Blogs » Politics » 18th Party Congress Timing Still A Mystery

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• 18th Party Congress Timing Still A Mystery
• Is Containment an Obsolete Strategy?
• Photo: The pool table maker’s wife, Shangqiu, Henan, by Mark Hobbs
• Chinese Patrol Ships Arrive in Diaoyu Waters
• Chinese reality show’s contestant on casting couch of her mentor?
• China: Divisions among Anti-Japan Protesters
• Visas to China are getting harder to attain
• Op-Ed: As Chinese Protesters Go Off Script, Shadow of Ultra-Leftism Grows
• Myanmar President Says China Friendship Won’t Change
• Made in US, But Sold in China
• Chinese ‘Soft Power' Expands in Africa with CCTV

18th Party Congress Timing Still A Mystery Posted: 23 Sep 2012 11:12 PM PDT With the CCP's 18th Party Congress and the unveiling of China's next generation of leaders just weeks away, The Telegraph's Malcolm Moore reports that the delegates who are expected to attend have yet to receive a precise date: "We have not had any official notice," said Hou Fanfan, a doctor in Guangzhou, while Li Xiaoying, a professor from Tianjin, said: "We don't know, sorry". Wang Zhixia, the Communist party committee secretary of a driving school in Jilin province, said there had been "no notice whatsoever" and that he was waiting for the provincial government to organise travel to Beijing. "It is doubly ironic that they are being so secretive about it when the Organisation department (the powerful internal Communist Party HR arm) held a press conference to tell everyone about how they have been especially transparent in selecting the delegates this year," said Dali Yang, the founding Faculty Director of the University of Chicago Centre in Beijing. Over the past three decades, the Communist party has usually given at least a month's notice for the five-yearly Congress. Analysts have speculated that the delay in confirming the timing for the congress, the details of which are typically finalized during the August gathering of top leaders at the seaside resort of Beidaihe, indicates factional jockeying at the top of the Party. A resolution of the case against disgraced former Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai has also held up any progress on the congress. The Party's silence over the timing of the congress is deafening, according to The South China Morning Post: Alice Miller, a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, said that going on past procedures, a Politburo meeting, probably late last month, should have set a date for the 17th Central Committee's seventh plenum and proposed a date for the 18th congress. A Politburo meeting held on September 17, 2007, made the decision to convene the pre-congress seventh plenum of the 16th Central Committee on October 9 in order for matters relating to the 17th party congress, which opened on October 15, to be finalised. … Hu Xingdou, a political commentator from the Beijing Institute of Technology, said the party should make its congress more transparent and announce its date as early as possible to prevent wild speculation. "The earlier the announcement [of the date] is made, the better for the party and the country," said Hu. Even with the date unknown, Jamestown Foundation fellow Willy Lam has made his prediction of who will secure seats on the revamped Politburo Standing Committee: A consensus has been reached by the outgoing Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) that the size of this highest ruling council should be cut from nine to seven members. Barring any last minute changes, the new PBSC is expected to consist of the following (and their prospective portfolios): Xi, age 59 (General Secretary and President); Li Keqiang, age 57 (Premier); Yu Zhengsheng, age 67 (Chairman of the National People's Congress); Zhang Dejiang, age 65 (Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference); Li Yuanchao, age 61 (Head of the Party Secretariat and Vice President); Wang Qishan, age 64 (Executive Vice Premier); and Wang Yang, age 57 (Secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection [CCDI]). The seven-member configuration is an effort by the leadership to return to the norm. Since the Cultural Revolution, the PBSC had consisted of either five or seven members. It was only increased to nine members at the 16th CCP Congress a decade ago. A seven-member PBSC in theory will make decision making more efficient (Apple Daily [Hong Kong] September 10; Ming Pao [Hong Kong], September 3). Whoever does take over the reins of China's top ruling bodies, they will face a number of social, economic and foreign policy challenges, and the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion last week to analyze the major issues. See also previous CDT coverage of the incoming generation of CCP leaders. © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us Post tags: 18th party congress, Bo Xilai, CCP 5th generation, chinese communist party, leadership transition, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, Xi Jinping, Yu Zhengsheng, zhang dejiang Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Is Containment an Obsolete Strategy? Posted: 23 Sep 2012 09:00 PM PDT International relations fans and China watchers should check out Fletcher Professor William Martel's piece in The Diplomat entitled "R.I.P. Containment," a very thoughtful look at why containment is no longer a practical option for U.S. policymakers when it comes to China, Russia or Iran. Martel's thesis is obviously quite provocative as the U.S. "pivot" to Asia, America's current strategy in the region, is arguably a modified form of containment with respect to China, although the use of the formal term by members of the Obama Administration is probably a firing offense. Here is Martel's thesis: Some would argue that the United States still follows a strategy of containment. When some policy analysts conclude America is trying to contain China with its "pivot" or "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific, or when economic sanctions crafted to "contain" Iran's nuclear aspirations, one could see why containment is still on people's minds. Not to be the bearer of bad news, but containment died more than twenty years ago. While once an immensely successful policy, sticking with containment promises certain foreign policy failure. Martel begins with the origins of the policy, including appropriate references to George Kennan and the Cold War. Having slogged my way through an international relations degree, I always look to Kennan, who was stationed in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow at the start of the Cold War, as an almost legendary figure who helped to shape the post-war world. Kennan's most significant influence can be traced back to the famous "Long Telegram" he wrote in 1946 (an internal government document) and a 1947 article, written under the pseudonym "X," in Foreign Affairs. The X article is the one cited as the seminal articulation of containment against the Soviet Union. As Martel explains, containment as described by Kennan and implemented by the U.S. in the decades that followed the X article was multifaceted: Bolstered by alliances and institutions, massive military establishments, and thousands of nuclear weapons, containment was the basis for American foreign policy during the Cold War. Containment rested on America's commitment to prevent the Soviet Union, its client states, and later China from expanding their sphere of influence. It was designed to "contain" these states, manage relations between Washington and Moscow, and deter "hot wars." Containment was an ideological struggle between Communism and capitalism. It was a political struggle between two different camps and their satellite states. It was a military struggle between two nuclear-armed superpowers. The policy of containment was successful during the Cold War (a "hot war" was prevented) because, according to Martel: "the Soviet Union was an ideologically extreme, economically backward, and politically isolated state." By the 1990s, the USSR ceased to exist, and containment no longer made any sense. In his article, Martel discusses Iran, Russia and China, but let's just focus on the latter. Why is Containment 2.0 not a useful strategy for the U.S. to employ in responding to China's rise? Martel brings up two main points: politics and economics. I agree with him on both fronts. The original containment strategy pitted Communism against Capitalism, something missing from today's geopolitical struggles: States today do not face ideological foes on any scale comparable to the Cold War. Without an ideological foe, the practitioners of containment cannot persuade states to organize their foreign policies to oppose others. In effect, states lack a compelling reason or the political will to coordinate their policies and actions. They view the world, not as a dangerous struggle against an expansionist ideology, but as a relatively benign contest between democratic and authoritarian states. I agree. While China watchers often spend far too much time debating the "China model" or "authoritarian capitalism," often using Cold War rhetoric, China is simply not comparable to the old Soviet Union (or the Mao-era PRC) in terms of political ideology. Mobilizing nations against China on a purely ideological basis is almost laughable in 2012. Martel sums up his point quite nicely: "The West's geopolitical adversaries do not inspire awe or fear." Angst, concern, worry — perhaps. Fear and awe? I don't think so. When I think about the Soviet Union during the Cold War, images of Winston Smith in Room 101 or Rubashov in a cold, dank basement dungeon come to mind. That was the stuff of literal nightmares. What are the comparable images of modern China? Someone working overtime in a Foxconn factory? The precision drumming during the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic games? A street vendor selling a fake Gucci bag? Not exactly terrifying. On the economic front, Martel argues that globalization and free markets do not allow for a viable containment strategy. Certainly global containment is difficult, if not impossible, these days. All one has to do is consider the difficulty of imposing economic sanctions on "rogue" states and realize that any attempt to minimize major players on the world stage would be pure fantasy. With China of course, even limited trade actions would be fraught with danger. Think about what could happen if certain members of the U.S. Congress had their way and all exports from China were suddenly subjected to a tariff of 25%. The damage to the economies of China, the U.S. (and many other countries) would be significant. Now imagine any attempt to turn back the clock and use trade as part of an overall containment strategy. It's simply unquestionable given economic interdependence and current patterns of international trade and global production. Martel sums up his argument thusly: The inescapable conclusion is that containment no longer fits our world. Where it once worked, containment no longer aligns with how the modern world is organized politically and economically. Simply put, it is no longer practical in a highly interconnected global economy in which states do not face a singular ideological threat. Based on politics and economics, I completely agree with Martel. However, I think he makes a mistake in deliberately avoiding the military angle. Martel might argue that during the Cold War, the military buildup on both sides was merely a tool in an ideological battle. Similarly, he might say that with the U.S. and China today, the absence of significant differences in ideology and the reality of economic interdependence obviates the need for a military struggle. I agree, but that doesn't mean that defense-based containment won't happen anyway. This is the one area where I find Martel's argument lacking. The U.S. "pivot" to Asia is all about