Blogs » Politics » Life for Bo Xilai, Wang Lijun; death for Gu Kailai: Boxun
Blogs » Politics » Life for Bo Xilai, Wang Lijun; death for Gu Kailai: Boxun |
- Life for Bo Xilai, Wang Lijun; death for Gu Kailai: Boxun
- Netizens: “Power of Weibo,” Not the Law, Saved Wu Ying’s Life
- Photo: All in all, by Michael Steverson
- Too Much “Negative” News, or Too Little?
- For Leaders, Fear at the Top?
- China Reverse Merger News: Gulf Resources Litigation Moves Forward
- Philippines, China: Scarborough Shoal Dispute Goes Online
- China: too much “negative” news, or too little?
- Fishermen detained by men in DPRK military uniform treated unhumanity
- Today’s Most Viral Image: A Donated School Makes Way For Luxury
- After Chinese Fishermen’s Ransom-less Release, Ties With North Korea Fraying
- “Pofu” or no “Pofu,” Yang Rui is just an idiot
- The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-21
- CDT Money: Property Market Still Cooling
- Sperm donation issue in China becomes urgent
- China’s wobbly transition
- In China, Fear at the Top
- China's Alarming Risk Of Financial Instability
- Taiwanese Bloggers to Han Han: You Misunderstand Us, We’re Not Like You
- Talking with Christians in rural China
| Life for Bo Xilai, Wang Lijun; death for Gu Kailai: Boxun Posted: 21 May 2012 10:47 PM PDT The mighty fallen: Bo Xilai and his wife Gu Kailai, whose misdeeds were brought to light by Wang Lijun as he sought to protect himself from reprisal. (Internet photo) Bo Xilai, the sacked party secretary of Chongqing, and his former police chief Wang Lijun, who triggered his boss's downfall by revealing his shady dealings and his wife's possible murder of a British businessman, are likely to be given jail sentences ranging from 16 years to life, while Bo's wife Gu Kailai may be sentenced to death if she is convicted of the murder of Neil Heywood, says Boxun, a citizen journalism site allegedly sourced by political insiders that has been surprisingly accurate in its reporting of the Chongqing scandal ahead of traditional media outlets given that the site's claims are often hard to prove. Earlier rumors said Beijing is expected to announce its final disciplinary action against Bo, Wang and Gu in August. Considering the severity of the case — the biggest political storm in China in 20 years — and the calls from the top circle of power for the case to be handled in accordance with the law, the final verdict may be declared as early as June and July, insiders in Beijing told Boxun. The three would all face the death sentence if the severest allegations against them are true, the insiders said. The most likely sentence for Bo, however, is a jail sentence of at least 16 years. It is believed that if Bo were to be put to death, this would raise further awkward questions for the central party authorities as to why they allowed him to get away with his crimes for such a long period of time and why they allowed such an obviously unfit candidate to get so close to attaining a place in the highest echelon of power. Wang meanwhile is accused of three crimes: treason, serious corruption and extorting confessions by means of torture. He is likely to receive the same sentence as Bo, while Gu is the most likely to be sentenced to death. The Communist Party announced in April that Bo is suspected of being involved in "serious discipline violations" and is under investigation by the party's discipline inspection departments. His remaining senior party posts were suspended at that time. Wang, the former director of the bureau of public security in the southwest municipality, rushed to the US consulate in Chengdu in neighboring Sichuan province on Feb. 6, telling American diplomats his fears that Gu was behind the death of Heywood last November and that Bo was threatening his life due to his discovery. Wang's dramatic move triggered upheaval that shook the central leadership to its core and brought great uncertainty to the once-in-a-decade leadership changeover to come at the 18th National Congress later this year, a time when the government is especially sensitive about maintaining political and social stability. Source: Want China Times
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| Netizens: “Power of Weibo,” Not the Law, Saved Wu Ying’s Life Posted: 21 May 2012 11:32 PM PDT It's official: Wu Ying will live. Ms. Wu, once among the richest women in China, was sentenced to death in January by a provincial court for illegally accumulating over RMB380 million, or about US$60 million, through a combination of loansharking and Ponzi schemes directed at (mostly wealthy) individuals and families. Wu then enjoyed a tidal wave of citizen and netizen discontent over her seemingly tainted sentence, as netizens surged forth to demand the ruling be struck down. At the time, they evinced a palpable sense that, somehow, their opinions could save her. They may have been right. In April, China's Supreme People's Court reviewed her death sentence, as it has for all death sentences since 2005. Perhaps in response to widespread public sentiment, it overturned her sentence and remanded the case to the Zhejiang court for re-sentencing. Yesterday, the expected result emerged: Wu Ying was given a two-year reprieve (死缓), which the Wall Street Journal explains will likely be commuted to life in prison after good behavior. While Ms. Wu may have slept well for the first time in months, China's censors were burning the midnight oil. At approximately eight o'clock in the evening, Beijing time, a search for Wu Ying's name called forth 3,653,956 recent tweets on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter. But by dawn, they had whittled that number down to a mere 8,329 (see below). Up top: By this morning Beijing time, there were just a few thousand tweets about Wu Ying. The night before there had been over 3.5 million Luckily, Tea Leaf Nation never sleeps, and was able to capture and analyze a sufficient number of tweets to form an outline of netizen sentiment toward the recent news. A number of netizens complained that the sentence was still "too harsh." But it's a far cry from death, which Wu Ying faced not months ago. The question that has preoccupied the Chinese blogosphere, at least before the censors descended: Why was the sentence suspended? And what does the suspension signal? Did the netizen outcry save Wu Ying? As Tea Leaf Nation reported in January, initial netizen reaction to Wu Ying's death sentence was fierce. Then, as now, millions of tweets poured forth on the blogosphere–then, as now, millions of them were scrubbed clean by morning time. But in the interim, those tweets, and their overwhelming support of Wu Ying, may have had helped convince Chinese authorities to lean on China's Supreme Court to strike down Wu's death sentence. Many netizens hailed the result. @杭州恰恰 wrote, "This is…a victory for public opinion! [Responsiveness to] public opinion is progressing!" @洪陈纷纭 wrote: "The power of democracy; the power of Weibo." If so, what does that say about the law? Unfortunately, many netizens felt their victory, if it was theirs at all, was a Pyrrhic one. @Q版温故's comment aptly captured netizen sentiment: "No matter what, the result is progress. But this time, the progress is mostly because of the contributions of public opinion, and not law itself." Instead of law, many commenters perceived realpolitik, hard at work. @闫英士 opined, "The real meaning is this: The death sentence is to save face, the commutation is to quiet citizen rage. But it all has nothing to do with Wu Ying herself, and certainly doesn't prove the independence of the so-called judiciary." So what kinds of fundraising are "illegal," and which are "legal," anyway? If Wu Ying's sentence was meant to send a message, it failed. All @Fermion could divine was this: "Conduct which harms or could harm the Communist Party's interests is criminal conduct! This is the basic principle of Chinese law!" @寒冷龙卷风 felt it reflected politics, and one's balance sheet: "Finance cannot be separated from politics. If you succeed, it's finance; if you fail, it's a crime." Unequal treatment for a notorious smuggler Many netizens felt compelled to ask, "And what about