Abe eyes lifting ban on collective self-defense INSIDE LOOK: Japan tried but failed to avert disaster in China dispute Um, I think I'm going to stop reading the Asahi Shimbun. Too depressing. Anything else on the island beat? Worldcrunch: Taiwanese Cash in on China-Japan Island Dispute — First it was South Korea getting all those Chinese tourists, now the Taiwanese are holding their products out as the high-quality alternatives to Japanese goods. The question is whether buying patterns will change, and if so, for how long? Wall Street Journal: Japanese Car Plants in China: Who's Feeling the Heat? — Auto industry expert Michael Dunne talks about what the dispute means for Japan in the huge Chinese car market. Don't forget that foreign auto production in China is done by joint ventures, so if the Japanese manufacturers take a huge hit, so will their local partners. Caixin: 'Economic war' with Japan unwise for China — The message here: Chinese consumers need to separate economics from politics. Foreign Policy: The most ridiculous anti-Japan boycotts — Some of the sillier casualties from that "economic war." For some reason, porn and Hello Kitty (and probably Hello Kitty porn) didn't make the list. In other news: Reuters: China's dorm room discontent emerges as new labor flashpoint — More discussion about the latest Foxconn labor situation. As reporters dig into the incident, complaints about living conditions abound. Wall Street Journal: New Labor Attitudes Fed Into China Riot — More on Foxconn, living conditions and clashes between workers and security guards. Forbes: The Coming Collapse of China — Not! — The latest not-at-all-subtle pushback against Gordon Chang's particular type of China economy doom and gloom story. China Daily: M&A regulations to be relaxed — Probably a combination of two things here. As the government has had to deal with more and more reviews, there have been delays. At the same time, making these easier may boost this type of activity. It's a win-win during an economic slowdown. New York Times: China Politics Stall Overhaul for Economy — Sounds like D.C. No consensus, so no action, even when it is desperately needed. These election/handover years can really suck. BREAKING NEWS – Financial Times: Chinese Communist party expels Bo Xilai — Meh. Not exactly a surprise, but it certainly is news. And coming in at 7:00pm on a Friday before a holiday, well, you know what that's all about. The government also announced that the 18th Party Congress will be on November 8, which is a bit later than usual. But better late than never, I always say. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
18th Party Congress to Begin November 8th Posted: 28 Sep 2012 04:03 AM PDT Xinhua reports that the long awaited 18th National Congress of the CCP is to start on November 8th, marking the beginning of China's once-a-decade leadership transition.
The news was released, by no mere coincidence, alongside the announcement that Bo Xilai has been expelled from the Party and will now face criminal prosecution. © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Posted: 28 Sep 2012 01:04 AM PDT Labor NGOs in Guangdong seem to be struggling amid the inconsistent treatment from provincial government and the lower-level executives. Charlie Vest and Shawn Shieh at China Development Brief translate a detailed report from Southern Daily:
See more on NGOs in China via CDT. © Mengyu Dong for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
China Bashing, Yet Another Reason the Republican Base Doesn’t Like Mitt Romney Posted: 27 Sep 2012 10:54 PM PDT Barack Obama and Mitt Romney have been doing a great deal of China bashing recently, particularly in sensitive "swing states" (key to the election) that have lost a significant number of manufacturing jobs in the last couple of decades. Both of them do it, although Romney's anti-China rhetoric has been much more aggressive. For Obama, there's very little downside in defending his "tough on China" record or reminding everyone that Romney, when he was running Bain Capital, profited personally from U.S. companies that outsourced to China. The base of the Democratic party is firmly against the current free trade system, and many progressive voters blame China for U.S. job losses. With a populist message like this, Obama can both energize his base and appeal to independent voters in the Midwest. For Romney, the political calculation is more difficult. He began the China bashing during the primaries as a way to distinguish his candidacy from his Republican rivals. Whether that message helped him with the base of the Republican party in securing the nomination is unclear, particularly since GOP constituencies are split about China. You can slice and dice GOP voters in a number of ways and still not be sure which issues are truly motivating them — I tend to be skeptical about data like exit polling that oversimplify voting choices. One thing is clear, though, when it comes to Republicans: they have mixed feelings about doing business with China. One perspective comes from what I'll call the xenophobic