the military. Just because the U.S. and China are economic partners and are not engaged in a political struggle does not mean that significant friction is impossible when it comes to territorial expansion and competition for natural resources. The Cold War may be over, but some of its language, such as "spheres of influences" have been making quite a comeback in the past few years. Could the U.S. use a containment strategy simply to limit the expansion of China in terms of territory and military capability? I think not only is this possible, but this is exactly what the "pivot" is all about. Has the U.S. convinced its allies in the Asia-Pacific region to increase ties to America because of ideology? Not at all. As China's military has grown and its foreign policy become more aggressive, the U.S. has found no shortage of friends here. During U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's recent trip to Asia, I suspect that the words "missiles" and "aircraft carriers" came up a lot more often than "socialism" or even "authoritarianism." For the record, I do not support containment, or the "pivot," or whatever else one wishes to call a policy that seeks to limit the rise of China. That should not be the goal of the U.S., which should focus its attention on ways to work with an ascendant China. As I've written many times, containment is an expression of a "zero-sum" mentality, the belief that as China rises, the U.S. must by definition decline. I reject that assumption. Moreover, I also believe that many of the supporters of a military build-up with China as its focus are connected in some way with the U.S. defense industry. Containing China's military will be quite profitable for some companies, and their influence on the American government is uncomfortably significant. However, just because I dislike containment, I must admit that a narrow policy consisting of a set of defense-based alliances might be with us for a number of years. A non-ideological containment strategy may not be as robust as its Cold War counterpart, but it is not yet obsolete. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us Post tags: Asia pivot, containment, George Kennan

Photo: The pool table maker’s wife, Shangqiu, Henan, by Mark Hobbs Posted: 23 Sep 2012 09:29 PM PDT The pool table maker's wife, Shangqiu, Henan © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us Post tags: Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Chinese Patrol Ships Arrive in Diaoyu Waters Posted: 23 Sep 2012 09:06 PM PDT Two Chinese surveillance ships entered waters near the disputed Diaoyu Islands this morning, according to the Japanese Coast Guard, in what Chinese state media has called a "rights defense" patrol. From Reuters: "In recent days, Japan has constantly provoked incidents concerning the Diaoyu islands issue, gravely violating China's territorial sovereignty," China's Xinhua news agency said. The ship patrols were intended to exercise China's "administrative jurisdiction" over the islands, it said. "Following the relevant laws of the People's Republic of China, (the ships) again carried out a regular rights defense patrol in our territorial waters around the Diaoyu islands." The Japanese Coast Guard ordered the Chinese ships to move out of the area, but received no response, an official said. Tensions between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands, known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands, spiked earlier this month when Japan's central government agreed to purchase three of the islets from their private Japanese owners. A string of anti-Japanese demonstrations ensued across China, even turning violent as angry protesters targeted Japanese-owned businesses and products. In one incident, a mob beat a Chinese man so badly for driving a Japanese car that he is now paralyzed. From The Wall Street Journal: The beating took place on the afternoon of Sept. 15 in the central Chinese city of Xi'an in Shaanxi province. Mr. Li, his wife, one of his son's and the son's fiancée, were on their way back from a shopping trip when Mr. Li's white Toyota Cor SCT.LB -10.73%olla was set upon by an agitated anti-Japanese mob brandishing sticks, bricks and steel implements, according to the Beijing Youth Daily. Mr. Li's wife urged the demonstrators not to damage the vehicle. "It was wrong of us to buy a Japanese car. We won't buy one ever again, OK?" she was reported as saying by Beijing Youth Daily. But the gang beat Mr. Li anyway, striking him on the head with a steel shackle and causing him to lose consciousness. Later, he was rushed to hospital where he was treated for open brain injury and then moved to an intensive care unit. He remained there until he regained consciousness three days later. Mr. Li can now move the left-hand side of his body but the right side continues to be partially paralyzed. The incident has evoked reflection among Chinese netizens and was the top story on Sina Weibo on Friday, according to the Wall Street Journal report. On the Japanese side, hundreds of people rallied peacefully against China in downtown Tokyo on Saturday, and the government has continued to urge the Chinese government to keep its citizens safe. The Japan Skating Federation then warned on Sunday that its skaters would pull out of next month's Cup of China in Shanghai in the absence of safety guarantees. Meanwhile, Chinese state media has continued to convey the government's hard stance on the crisis, with the People's Daily urging Japan on Sunday to "repent" for its infringement on China's territorial sovereignty. Also on Sunday, China postponed events scheduled for later this week to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two sides. From The China Daily: Two associations – entrusted by the government to organize events to mark the anniversary – cited Japan's attitude over the Diaoyu Islands as the reason for the postponement. "Considering the current situation", events to commemorate the