Lai Changxing (赖昌星)?" Mr. Lai was sentenced last Friday to life imprisonment, not death, for smuggling approximately 20 billion RMB (yes, that's "billion" with a "b") out of China between 1996 and 1999, and then fleeing to Vancouver. Canada recently repatriated him, but only after receiving assurances Lai would not be killed. Some netizens saw this differential as the result of luck, or realpolitik. Netizen @寒冷龙卷风 added: "Someone else smuggles out billions and is given a life sentence–which will be reduced in a few years–and gets to see an outside doctor, et cetera. But it's just dependent on luck. In those years, everyone in the Red House [code for Lai's mansion, in which he is reported to have plied visitors with liquor and prostitutes] was a big official for the Celestial Dynasty [i.e., China's government]." But @民族精神大本营 offered a plausible rebuttal, arguing, "Lai Changxing did not die because 'international law is superior to domestic law.' His immunity to the death penalty for smuggling was [due to] international law. Lai Changxing's original death penalty was under domestic law, so, he was not sentenced to death. The legal basis for Wu Ying's death sentence is completely not up for debate." A bad sign for a valuable sector Many netizens turned the discussion to private finance. After all, Wu Ying's original crime (let's call it that) was raising money from individuals, not banks, and promising outsize returns to lenders. Some observers feel Wu Ying's original death sentence came in part from a government effort to crack down on so-called "grey market loans," i.e. those occurring outside of government purview. But many netizens felt this market should be allowed to flourish. @Golgoltonny wrote that "private enterprise is today's hope and tomorrow's fortune." @江南运河 argued that Wu Ying's behavior should not tarnish the credibility of private finance: "The goal of recognizing the legal status of citizen finance is to support the small and medium micro-enterprises that support private enterprise, allowing the local economy … to get a timely infusion of lifeblood. Because these loans are usually not too large, they won't spread [and become destabilizing]." What happens to Wu's assets, anyway? Speaking of filthy lucre, what happened to Wu's assets, anyway? Recent reports have simply stated that her assets, despite being ill-gotten, will not be confiscated (Chinese). Many netizens found this perplexing. @中关村社点评员 asked, "Why didn't the confiscate her assets? Why not sell them and use them to pay back the debts?" And to Wu Ying? We just may see Wu Ying again. Pending good behavior, her temporary reprieve will eventually become a permanent reprieve--but also a life sentence. However, even life sentences can be shortened in certain circumstances. One netizen, @仔卿同學, decodes it hopefully: "Life imprisonment = 10 - 20 years." If that becomes true, Wu Ying will re-emerge one day to find a China very different from the one she was forced to leave behind. | |||||||||||||||
| Photo: All in all, by Michael Steverson Posted: 21 May 2012 10:56 PM PDT © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| Too Much “Negative” News, or Too Little? Posted: 21 May 2012 10:47 PM PDT Last week, China Media Project wrote about a recent series of articles in the Beijing Daily, a newspaper controlled by the Party leadership, that blasted the West, including an editorial that condemns Western-style media freedoms. From CMP:
CMP also pointed out that after the editorial was published, ironically, searches for "Beijing Daily" were blocked from Sina Weibo. CMP now reports that the above editorial has inspired a lively debate in China about the purpose of the media. They translate a letter to Southern Metropolis Daily in which the author disagrees with the concept of media put forward by the Beijing Daily:
© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| Posted: 21 May 2012 10:20 PM PDT In a New York Times Opinion, Harvard's Roderick MacFarquhar writes that the Bo Xilai scandal – and the revelations about the wealth and lifestyle of his family and the families of other "princelings" – has suggested an underlying fear among China's leadership about the country's future:
Last week, The Guardian reported that three retired CCP officials called on leaders to disclose their family wealth before the issue further erodes the party's grip on power ahead of the upcoming leadership succession. © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| China Reverse Merger News: Gulf Resources Litigation Moves Forward Posted: 21 May 2012 09:05 PM PDT
Yeah, that's right. Another Chinese company listed in the U.S. accused of accounting book flim-flammery. Funny thing: I haven't really been following this case, but once I read about the status of the litigation, I had a quick peek at Gulf Resources to see who they are. Perusing their latest annual report, I was interested to read about who they used to be. If you're not used to reverse mergers, this language might sound a bit crazy (I personally find it entertaining):
Got it? If anyone ever asks you what a reverse merger looks like, just cut and paste that language and send it to them. Any way you look at it, this kind of structure should raise some questions. So a Delaware company that from 1993 was in "the business of owning, leasing and operating coin and debit card pay-per copy photocopy machines, fax machines, microfilm reader-printers and accessory equipment" is now in the business of manufacturing and trading "bromine and crude salt," among other things in the chemical sector. I guess they phased out the fax machine stuff. By itself of course, this sort of transaction is fine. Just because these guys were involved in a reverse merger doesn't mean that anything untoward is going on. Improprieties were not apparent, or at least alleged, until about a year ago, when Gulf Resources was slammed by a research report that suggested the chemical company was not at all what they said they were:
Well, that certainly doesn't sound good, does it? The Glaucus report wasn't very positive about investor options, either:
Ouch. Given that Gulf Resources is located in Shandong and does all its business in China, litigation here would normally make sense. But for an investor suit against a U.S.-listed company, coming to a China court really isn't feasible, so they were left with a U.S. federal court action. Since I haven't seen the evidence and have no special knowledge of this case (or the underlying U.S. law), I don't have an opinion on the merits of the class action. For the record, the plaintiffs are alleging the following:
Only two sets of accounting books? These guys need to do some more digging. Needless to say, a lot of folks are going to be watching this case for a variety of reasons, although I suspect it will not end well for the investors themselves. The evidence that comes out during trial will be the entertaining and informative part of all this. Gulf Resources is now a prominent member of the China reverse merger bad boy club, which includes quite a few companies that have been accused of accounting irregularities. Will any of this have an effect on similarly situated companies, or has all the damage already been done with respect to market pricing? Stay tuned. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| Philippines, China: Scarborough Shoal Dispute Goes Online Posted: 21 May 2012 08:44 PM PDT Scarborough Shoal located in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea is being claimed by three countries: China, Philippines, and Taiwan. Tension rose in the past month between the Philippines and China when the governments of the two nations accused each other of illegally occupying the territorial waters near the shoal. It sparked nationalist sentiments in both countries and the 'word war' has gone online. Filipino netizens shared this Google Map of Scarborough Shoal to highlight its proximity to the Philippines Below are some social media reactions from the Philippines
@redsohigh In terms of bullying and intimidation. We can't defeat China in terms of owning Panatag Shoal (Philippine name for Scarborough). Gosh. We are an easy nuclear target.