wing of the GOP, the folks who firmly believe that sometime in the near future, troops from the United Nations will invade the U.S. and force Americans into internment camps. Alas, I am not making this up. These folks don't even trust multilateral institutions set up and dominated by the United States, much less what they would refer to as "Red China." Speaking of which, a GOP combination of old Cold Warriors and small government ideologues see Communist China as antithetical to free market capitalism. These Republicans are not as interested in what China actually does so much as what it represents. Any political rhetoric that adopts a contrary position to that of Beijing is a positive to these groups. A much narrower anti-China constituency in the Republican Party doesn't care about economic issues, preferring to focus on geopolitics, territorial disputes, and military expansionism. This group includes the defense contractors and their political lackeys who benefit from U.S. government spending on big-ticket items such as naval vessels, aircraft, and anti-missile technology. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, who routinely advocates for a more aggressive military stance against China, is a good representative of this category. Unfortunately for Romney, the Republican Party also harbors constituencies that favor a closer relationship with China. These people are almost completely focused on trade and investment issues. The largest category, call them the John Huntsman or Chamber of Commerce wing of the GOP, wants to maintain, and build on, the bilateral status quo. The needs and desires of America's largest corporations, and in particular industries such as financial services, pharmaceuticals, entertainment, and high technology are represented by these folks. For this group, Romney's China bashing, in particularly his threat to impose tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S., represents not only a problem for the bilateral relationship in general, but also to the profits of some of the largest suppliers of campaign donations to the GOP. Additionally, there are Republican idealists who genuinely believe in free trade and/or a laissez faire approach to all commercial matters, including cross-border transactions like trade and investment. This is a rather eclectic group of people, ranging from respected trade specialists to fringe libertarians. To them, Romney's talk of a more aggressive trade policy smacks of "Big Government" interference in the economy. Given these competing interests within the GOP, what's the political effect of Romney's China bashing? That's a very tough call, particularly when many people, including myself, have difficulty believing that Romney would actually follow through with any of his campaign promises with respect to China. On the other hand, as the rhetoric has been ratcheted up considerably in the days following the two parties' political conventions, Romney has staked out a position on China that would be difficult to retreat from should he be elected. But while party apparatchiks and big donors may not support Romney's China strategy, what about voters? One of the least persuasive Op/Eds I've read in some time, written by Charles Kadlec in Forbes entitled "Will China Bashing Cost Mitt Romney The Election?", attempts to answer this question. Kadlec, one of those fringe libertarians with a Ron Paulish fixation on the gold standard who overuses the word "liberty," firmly believes that Romney's current political freefall is somehow related to his anti-China talk:
Sure. Kadlec would have us believe that although Romney came off a poor showing at his party's political convention and then stepped in deep doo-doo by politicizing an attack on a U.S. consulate that left several foreign service officers, including the ambassador to Libya, dead, his precipitous drop in the polls is all about the China bashing. If only it were true! Kadlec's assumptions here are truly stunning:
Now we're into self-parody territory. But none of this is too surprising. Ideologues have a tendency to assume that their beliefs are universal. To folks like Kadlec, if only Romney was more of a libertarian, the population would rally around his message and vote him into the White House. This is absurd. Most Americans, including a good number of politicians who work on Capitol Hill, have no idea that tariffs on Chinese imports would lead to higher prices. I could trot out some survey data on how stupid the American electorate is these days, but you've heard all that before. As the late great George Carlin once put it, "Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that." China bashing may be hurting Mitt Romney with certain GOP constituencies, including Chamber of Commerce types and multinational corporations, which include quite a few prominent Republican donors, but when it comes to actual voters, it's difficult to see how anti-China rhetoric will result in any significant loss of support. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
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