normalization of relations between the two nations will be "adjusted to an appropriate time", said a statement by the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the China-Japan Friendship Association. Events were scheduled to take place on Thursday in Beijing to mark the signing of a joint statement between China and Japan on Sept 29, 1972. But "the atmosphere has been ruined" due to Japan's "buying" of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea earlier this month, the statement said. What gives? With neither side indicating any willingness to negotiate a resolution of the dispute, and with Taiwan also laying claim to the islets, Mark McDonald of the International Herald Tribune takes a stab at a settlement proposal: In the face of deep emotions and official intransigence, it seems unlikely that Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei might agree to a radically simple notion: All three nations would stand down and renounce their claims, thereby settling things. Nobody would win, so nobody would lose. It would require a bold new kind of diplomacy, but the Senkaku/Diaoyu rocks could be established as a kind of "international zone" surrounded, say, by a 12-mile cordon sanitaire. The islets would belong to no specific nation, much like the legal status of the Moon. No fishing or tourist boats would be allowed to encroach. No military drilling, no oil drilling. And in the spirit of a negotiated settlement, the currently unmanned lighthouse on Uotsuri, the principal islet, could be occupied by a trilateral rotation of keepers. © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us Post tags: anti-Japan protests, anti-japan protests 2012, diaoyu islands, maritime security, senkaku islands, Sino-Japanese relations, territorial disputes Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Chinese reality show’s contestant on casting couch of her mentor? Posted: 23 Sep 2012 12:18 PM PDT The Voice of China (中国好声音), a reality singing contest show that premiered in this July on the Zhejiang Television, has become a hit on the mainland and led audience ratings for its time slot. But the gossips are flying as well, with the talent show's huge success. A female contestant, Ding Ding, was rumored to have been on the casting couch of one of the show's judges or coaches, Yang Kun, a famous Chinese singer and musician, since the beginning she was picked by Yang as his team member (or trainee) in the first 'blind audition" phrase of the show. The intimate bed shots were revealed online too, after the 25-year-old hottie controversially advanced to the next round in an individual "battle" against the other powerful team member of Yang's which ever promoted the audience to think that there was something fishy. To many people's disappointment, however, these intimate shots have turned out to be bed scenes from one of Yang Kun's Music Videos. Ding Ding performs in The Voice of China.

China: Divisions among Anti-Japan Protesters Posted: 23 Sep 2012 08:07 PM PDT Yi Lu from Tea Leaf Nation looks into the discussion among micro-bloggers and sees there are more and more divisions along the line of regional and class differences among anti-Japan protesters. Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Visas to China are getting harder to attain Posted: 23 Sep 2012 01:34 PM PDT Over the past two months, I have been working hard to attain the Z-visa — basically, a long-term work permit. Even with an established company on my side providing all necessary paperwork, my application has yet to be submitted. Every time we go to the Labor Bureau, a new rule appears to delay and deny us. Now back in the states without a visa, I'm going for the F-visa — the basic business visa that allows you a few months' stay, but can be potentially renewed with a trip to Hong Kong. What was so easy for my friends to get in the past is suddenly mystifying. A call from my visa agent informed me of a new rule: that my authorized invitation letter needs to specifically state my gender and nationality (and other things), even though that is 1. on the application, 2. clear from both my picture and the fact that I'm applying from my home country. Rules are rules, even if they don't appear on the Chinese consulate's website. I'm going to dare say that this is not just my personal issue, resultant of blogging about China for years, as I have yet to submit the actual paperwork. I haven't even been able to get that far. My friend who works in the admissions department of a well-established American university with a campus in China said that this is the first year their students have run into trouble with visas. "The consulate sent back a ton of visa applications, saying that they didn't sound like students," she told me. This is coming from a school that has been established in China for 25 years. When another friend recently attained his Z-visa within 5 days of submission (Shanghai), I started to wonder if Beijing city (whose labor bureau has our administrative assistant running around town for this and that) is tightening its clamps for reasons of its own, something having to do with a certain political transition this December. If rock concerts and film fests in Beijing can be canceled and unplugged at will (as they were this summer), seemingly for the sake of "maintaining stability" for the upcoming leadership transition, then it should come as no surprise that foreigners are being barred from establishing themselves — especially in the capital. Filed under: Current Events Tagged: China foreign relations, China visas