@SoWhatsNews China has caught all the fish in Panatag Shoal hence the stoppage and the fishing ban. Sweet n Sour Fish Fillet is selling well today in China. Perhaps to ease tension, both the Philippines and China have imposed a fishing ban in the contested area.
@crystalbrosas Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys Islands are for the Philippines. HAVE MERCY ON OUR COUNTRY. Even if I have Chinese lineage. -_- Bigger than Scarborough, the Spratly issue is more controversial and potentially more dangerous since 6 countries in the Asia-Pacific are claiming the resource-rich islands.
Roselyne Bairan Cua China is so big already yet it's still interested in our small islands. They should just stay away from our islands and focus on their own problem. Maybe they know we don't have military warfare. They are bullying us. Yet they are afraid of Facebook.
Scarborough is rich with marine resources. Photo of giant clams confiscated from fishermen in the area. Photo by @karadavid Rieya Piscano comments on the ongoing 'cyberwar' between nationalist netizens of the two countries
Hackers who attacked the website of a Philippine university left this message: "We come from China. Huangyan Island is ours" The president of the University of the Philippines issued this statement after hackers defaced the university website
Carol P. Araullo advises the Aquino government to resolve the issue without inviting US military intervention
Written by Mong Palatino · comments (0) | |||||||||||||||
| China: too much “negative” news, or too little? Posted: 21 May 2012 08:21 PM PDT Late last week we wrote about the latest hardline editorial in the Beijing Daily, the official "mouthpiece" of the city-level Party leadership in Beijing, an ideological attack on the concept of "freedom of speech" that singled out "certain commercial newspapers and magazines" in China for exaggerating social and political problems in the country. Over the past few days, the Beijing Daily editorial has sparked a small-scale debate in China's media about the role of the press. Here we include a translation of one of the more interesting responses, this one a letter written in to Southern Metropolis Daily — no doubt one of the papers Beijing Daily had in mind as a regular trouble-maker.
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| Fishermen detained by men in DPRK military uniform treated unhumanity Posted: 21 May 2012 07:05 PM PDT Twenty-eight Chinese fishermen returned home on Monday after being detained in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The fishermen, and their three vessels, arrived in Dalian at about 7 am. PHOTO BY QUAN YI / FOR CHINA DAILY Incident ends peacefully after 10 days as men return from DPRK Chinese fishermen detained by men from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea arrived with their vessels in Northeast China's Dalian on Monday, bringing a peaceful end to an international incident that lasted for 10 days. They were released from the custody of men in DPRK military uniform without paying any fines or "ransom". It was reported that the men initially demanded payment of 400,000 yuan ($63,200) for each boat before lowering their request to 300,000 yuan, and they even set a deadline of May 17. The men demanded that the fishermen sign a confession to fishing illegally in DPRK territory, and they were forced to pledge never to do it again. The 28 fishermen arrived at Dalijia fishing harbor at about 7 am and received medical tests in a local hospital. According to the observations of a China Daily reporter, they appeared unharmed and had no cuts or bruises. Earlier, media had reported that 29 fishermen were captured, but one captain explained that a crew member was ill and didn't get on board that day. Han Qiang, captain of the Liaodanyu 23536, said his boat was seized along with two others in the Chinese section of the Yellow Sea on May 8 and dragged to a DPRK island, where the crew was held in custody by armed militiamen in DPRK uniform. "I was so afraid to lift my head up and see their faces because some of us got slapped for doing that," he said. The DPRK captors stripped them of their good shoes and clothes, and some of the detained fishermen came back with plastic slippers on their feet. Additionally, Han said they took everything they could move from the ship, including fishing nets, fish, phones and all the crew members' belongings. "They even took the washing powder away, and also pumped out the diesel from the fuel tank, just leaving enough for us to go back." Zhang Shouyi, 28, from Taihe county in Anhui province, was a sailor on one of the ships. He said he and the seven other crew members were held below deck in a small, unlit room of about 3 square meters. "They locked the door with iron wires, and if the guards were in a good mood, they would accompany us to allow us to use the bathroom. Otherwise, we were only allowed to relieve ourselves in that small space," he said. Zhang said they did not have enough sleep or enough food. "Since being caught, we could hardy fall asleep these days." The crew members were cut off completely from their family members. "I was afraid that they would worry about me if I told them. They thought I was working in Shandong and do not know I'm here. So I plan to call them in a day or two." The wife of detained fisherman Zheng Xiujun, 31, rushed from Suihua in Heilongjiang province upon hearing the news of her husband's return. "When I first saw him in the hospital, it was impossible to hold back my tears. I was crying for his return, and it was a load off my mind," she said. "He looked visibly thinner. My heart hurt when I saw his bushy beard because he normally shaves every day." Han said he does not want to repeat this incident and will shy away from fishing too far out into the ocean in the future. Dong Manyuan, a researcher with the China Institute of International Studies, said the Chinese government should reflect on this incident and strengthen the safety education provided to those who fish offshore, especially in border areas. The Chinese government should also encourage fishermen to abandon methods that seriously damage coastal resources to protect them for future generations, he said. In addition, China should develop an emergency response mechanism to prevent such incidents from happening again. Since the incident, the Chinese government had been in close communication with the DPRK to push for a speedy resolution to the issue. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said China demanded the DPRK ensure the safety and legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese fishermen. Contact the writers at zhangxiaomin@chinadaily.com.cn and cuihaipei@chinadaily.com.cn Xinhua contributed to this story. Source: China Daily
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| Today’s Most Viral Image: A Donated School Makes Way For Luxury Posted: 21 May 2012 03:41 PM PDT It's one tragedy after another. After Mianyang, Sichuan suffered in the horrible earthquake of 2008, millions of RMB were donated to rebuild a local school. Now, that school has suffered not from a quake, but from greed. With over 16,000 re-posts since its appearance, its ruined husk is Sina Weibo's most viral image of May 21, 2012 according to Hong Kong University's Weiboscope. Weiboscope displays the most widely re-posted images among prominent users. What is this image? This is what's left of a school built with donated funds for earthquake victims. (Yes, it was built after the earthquake.) The accompanying text explains: "Sichuan middle school rebuilt post-earthquake with Hong Kong assistance demolished to make way for luxury apartments: In a May 18 television interview, head of the Development Council of Hong Kong's Sichuan rebuilding group Mai Jiguang confirmed that the middle school rebuilt in Mianyang, Sichuan with 2 million RMB [US$315,000] raised from donations by the rebuilding group and educators had already [been demolished]. Moreover, a luxury-style commercial and residential project has already risen in its place. The Hong Kong government is currently considering whether to seek to recoup the funds from the local government."[Chinese] Where did it come from? Forbes Magazine's Chinese portal tweeted this image the evening of the 20th from its official Weibo account (@福布斯中文网). Why is it so popular? If there's one issue that angers Chinese and leads to domestic unrest, it's unauthorized land takings by inscrutable local officials. If there are two issues that anger Chinese, the second may be the neglect of children's education and welfare in order to make a quick buck. As Tea Leaf Nation earlier reported, netizens were irate when students in Shaanxi were recently kicked out of a brand new school to make way for an Audi dealership. Moreover, many children died in the 2008 earthquake because their schools, in many cases due to graft, were not build to code. Put those trends together, and you have a potent mix for netizen anger and the day's most viral image. Footnotes (? returns to text)
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| After Chinese Fishermen’s Ransom-less Release, Ties With North Korea Fraying Posted: 21 May 2012 01:13 PM PDT We'll start with the (very) good news. Twenty nine innocent Chinese fisherman, by all accounts essentially kidnapped for ransom by North Koreans while working in Chinese territorial waters approximately two weeks ago, have been released, arriving safely in a port in the city of Dalian. And China didn't pay anything to get the fishermen back–at least not so far. As reported today on Phoenix Television, after starting at 1.2 million RMB (about US$180,000) and reportedly fluctuating upward in recent days, the ransom for the fishermen (technically, for the boats) was finally lowered to 900,000 RMB. But even that amount has not been paid, although the specific circumstances surrounding the fishermen's release await further details. While tragedy and potential diplomatic crisis have apparently been averted, the days-long uncertainty surrounding the fishermen's fate and condition gave netizens ample time to broadcast their feelings. Chatter on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, makes a few trends apparent. It may not be what the North Korean regime wants to hear. 1. China and North Korea have completely grown apart Distaste is hard to quantify. But China, or at least the vast majority of Chinese netizens, may actually dislike Kim Jong-Un's regime even more than most others around the world. While North Korea's toxic cocktail of incompetence, opportunism and outright evil is an abstraction for many countries, China has to deal with the North's antics every day. Yet, as North Korea's apparent disrespect for China grows, the country continues to give the North aid. No wonder @永远第一书记 wrote, "In fact China is a vassal state of North Korea's, giving billions in tribute every year." It may thus be old news that North Korea has virtually no defenders in China's blogosphere–not, anyway, while netizen commenters are tripping over themselves to see who can make the most memorable fun of North Korea. (You can calm down, netizens–Tea Leaf Nation chose a winner weeks ago.) More significant, however, is netizen language which now views North Korea as a de facto enemy. @深圳老崔 did not see a distinction between North Korea, Japan and the Philippines (two long-time rivals of the Middle Kingdom). He wrote, "Japan occupies the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, the Philippines occupies the Scarborough Shoal (Huanyan Dao); North Korea sees this and says 'damn, we don't have an island, forget it, just kidnap a few fishermen.'" Later he asked, "Where did the spirit from the 'Help Korea, Oppose America' [war] go?" No wonder @杨佩昌 decided, "It's time for us to say goodbye to North Korea." @章立凡 agreed, and felt it was time to mobilize the troops (or at least the redbacks): "This time it's different from the past, it's completely the awful result of policies of appeasement. If the government wanted to deploy troops, or money, it certainly would not be unable." @姚波-风过无痕 put it simply, "This is a terrorist country." 2. When dealing with the rogue state, China's government must placate its own nationalists It's no secret to longtime China analysts that the government fears domestic blowback from crises like these. As Kaiser Kuo wrote ten years ago in Time, "The Party has had to squelch spontaneous expressions of nationalism when they do not serve state interests." Weibo provides a near-ideal platform for netizens to express whatever nationalism they may be feeling at the time to hundreds of millions of potential viewers. It's small wonder, then, that once netizens have identified a popular punching bag, they rush to see who can land the strongest blows. With the escape of Chen Guangcheng and conflicts in the Philippines and now the Bohai bay, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has made an especially juicy target. Among the popular anti-MFA tweets came from @作业本: "The MFA is really [tough], a week passes. And the MFA is. Still. Investigating. The. Situation." Netizen @飘过蓝天的浮云 scolded, "China is really weak, so weak we have to tiptoe around the North Korean Kim family. Given that the MFA is hesitating, this time, for our brothers and compatriots, for these suffering fishermen, we need to unite our voices in opposition! Please re-tweet!" It has been re-tweeted over 2,500 times. 3. Netizens see Sino-North Korean relations as further evidence their government is indifferent to non-elites In many netizens' eyes, if North Korea's government is incompetent and evil, it partly gets away with it because China's government is incompetent and indifferent. @小康就好 went to the heart of many complaints, writing: "The celestial dynasty [slang for China's government] never puts the interests of the grassroots citizens at number one." In one widely-discussed tweet, @深圳老崔 wrote, "Regardless of whether the Philippine and North Korean messes are real or fake, [stop] acting like you're some big responsible power. You don't care whether a group of we 'fartizans' [屁民, slang for "ignored citizens"] are lost." Engineer @百岛吕某人 did not help the government's reputation for indifference when, in a tweet titled "Begging everyone to re-tweet," he wrote: "The local government sent the mayor to comfort us for awhile, then he left. The North Korean side said it wanted 800,000 RMB to let us go, but we said we didn't have money." Not only did the fishermen and their families not have the money, they likely had nothing close to the amount required to placate their captors. To a cash-desperate North Korean, the average Chinese person lives quite richly. But from the Chinese side, the ransom demand threw a spotlight on China's sharp division between rich and poor. Changing accounts of just how much money the captors were requesting (is it 1.2 million RMB? 2.7 million RMB?) kept the cash question at front and center. In response, netizens fed up with the government tried to turn Weibo into a sort of Kickstarter.com for kidnapping victims. While @章立凡 vowed "not to pay a cent," @Rick郭 argued that "monetary assistance would be in order to save the lives of these compatriots." It was an impressive display, or at least bluff, of Chinese solidarity, but it stemmed from mistrust of government generally. @马陌上Q called for commenters to "stand up and call for everyone to chip in for the 1.2 million RMB to pay the ransom and bring our compatriots home! As one of the few governments in the world without an army [sic], I trust that our government has no other way than to pay the ransom. Instead of letting the government surreptitiously stuff cash into North Korean hands (no doubt incurring many middleman fees in the process), it's better for taxpayers to be open–and pay directly!" It turns out that wasn't necessary. Whatever as-yet unrevealed backchannel communications the Chinese government used, they appear to have worked this time, and at no major financial cost. But Phoenix Television has reported the fishermen have expressed fear at going near North Korean waters again. If such fear continues to spread, it may hurt China's reputation and bottom line in a way that one day invites a less patient response from North Korea's big brother next door. [Thanks to Tea Leaf Nation writer Fleur for contributing research.] | |||||||||||||||