Op-Ed: As Chinese Protesters Go Off Script, Shadow of Ultra-Leftism Grows Posted: 23 Sep 2012 10:38 AM PDT [Note: The following is a Tea Leaf Nation op-ed, and does not necessarily represent the opinions of the editors.] In Shanghai, some demonstrators appeared to harken for the Mao era The recent anti-Japan protests in more than 50 cities in China turned out to be not only a show of patriotism and anger, but a campaign platform for competing political ideologies. The coexistence of opposing political claims during a movement that at first blush appeared unified betrays the chaos that characterizes China's ideological sphere in an era of drastic change.  Dissonant voices sounded from both sides of China's political spectrum. On September 16, protesters in the southern mega-city of Guangzhou held up a banner that read, "Turn anger into Strength; we want political reform." That same day, protesters in the nearby metropolis of Shenzhen echoed those sentiments. After carrying a banner which read, "Democracy, Freedom, Human Rights, Constitutionalism," demonstrators were arrested by the police in the name of "disrupting social order." Conservatives also weighed in. Marchers in more than 20 cities including Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou carried portraits of Mao Zedong and slogans like "Chairman Mao, we miss you" and "Long live Chairman Mao." Some even called out "Maoist ideology" to "save the country." The scene, some netizens said, reminded them of Red Guards marching through Tiananmen Square in the late 1960s, the heyday of China's famously divisive Cultural Revolution. While no evidence exists that these swerves off of the prevailing anti-Japanese script were anything other than grassroots, the government's divergent responses to the two voices have lead many to conclude that the government still favors Maoism to reformism. Indeed, the recent protests show that many of Mao's "Cultural Revolution thoughts"(文革思维)—idolatry, adoration of authority, class struggle, populism, and ignorance of law and individual rights–remain deeply rooted in Chinese society. The legacy of the Cultural Revolution The Cultural Revolution is widely regarded as the biggest man-made disaster China has experienced in the last half-century. Set into motion by Mao Zedong in 1966, it aimed to enforce Communism and Maoist orthodoxy through "class struggle," which then turned into uncontrollable spread of violence that caused millions of deaths and nationwide disorder that significantly paralyzed China's economy and society until 1976. Its scar tissue permeates Chinese politics and life because Chinese people have not had the opportunity to fully reflect on what happened in the way that Germans have reflected on the Second World War. After a quick condemnation at the third session of the eleventh central committee of the Party in 1978, the government chose to willingly forget about the tragedy, oppressing discussions about it in the public sphere. Because it has failed to learn from its history, China is still shrouded by the shadow of ultra-leftism. This is why, despite its high-speed economic growth, China is stagnating on the way to becoming democratized and civilized. As @王冉 points out on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, the only way to prevent the kind of unconstrained and irrational violence manifested in this round of anti-Japan protests from reappearing is to thoroughly reflect on the lessons of history and start restructuring China's political system. "We shouldn't misinterpret history," he writes. "What the damaged property of our compatriots and the fires of violence show us is not the indispensability of unlimited government power or the importance of 'preserving stability.' Instead, [it shows] precisely that we should clean up the evil legacy of the Cultural Revolution, bravely push forward political reforms, expose politics to sunshine, force the government to take responsibility and let rule by law prevail. All of these are important and urgent. "[Chinese] In Shenzhen, one protest banner called for democracy and human rights Of course, recent demonstrations are not the first warning sign that the possibility of a revived Cultural Revolution remains latent. What happened in the western city of Chongqing from 2009 to 2011 showed how dangerous government could still become if it incorporated ultra-leftism into administrative policies. Under the principle known as "Sing Red and Strike Black"(唱红打黑), cultural symbols of Mao's era were promoted, some private companies were criminalized as gangs by judicial institutions in flagrant violation of procedural justice, and many were sent to hard labor because they had criticized the government. Fortunately, the "Chongqing model" came to a speedy end in March after Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun attempted to defect, leading to the downfall of Chongqing Communist Secretary Bo Xilai. Shortly thereafter, at a press conference following the National People's Congress, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao openly called for political reforms, warning that "if political reforms fail, a tragedy like the Cultural Revolution might be replayed." Although Wen had repeatedly mentioned political reforms in his term, never had he been as audacious and straightforward on a domestic occasion. Wen's remark brought hope and confidence to many who desire democratization in China. Sixteen days after Wen issued his remark, his determination was echoed by five citizens who met in Guangzhou and held up signs demanding political restructuring. But police soon arrested them, suggesting that Wen's words neither represented a consensus among the central and local governments nor hinted at real changes. In 2012, a sensitive year when leadership positions are to be handed over and the future of China is to be decided, the road to democracy and constitutionalism is still obscured by mixed messages and opposing political ideologies among both China's government and its society. Despite the patina of unity, what last week's anti-Japanese protests really showed is that China is not any closer to contending with its past or settling on a vision for its future.  Footnotes    (? returns to text) 我们不要误读昨天。那些遍体鳞伤的同胞财产，那些熊熊燃烧的暴力火焰，它们昭示的不是权力无边界的政府和不计代价的维稳有多么的重要，而恰恰是–彻底肃清和埋葬文革，勇敢推进政治体制改革，让阳光政治替代宫廷手段，让政府为选民负责，让法治阳光普照中国，这一切，有多么的重要和多么的紧迫。?