| “Pofu” or no “Pofu,” Yang Rui is just an idiot Posted: 21 May 2012 10:27 AM PDT As the only Chinese and the only girl on the masthead, the boys from rectified.name kindly asked me to write a piece commenting on Yang Rui's statements from a women's perspective, especially his calling Melissa Chan a "泼妇", a word Brendan and others translated as "bitch". It is very sweet of them, and I feel bad for what he said to Melissa, but let's be clear, there is no women's perspective, there is only the universal sense that this guy is an IDIOT. First, Yang's Chinese is very bad. I don't think anything Melissa did deserves the word "泼". She didn't sit on the ground yelling or screaming. She was just really good at her job. Where does the "泼" come from? As an anchor for an influential Chinese TV station, I feel Yang should improve his Chinese and find a more suitable word to describe a peer, especially one who does actual journalism, rather than showing off his sort of English language skills in a TV studio and writing shameful microblog posts. Second, I don't care whether he is xenophobic or nationalist or racist, as long as he keeps those thoughts to himself. Who the hell cares what this guy thinks? In China we have many so-called journalists like this and they are not the pride of my country. It would be nice if they didn't go out of there way to put their naïve and simple ideas on Weibo and the Internet. Weibo posts are public. People, both Chinese and foreign, will judge the quality of Chinese journalism on the stupidity of the brainless "patriotic" few. It's not fair because, trust me, there are many good Chinese journalists. That's all I have to say about this. I am not going to waste my time on Yang Rui. Guys, 散了散了。There are better things to worry about. | |||||||||||||||
| The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-21 Posted: 20 May 2012 08:59 PM PDT
© Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us | |||||||||||||||
| CDT Money: Property Market Still Cooling Posted: 21 May 2012 09:39 AM PDT In the wake of another cut to the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for commercial lenders, the second such move this year, data releases continue to indicate that China will need to take additional policy steps to boost an economy under siege both from financial crises abroad and slowing growth at home. With April's bank lending already weaker than expected, the China Daily reported Thursday that China's "Big Four" banks "made almost no new loans" in the first half of May. The figures do not reflect any increase in lending enabled by the RRR cut, which did not take effect until May 18, but doubts persisted over whether the move by China's central bank would have a large impact anyway. What ails China's lending environment, and why won't an RRR cut fix it? MarketWatch's Craig Stephens thinks banks might have a supply-side problem, battling higher funding costs as their expanding suite of wealth management products – and the higher returns they offer investors – squeezes their margins. But Bob Davis and Tom Orlik write in The Wall Street Journal that the problem lies on the demand side, that the government can no longer "turbocharge the economy as they have in the past" by pushing state-owned banks to churn out new loans because the system lacks an ample supply of borrowers willing to take them:
Even beyond the steelmakers and manufacturers, the troubles plaguing China's cooling property market don't help banks' lending prospects either. Average home prices in 70 Chinese cities fell again in April, as the government continues to demonstrate a commitment to a price correction that it began in 2010. And while property prices may rebound in the 4th quarter as supply begins to ease, one research analyst told China Daily, housing ministry official Zhang Xiaohong told local media on Friday that Beijing won't reverse its course and that "There is still room for property developers to continue to adjust prices to boost sales volume, but there is no more room for property speculation." For now, reports Robin Kwong in The Financial Times, developers can only continue to push their large inventories of unoccupied properties:
The Globe and Mail's Mark MacKinnon points out that the Chinese government's handling of the housing market reflects not just an attempt at a market correction, but also a play for political preservation:
Wen Calls for Growth Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao took time during his weekend trip to Wuhan to reiterate the government's aim of fine-tuning the economy to support growth, according to The China Daily:
Even if he was only repeating the same long-deployed talking points, Chinese stocks rose today and Bloomberg News reports that Wen's comments led analysts to speculate that the fine-tuning may become a little more heavy:
The Battle For Securities Reform
Is China Deleveraging? The Wall Street Journal's Tom Orlik writes that while China's credit-fueled growth (which saw the ratio of credit to GDP rise to 173% by the end of 2011) may have saved China's economy from the global financial crisis, the trend has begun to reverse amid an environment ripe with inflation, an overheated property market, among other things. It's good for the ratio to come down and it should continue to come down, but this comes with consequences that Beijing can temper in a number of ways:
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| Sperm donation issue in China becomes urgent Posted: 21 May 2012 03:04 AM PDT Sperm demand becomes higher and higher in China. Some sperm banks such as in Jiangsu province gives the donors 5,000 yuan for their sperm donation.
About 90% donors are college students, and only 30% of them can reach the quality even thought they are younger and healthier than those males who are already working and bearing social stress. Compared the low quality sperm donation, the demand of them are higher and higher these years. The infertility couples should wait more than 1 year for their turns to get sperms from sperm bank. "High demand and lack of supply is a common quandary faced by people all around the world. The problem appears as soon as the sperm bank has been built," said Zhang Wei, an expert in this field. "Only 15% to 20% of the donation can reach the quality." The quality of male's semen was reducing 1% per year since 1981 to 1996, according to the data given by Family Planning Commission in China. At present, it is known that 10 % to 15% couples are infertile. And even the women who are unmarried also want to have babies relying on the sperm banks. 粗绳入画820260: The social ethics should be concerned first unless someday the donor might involved with his "daughter". 金玉良言676359: Damn! I waste my sperms thousands times, how could I know the bank pays money? 卢高书: We should grasp the fact through its appearance. People will feel worried when they have no job, but will have low quality lives when they are struggling for jobs. 一吐为快6189918: Chinese group will become as rare as panda. 成长坚持: Is it tell people that there is no good genus in China? 才气过人716828: Strongly don't agree with sperm donation. Reducing Chinese population is the way to let China become strengthener and wealthier. It is exact the goal we launch one-child policy. wl8819230: To be honest, how much your sperm worth? In China, such kind of damn society, people always do bad things without conscience, especially doctors whose professional ethics are eaten by dogs. In a good chance, they will colon a bunch of monsters by using your sperms. 千里之足648713: I'm willing to save those families. I sperms are pretty good. My child is a Ph.D. in Peking University and all my sisters are so smart and went to colleges. If you need me, please call me. lvqs1976: Why not change the one-child policy? Check those data, young people have huge pressure in lives and are living in a bad environment, Chinese people will become extinct. Source: Sohu
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| Posted: 21 May 2012 04:53 AM PDT The whole point of political office is to steal as much money as possible as fast as possible By David Ignatius Perhaps when Chinese leaders began to speak over the past several years about a new "Beijing Consensus" and the triumph of the "China Model," that was a warning that the bubble was about to burst. And we're seeing that hubris play out now, as China's leaders struggle with the greatest internal crisis since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. This time, the political machinations have mostly been behind the scenes among the Communist Party elite. The headline event was the purge of Bo Xilai, the ambitious party chief in Chongqing province. But the corruption investigation of Bo has sent shock waves across the system. Bo's network of friends and cronies was so wide that many senior party and military officials fear they might be affected. Because China works so hard to conceal the workings of its political system, outsiders get only glimpses of the turmoil. The Financial Times reported last weekend that Zhou Yongkang, one of Bo's key backers on the Politburo's standing committee, had been forced to give up control of China's police, judiciary and secret police. The Wall Street Journal wrote Thursday that two senior Chinese military officials, Gen. Liu Yuan and Gen. Zhang Haiyang, had been questioned about their links to Bo. Such rumors abound, all impossible to verify. Across China, there is said to be uncertainty as officials try to understand what's happening and to protect themselves. It's a nerve-wracking moment for a country where, as one longtime China investor privately observes, "the whole point of political office is to steal as much money as possible as fast as possible." The official line, conveyed by People's Daily, is that the country's leadership transition will go forward as scheduled this fall, with Xi Jinping expected to succeed Hu Jintao as president. But this brave front masks what China-watchers describe as a state of high anxiety. Though Bo has been attacked as a "princeling" son of the party elite, some of the Politburo members who ousted him are princelings, too, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Xi himself. The full array of targets in the anti-Bo campaign is not yet clear, so the fallout is hard to predict. What dynamics underlie this jockeying among the leadership? I put that question to Kenneth Lieberthal, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution and perhaps America's most respected Sinologist. He notes three factors that make the current moment so delicate: ●The Chinese leadership is rarely so clearly divided. The party rulers prize consensus and believe that it's a key factor in maintaining stability. They learned long ago that if they don't hang together, they risk all hanging separately. That essential consensus is now in question. ●The Chinese middle class, whose rise has buttressed political stability, appears disgruntled. Social media in China are alive with complaints about product safety, food safety, air quality (described by U.S. officials as "crazy bad") and widespread corruption. A crucial social force is increasingly disaffected, and the spread of new social media amplifies this discontent. ●The Chinese elite worry about a huge migrant labor force, estimated at 300 million, who live mostly on the margins of the rich coastal cities. They represent a potential source of instability because they are denied full urban status, with its attendant benefits. If there's one thing China is good at, it's managing and suppressing internal dissent, so you'd have to bet that Beijing will keep the lid on. But it's getting harder. These problems would be worrying even if the Chinese economy were still in its mega-boom phase. But economic growth is cooling. China's imports and exports have both slowed over the past year, and the country's central bank just lowered its reserve requirements, for the third time in six months, to encourage banks to lend more money. What does this wobbly Chinese transition mean for America? Lieberthal is surely right that there's little the United States can do to shape events, in any event. China is too big and complicated a country for that. For 40 years, the United States has seen a rising and stable China as being in its interest, and this core interest hasn't changed. But if the Chinese leadership can't contain the current turmoil, new political forces may emerge calling for a more open and democratic China. Americans are bound to be sympathetic, as they were to the Tiananmen protesters. But the process of change could be wildly unstable: An evolving China is better for everybody than an exploding one. | |||||||||||||||
| Posted: 21 May 2012 04:41 AM PDT By RODERICK MacFARQUHAR IN the heyday of the Soviet era, Communist leaders were described by the dissident Yugoslav theorist Milovan Djilas as the "New Class," whose power lay not in ownership of wealth but in control of it: all the property of the state was at their beck and call. There was the apocryphal but appropriate story of Brezhnev's showing his humble mother around his historic office, his magnificent collection of foreign luxury cars and his palatial dacha with its superb meals, and asking for her impressions — to which she replied: "It's wonderful, Leonid, but what happens if the Bolsheviks come back?" But if even a fraction of the stories about the wealth and lifestyles of China's "princelings" — the descendants of Mao's revolutionary generation — are to be believed, China's New Class wants not only control, but also ownership. Few of China's netizens are likely to believe that Bo Xilai, the Politburo member and party boss of the mega-city of Chongqing who was ousted in March on corruption charges, was an aberration. Why has ownership of wealth become so important for the Chinese elite? And why have so many Chinese leaders sent their children abroad for education? One answer surely is that they lack confidence about China's future. This may seem strange, given that the Chinese have propelled their country into the top ranks of global economic powerhouses over the past 30 years. There are those who predict a hard landing for an overheated economy — where growth has already slowed — but the acquisition of wealth is better understood not just as an economic cushion, or as pure greed, but as a political hedge. China's Communist leaders cling to Deng Xiaoping's belief that their continuance in power will depend on economic progress. But even in China, a mandate based on competence can crumble in hard times. So globalizing one's assets — transferring money and educating one's children overseas — makes sense as a hedge against risk. (At least $120 billion has been illegally transferred abroad since the mid-1990s, according to one official estimate.) Mao and his colleagues had a self-confidence born of many factors: triumph in civil war; a well-organized party apparatus; a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework, the road map to a socialist future; and the bulwark of the victorious People's Liberation Army. Today, more than 60 years after the civil war, only the P.L.A. looks somewhat the same, and the self-confidence is fraying. The denunciations of party leaders and officials by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution undermined the party's authority and legitimacy. The party's insecurity was accentuated by Deng's rejection (in practice) of Marxism-Leninism. The cloak of ideological legitimacy was abandoned in the race for growth. Today, the party's 80 million members are still powerful, but most join the party for career advancement, not idealism. Every day, there are some 500 protests, demonstrations or riots against corrupt or dictatorial local party authorities, often put down by force. The harsh treatment that prompted the blind human-rights advocate Chen Guangcheng to seek American protection is only one of the most notorious cases. The volatile society unleashed against the state by Mao almost 50 years ago bubbles like a caldron. Stories about the wealth amassed by relatives of party leaders like Mr. Bo, who have used their family connections to take control of vast sectors of the economy, will persuade even loyal citizens that the rot reaches to the very top. The Bo affair is not just about massive corruption but also succession. Mr. Bo had developed a high-profile "Chongqing model" characterized by crime busting, Maoist singalongs, cheap housing and other welfare provisions. It was a populist, and popular, attempt by a charismatic "princeling," son of a revolutionary hero, to assert his natural right to ascend to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress later this year. Among the rumors circulating in China is that, once on the committee, Mr. Bo would have tried to replace the party's incoming general secretary and president agreed to by the outgoing leadership: Xi Jinping. Mao, who died in 1976, hand-picked his successor. Deng, who died in 1997, blessed Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to follow him. Mr. Hu, not being a revolutionary hero like Mao or the godfather of economic reform like Deng, did not have the prestige to appoint his successor. The low-key Mr. Xi, a princeling like Mr. Bo, emerged as a result of jostling behind closed doors. Lacking institutional legitimacy and a laying of hands by an elder, he might have looked an easy target to an ambitious Mr. Bo. In the months ahead, party leaders will use every propaganda tool to dissipate the damage inflicted on leadership unity, party discipline and national "harmony" by the Bo debacle. They might divert criticism from Bo by depicting his allegedly murderous wife as China's Lady Macbeth. But members of China's New Class will still worry that the revelations about elite corruption have exposed them to the danger of the Bolsheviks coming back. | |||||||||||||||