Myanmar President Says China Friendship Won’t Change Posted: 23 Sep 2012 10:14 AM PDT CDT previously reported Myanmar's parliament would reassess the country's relationship with China. But as Myanmar transitions to democracy, President Thein Sein told Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping, Myanmar's friendship with China would not change. From Reuters: Chinese officials and media have expressed concern Washington's renewed interest in slowly democratizing Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, could be part of U.S. designs to dilute China's influence there and encircle China with pro-U.S. states. But during a meeting on the sidelines of a trade fair in southern China, Thein Sein said Beijing should not worry. "Myanmar is at present in a transitional phase, but Myanmar pays great attention to developing relations with China, and its policy of seeing China has a true friend has not changed," China's foreign ministry cited Thein Sein as telling Xi. "China has for a long time provided a large amount of sincere support and help, and stood at Myanmar's side at the most difficult of times. Myanmar's people will never forget this," Thein Sein added, in the statement released late Friday. China has worried about its relationship with Myanmar due to a halt in the controversial dam project in the Irrawaddy River, and Chinese media has had mixed reactions over the ending of censorship in Myanmar. The Asian Correspondent reports China has persuaded Myanmar to maintain the status quo: President of Burma Thein Sein will have a trip to the United States after concluding his China trip. He has been visiting China for a trade fair since 18 September. It is Thein Sein's second trip to China from the time when he became head of state in March 2011. President Thein Sein has planned to attend the 9th China-Asean Expo and the China-Asean Investment Summit. The 9th Expo in Nanning aims to promote economic cooperation between China and ASEAN. Burma was rewarded the trade fair's "Country of Honor" this year and President spoke at the opening ceremony on behalf of the ASEAN-member states launch the event which runs from September 19 to 24. It looks as if China has been trying to keep Burma within its influential sphere since the ASEAN-member country has also been seeking to join in the US-led Cobra Gold military exercise in the Pacific. A senior Thai army officer was quoted by Japan's Kyodo News saying that Burma expressed an interest in joining the Cobra Gold annual military exercises in the future. China may be concerned about military relations between Burma and the US to some extent. According to CRIEnglish, Xi is urging Myanmar to ensure smooth implementation of projects between the two countries: Xi said the two countries should continue to strengthen communication and coordination to accelerate the formulation of mid-term and long-term goals of bilateral exchanges in politics, economy, trade, culture, security and other areas to steadily push forward comprehensive cooperation. The current development of China-Myanmar relations is generally good, Xi said, noting that China is ready to work with Myanmar to promote the healthy and stable development of the bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. The vice president said that China will continue to encourage Chinese enterprises to make investment in the livelihoods of Myanmar's people and other areas. China is also ready to work with Myanmar in agricultural cooperation. © Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us Post tags: ASEAN, bilateral ties, democracy, Myanmar, Xi Jinping Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Made in US, But Sold in China Posted: 23 Sep 2012 10:05 AM PDT As analysts claim "Made in China" products actually profit American producers, the New York Times reports a manufacturing shift now has certain products made in the United States but sold in China. This shift comes amid a slowdown of manufacturing in China due to the decrease in demand from the US and the European Union: Standing over a small tank of water in a Brooklyn factory, Zbigniew Solecki plunged a gleaming faucet into the water, then shot air at 60 pounds per square inch into it. He watched for rising bubbles, a sign that an unseen fissure had, unacceptably, let the air stream out. It is a rite of passage that Mr. Solecki performs dozens of times a day. "Every last piece is pressure-tested before it goes out the door to China," said Jack Abel, the engineer who built the factory. "Or anywhere else." After generations of manufacturers in New York and across the United States folded because they were unable to compete with imports, Watermark, with its only factory in the East New York section of Brooklyn, has managed to crack the code. Instead of trying to make Watermark's products cheaper, Mr. Abel has prospered by first making them more expensive — offering custom-made fixtures unique to each building — and then figuring out how to do that at lower cost. The company has supplied thousands of fixtures to six new luxury hotels and condominiums being built in Shanghai, Macau and Hong Kong. Manufacturing jobs in New York have declined by about 80 percent from a high of 1.1 million jobs in 1947, all but shutting down what had been a heavily trod avenue into the middle class for immigrants and people without advanced educations. Aside from custom-made water faucets, US manufacturers are producing other high-end products to meet Chinese demand, from Jing Daily: Going against the decades-long trend of lower-priced Chinese imports flooding the US market, a growing number of American manufacturers, fashion brands, leathergoods makers, and family-run wineries are looking to China's luxury consumer as a new and important target market. Over the past few years, smaller companies — rather than just high-end giants like Tiffany & Co. and Coach — have found that undertaking a higher pricing strategy, rather than targeting the mid- or low-end mass market, is a plus in China. Demand from high-end property developers in search of top-quality faucets and construction materials isn't the only trend leading American companies to China. For some apparel, accessories and footwear brands, the growing number of wealthy mainland Chinese now moving away from "bling" and towards low-key high-end consumption is providing a whole new demographic. This November, the Wisconsin-based shoemaker Allen Edmonds – for decades, the go-to footwear brand for US presidents and business leaders — plans to open its first location in Shanghai, with an ambitious expansion plan to follow. As Paul Grangaard, president and CEO of Allen Edmonds, said this summer, "We are scheduled to have at least six to 12 flagship stores and over time, 40 or 50 stores in China in the next five years." While most smaller-scale, US-made heritage brands generally don't have the production capacity (or, for some, the desire) to expand into the China market in any major way, a niche is clearly forming. With the likes of Patrik Ervell on the more adventurous side, and Allen Edmonds on the more traditional side, making inroads in China despite virtually nonexistent advertising budgets or huge online campaigns, we can safely assume that demand will only continue to rise for American brands besides Tiffany and Coach. Given the number of well-curated, small multi-brand retailers grows in China as well, the trend may really take hold in a measurable way sooner than we'd expect. Despite the slowdown in manufacturing and increase in imports, the Financial Times reports the appeal of China as a manufacturing base has not yet disappeared: Well-known stresses in the current model are becoming more apparent, including a downturn in total factor productivity, which is the vital, unmeasurable part of economic growth resulting from technological change and institutional efficiency. The transition will require difficult political reforms and an effective response to the competitive threat posed by advanced manufacturing, which is slowly tilting advantage back to the US in particular. China's attraction as a global manufacturing base has not worn off yet, but several developments are chipping it away. At home, these include rising labour costs and skills shortages, as well as discriminatory application of the policy of indigenous innovation, insecure intellectual property rights, weak rule of law and the stifling impact of state-owned entities on enterprise. By contrast, the US is a clear leader in top-end manufacturing, the creation of "smart" companies and in intricate touchscreen technologies. Even more important will be its competitive advantage in new shale oil and gas extraction technologies, and in the development of so-called additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, which is set to change the way we think about manufacturing. These problems will not retard Chinese innovation and technological competitiveness forever. But to adapt, China requires extensive political reform, more robust institutions and a tilt in the role of the state towards supporting enterprise. It will not be helped by the uncertainty over the nature of its downturn and the consequences of the leadership change. © Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us Post tags: luxury goods, made in China, made in the U.S., manufacturing Download Tools to Circumvent the Great Firewall

Chinese ‘Soft Power' Expands in Africa with CCTV Posted: 23 Sep 2012 04:35 AM PDT Chinese government state-controlled media, China Central Television (CCTV), launched its African regional bureau in Nairobi, Kenya on January 11, 2012. While its presence has diversified the media landscape in Africa, media watchdogs and foreign media outlets - such as CNN and the New York Times - have been rather skeptical of its journalistic independence given the media organization's close ties with the government. Background of CCTV Africa According to its official website, CCTV Africa produces a daily one-hour news program, a weekly talk show, a weekly documentary series program. The channel has recently produced a special documentary program to introduce Kenya. CCTV Africa has about 100 employees, many are Kenyans. A screenshot of a promotion trailer of CCTV Africa from YouTube. The new entrant "raid[ed] a number of local TV stations for notable broadcasters and other staff", according to eXpression Today, a magazine published by The Media Institute, a media-watch non-governmental organization in Kenya. Since the decision to establish CCTV in Nairobi was made in the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the NGO watchdog speculated: Although details of how the Chinese TV (that is, CCTV) network gained entry remain 'top secret' because of the opaque nature with which China cuts deals with partners, sources at Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information say that CCTV's entry into Kenya was crafted during the Africa-China summit of 2006 (that is, FOCAC), when President Mwai Kibaki