| China's Alarming Risk Of Financial Instability Posted: 21 May 2012 04:27 AM PDT By Patrick Chovanec In my debate with Andrew Batson in The Guardian in March, I noted that: In my last several posts, I've focused on the former — the slowdown in China's GDP growth. I want to switch gears here for a moment and call attention to a rather alarming story involving the latter — the risk of financial instability — which somehow slipped under most people's radar screens. In early April, Caixin magazine ran an article titled "Fool's Gold Behind Beijing Loan Guarantees", which documented the silent implosion of Zhongdan Investment Credit Guarantee Co. Ltd., based in China's capital. "What's a credit guarantee company?" you might ask — and ask you should, because these companies and the risks they potentially pose are one of the least understood aspects of China's "shadow banking" system. If the risky trust products and wealth funds that Caixin documented last July are China's equivalent to CDOs, then credit guarantee companies are China's version of AIG. As I understand it, credit guarantee companies were originally created to help Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) get access to bank loans. State-run banks are often reluctant to lend to private companies that do not have the hard assets (such as land) or implicit government backing that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) enjoy. Local governments encouraged the formation of a new kind of financial entity, which would charge prospective borrowers a fee and, in exchange, serve as a guarantor to the bank, pledging to pay for any losses in the event of a default. Having transferred the risk onto someone else's shoulders, the bank could rest easy and issue the loan (which it otherwise would have been reluctant to make). In effect, the "credit guarantee" company had sold insurance — otherwise known as a credit default swap (CDS) — to the bank for a risky loan, with the borrower forking over the premium. Now putting aside what happened at Zhongdan for a moment, let's just consider what this means. Like any insurance scheme, this arrangement only "works" if the risks are not correlated. If you insure 100 people in 100 different towns against a tornado striking, you collect premiums and then, when a tornado strikes one of those towns, you make the payout to one claimant and the premiums from the rest cover it. If you insure 100 people in the same town against a tornado, you collect premiums for a while at no cost — it looks like a fantastic business. But if a tornado finally does strike that one town, you have to pay everybody at once and you're wiped out. That's exactly what happened to AIG when it sold credit default swaps on mortgage-backed CDOs. As long as the housing market didn't collapse, all they did was collect premiums. When it did collapse, they went under. Or rather, they had to be bailed out so that all the banks and other customers who had bought insurance from them — who thought they were insured — wouldn't go bust when AIG couldn't pay up. The concern in China is that — like that tornado — a drop in the local property market, or a decline in exports, could hit all borrowers at once, overwhelming the local credit guarantee company and leaving the banks high and dry. The risk is exacerbated by the fact that many credit guarantee companies were capitalized with loans from the same banks whose other loans they are guaranteeing. In effect, banks are insuring themselves, or each other, and would still end up holding the bag on loan losses that are supposedly insured. (It would be interesting to know how such "guaranteed" loans are treated when regulators perform their much-vaunted stress tests on Chinese banks. I suspect these loans are considered loss-proof, because they are "insured.") Zhongdan, the company in the Caixin article, took these risks one step further. It persuaded borrowers to take out bank loans based on guarantees from Zhongdan, and then hand some or all of that money back to Zhongdan to invest in Zhongdan's own "wealth management" products: Since this use of funds completely violated banking rules, Zhongdan forged documents indicating the money was being borrowed to pay fictitious suppliers: The whole thing started to unravel in January when banks "reacted to rumors of a liquidity crunch" at Zhongdan: At that point, regulators stepped in and told everybody to freeze — and to keep all the assets as "good" on everyone's balance sheets while they figured out what to do next. Zhongdan had over 300 clients, and guaranteed RMB 3.3 billion (US$ 521 million) in loans from at least 18 banks. The only liquid assets that the guarantee company appears to have available to pay banks is RMB 210 million (US$ 33 million) in margin accounts deposited with the banks themselves. Good luck finding the rest: Lest you think Zhongdan was just a colorful outlier, think again:
Read that last quote again. The implication is that Zhongdan's modus operandi (forging documents to channel loan proceeds into risky investment schemes) is common practice among China's credit guarantee companies, and that Chinese banks have been willing co-conspirators. I wish I could tell you the size of the problem, on a systemic level, but that's part of the problem — it's too opaque. Nobody I've talked to knows. One of the reasons banks may have been willing to go along with the charade was the need to fulfill their quotas when it came to boosting SME lending. If so, it reinforces what I said years ago, that state-mandated set-asides are not the way to improve entrepreneurs' access to bank lending, that banks need to revise their whole approach to lending: More importantly, the Zhongdan episode — which I'm amazed hasn't attracted more attention and concern — illustrates the kind of hidden risks that have developed in China's financial system, to which bank and regulators have been willing to turn a blind eye in order to meet the insatiable credit demands of investment-led GDP growth. In a recent report debunking "myths" about China's economy (which could have been titled "China: Don't Worry, Be Happy"), CLSA's Andy Rothman maintains (in Myth #13, p. 46) that there are "no shadow banks" in China. "Anything in the shadows sounds scary," he says, but never fear because all of China's financial institutions, banks and non-banks, are under the firm control of the Party. "They are," he quips, "Party animals." Indeed. Zhongdan and other credit guarantee companies certainly seem to have been partying it up. Only now is what they have done beginning to emerge from the shadows. It looks pretty scary to me. | |||||||||||||||
| Taiwanese Bloggers to Han Han: You Misunderstand Us, We’re Not Like You Posted: 20 May 2012 01:01 PM PDT Beautiful Formosa, we hardly know ye. Though netizens have never held back their praise for Taiwan, or China's "Treasure Island" (宝岛), Han Han's recent blog entry, Winds of the Pacific, took the admiration to another level after going viral online. (Tea Leaf Nation recently translated an excerpt of it.) Often dubbed the opinion leader of contemporary Chinese youth, Han Han depicted the kindness and generosity of the Taiwanese he encountered, in contrast to what he felt was Mainland Chinese's lack of empathy. He thanked Hong Kong and Taiwan for preserving traditional Chinese values, things he felt were "already lost" on the mainland. In praise of the humble Wang Songhong, I mean, Wang Hongsong, I mean…forget it The post garnered such attention that Taiwanese president Ma Ying-Jeou publicly responded to Han's piece through Taiwan's Central News Agency, saying he was "proud that traditional Chinese virtues such as honesty…and tolerance are increasingly displayed and seen in Taiwan." One Taiwanese also got famous along with Han Han's blog entry: The kind taxi driver who found Han Han's phone in his car and drove back to his hotel to return the lost property. Han Han wrote that the man left a deeper impression on him than President Ma, though Han actually remembered the man's name incorrectly, writing "Wang Hongsong" instead of "Wang Songhong" the first time. Han Han later made the correction and apologized. (According to Taiwan's CTV News Channel, the taxi driver is actually named Li Hongsong—Han Han seems to have gotten it wrong the second time, even, though no further correction is spotted in his blog so far.) Lin Shu Shu: It's not about Chinese values Amidst mainlander praise and Taiwanese pride, however, other voices are also sounding. Some of these voices come from Taiwan's own bloggers who refuse to give in to self-congratulation. Lin Shu Shu's (林樹樹) recent post, Civic Virtue or Traditional Chinese Virtue—Han Han's misunderstanding of Taiwan (是公民素養,還是中華傳統美德?