led a Kenyan delegation to Beijing to join more than 40 other African heads of state and government in establishing a new platform of co-operation between China and Africa. Apart from deals on infrastructure development, other areas of cooperation included capacity-building in media and ICTs (information and communication technologies). CCTV and China's soft power in Africa The presence of Chinese media outlets in Africa can be traced back to as early as 1950s, when Xinhua News Agency and China Radio International (CRI) started broadcasting. During that time, the goal of these outlets was to disseminate propaganda and support the African liberation movements. Nowadays, many western media and observers believe that the presence of CCTV in Africa is to expand the Chinese government's soft power and compete with media giants in the West, such as CNN and BBC. Tom Rhodes from the Committee to Protect Journalists comments that: The expansion comes as other, predominantly Western media houses are shrinking their media presence in East Africa; BBC has been forced to cut a number of correspondents and France 24 announced a merger with Radio France Internationale to contain costs, for example. Wu Yu-shan [pdf], who published a research paper in June 2012 on the rise of China's state-led media dynasty in Africa recently, points out: Its soft power is about not only promoting international status but also making Chinese values and culture attractive to a public grown weary of traditional ideology. Therefore China needs to inspire its own public before it can offer anything beyond economic growth to the world. Wu [pdf] also argues that China wants to counter the negative portrayal by Western media giants, an observation confirmed by CCTV Africa bureau chief Song Jia-ning in July 2012: The Western media's treatment of China and its expanding role in Africais one of the most obvious examples. Common themes in Western media coverage are China's negative impact on Africa and its dealings with corrupt governments. They regularly report on China as a monolithic entity, criticize China's colonial ambitions and emphasize present circumstances – with little socio-historic explanation of the China–Africa relationship. Objectivity of CCTV in question Wu's paper also questioned the editorial objectivity of CCTV [pdf] given its state-owned nature: At the same time, the Chinese media have state objectives to meet. When covering Africa, where competitors tend to comment on the controversial areas of China–Africa relations, the Chinese media emphasize the easier narrative of positive stories, friendship and sincerity, avoiding any grey areas. Media Watchdog NGO eXpression Today also points out: …China rarely comments on the political affairs of other countries publicly. In this regard, CCTV's entry into Kenya is unlikely to have any significant impact on Kenyan politics because 'toxic' politics is a no-go-zone for Chinese media. By keeping off serious political issues, CCTV will be no different from KBC and will, therefore, not pose any serious competition to local TV stations and other international networks in any significant way so long as politics remains the preferred media content. Journalist Sambuddha Mitra Mustafi believes that money can't buy credibility: The success of China's global media effort may depend on whether its media can identify that big story when it arrives, and then let the coverage prove their journalistic mettle to the world in a way that declarations from well-meaning editors and officials never will. If CCTV can become the go-to channel for everyone in the world, even if only for a few days, it could change the game for good. And when such a moment does arrive, journalists must be able to ask tough, relevant questions, even of the Chinese leadership. Does the leadership have the stomach for that? Media exchanges between China and Africa have become more frequent since the 2000s (see Wu's paper [pdf]), ranging from technical support, content provision, exchange between officials, and journalistic training. However, the journalistic training programs has been under scrutiny. There is a story in Shinn and Eisenman's new book, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, written by Gideon Nkala and originally published in Mmegi Online: After returning home from the June 2008 African journalist training program, Gideon Nkala of Botswana's The Reporter newspaper published his firsthand account providing a rare glimpse into China's multilateral journalist training programs through African eyes. He notes that the African journalists were all looking forward to the lecture on Tibet, during which, the CPC instructor said, 'Tibet has always been a part of China and greater Tibet is a media creation that never existed.' The Chinese people 'see all the lies and fabrications of the west, [which] tells of the atrocities committed by the Chinese and says nothing when the Monks in Tibet kill and maim people.' The instructor also 'brought pictures to show that even pictures are cropped to cover the atrocities committed by the Monks and their supporters'. He made the whole class burst into laughter when he said, with a straight face, that a new entrant into Chinese street lingua for anything that is untrue and fabricated is now called CNN. 'If someone is telling a lie in China, we now say "you are CNN."' Written by Ronald Yick · comments (0) Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

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