──韓寒對台灣的誤解), poses the critical question: To what is the kindness of people like Mr. Li Hongsong due? "Praises of Taiwanese' humaneness is often seen in mainland tourists' journals. Mainlanders often attribute it to Taiwan's preservation of traditional Chinese values, but this is but a misunderstanding." Lin thinks Han Han's mistake comes from his lack of understanding of Taiwan's history: When Japanese colonists first stepped on Taiwan in 1895, what they faced was a place no different from Mainland China. But the rule of Japanese colonialists created the basis of the rule of law, and in the 1930s intellectuals in Taiwan started to promote civic participation. The trend gradually spread to the masses thanks to the development of democracy and the flow of information, especially since the 1990s. What Han Han saw in Taiwan, therefore, is the result of a developed civic society. It has nothing to do with traditional Chinese values. Zhang Junkai: We like to feel different Taiwanese student Zhang Junkai (张钧凯) also casts his doubts in his recent post on guancha.cc. He doesn't see Han Han's blog entry as potentially leading to genuine cross-strait communication. Rather, Han Han's popularity only reaffirms Taiwan's long-standing misunderstanding of Mainland China. Zhang considers the problem in its historical context: The double division (those being the Chinese civil war and the Cold War) lying between the mainland and Taiwan has never been really resolved. As Zhang argues, concepts of "Democracy" and "Liberty" serve as useful tools for Taiwanese to distinguish themselves from the underdeveloped and corrupt "Red China." Taiwanese welcomes anyone from the mainland who can be seen as a "flag-bearer of liberalism" or a "democratic dissident." Hence Taiwan's acceptance of Han Han is no surprise, since he is famous for his bold criticism of the PRC government. A mainland celebrity's unconditional compliment reaffirms Taiwanese conviction of their social and political superiority, Zhang writes. Better yet, it is comforting to Taiwanese, who are as anxious and fearful of the mainland as they have always been. Taiwan, Zhang argues, is not immune to the problems that Han Han identifies in Mainland China. Zhang calls for a more sincere effort towards mutual understanding between two sides of the Taiwan Strait. He then concludes: "Han Han brings the wind of the Pacific from Taiwan back to mainland. But we hope this wind can actually go both ways." On guancha.cc, the site hosting Zhang's blog, reader reactions split. Ninety-one readers rated the article "insightful", and seventy-three "ridiculous." The split of readers' responses is almost symbolic of the split of opinions regarding the current mainland-Taiwan relations. But as Han Han rightly points out, communication between both sides is indeed improving– even the kind taxi driver has his own QQ and Sina Weibo account. | |||||||||||||||
| Talking with Christians in rural China Posted: 21 May 2012 03:56 AM PDT A few weeks ago I had the chance to visit a very small village. The villagers there told me this story of how they converted to Christianity and I thought it was an interesting account that gave a glimpse of their relationship with God and a few of the practical challenges of being a rural Christian. The following is a fairly close retelling of what I overheard from their congregation- Villager #1 – Before we became Christians, our village was known for quarreling with our neighbors. Outsiders said that you could hear us fighting even before you entered. Neighbors would fight from sun up to sun down. We were really terrible then (congregation nods in agreement). Another villager later told us that she had been one of the absolute worst, and raised her hands to show her ability to fight. The other villagers found this hilarious, but it seemed pretty obvious that she was one tough old lady. Then one of our villagers met the minister from the nearby town and became a Christian (this minister was Chinese, he had been converted by another Chinese minister in the 80′s). When the others saw how happy she was, they wanted to become Christian too. Now almost the whole village has become Christian, and we no longer fight with each other. Things are much better now. We even received an award from the local gov't for being a harmonious village. The Lord has blessed our village in many other ways as well. For instance, because we are located high on the cliff, and we only recently had a road built, we used to have to lower caskets down by rope for burial. From time to time, the casket would tip over and the body would come tumbling out, it was a terrible misfortune for the family. Since we became Christians though, this has not happened a single time. Minister from the nearby town – When the villagers from this place first started coming to my church, it took them nearly 6 hours to get to the chapel. This was because there was no road to the village, and so the trip was not only difficult but dangerous. When I learned about this I contacted a Christian charity for help. The charity then worked with the local gov't to secure the funding for the project, but to keeps costs low, the villagers had to work together. Even though they weren't fighting with each other as much during that time, they were still too busy farming to work on this project. One day though, this woman (a woman missing one arm comes to the front of the church), picked up a bucket and started working on the road. When the others saw that even this disabled person was willing to work, they knew they had no valid excuses (at this point, most of the people in the church were crying, including the woman). Now that the road has been built it is not only much easier for them to come to the city for church, but they can also reach emergency medical services and sell their goods in the market. This is truly a precious gift from God. Lay Leader responding to a question about literacy - In our village we have very few people who can read. Most of the young people have left (the ones who could read), and so it can be difficult for new believers to understand the Bible's teachings. One of our members was so determined to learn the lessons, that she had her husband read her passages from the Bible every night until she memorized most of the important texts. Even though she can't read, the others in the church know that if there is ever a question about the scripture, she can always recall the whole verse. Another woman's husband decided that he could teach his wife to read while she worked. So every night he would copy a verse in large characters for her. Then when she was plowing the fields, she would attach the verse to the back of the cow and study the characters one by one. Now she is one of our church leaders. So even though most of the members can't read, all of the members can access the Bible in one way or another. We also spend time before each church service learning all the songs for the day. Minister from nearby town answering a question about whether or not he'd ever had trouble from the local gov't for being a Christian- One time in the late 80′s, shortly after I became a Christian, I saw many young people on a motorcycle and they seemed to be prostitutes. I thought this was something that the gov't should control, and so I made several large-character posters encouraging them to take action. A few days later the Public Security Bureau came and took me to the police station for questioning. They asked, "Did you write the signs near the gov't buildings?" "I did," I said. "Who told you to do this?" they said. "I did it by myself," I replied. "Why are you against the Party?" they asked. I was very confused though, because I had never said anything against the Party, I was just encouraging them to uphold the laws. After several more rounds of questioning, I finally realized that these officers had never even seen the posters. Someone had simply reported to them that I was putting up signs by the gov't buildings, and that I had never done this before I was a Christian. In those days, that was enough to get you into a lot of trouble. Once I recognized this and explained to them what the signs had actually said, they were very embarrassed that they had questioned me about them, and assured me the gov't would look into this case. | |||||||||||||||
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