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- Gary Locke Talks Chen, Drama in China
- Finding Zen and Book Contracts in Beijing
- China, Philippines Agree to Show Restraint
- Cartoon: The Wall, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场)
- Chen Xitong: Tiananmen Crackdown was a Tragedy
- Hexie Farm (蟹农场): The Wall
- Wine from Gobi Desert Aims At Market
- The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-29
- The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-29
- Is Li Xingong Arrest Another Victory for China’s Weibots?
- Chinese Democracy Has its Benefits
- Some Data on Reverse-Merger Class Action Lawsuits
- Xinhua: No “Massive Stimulus”
- Echoes of Zhu Rongji? China’s New Privatization Push
- Urban Wages See Double-Digit Growth in 2011
- Sina Weibo “User Contracts” Go Live
Gary Locke Talks Chen, Drama in China Posted: 30 May 2012 12:18 AM PDT U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke gave an exclusive interview to Newsweek about his posting in Beijing, which has not lacked drama. He first discusses the day that former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun entered the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, seeking asylum:
Chinese responses to Locke vary between admiration and disgust. CDT's Anne Henochowicz put together a slideshow for Foreign Policy which looks at various images of Locke in Chinese netizens' eyes. © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Finding Zen and Book Contracts in Beijing Posted: 29 May 2012 11:32 PM PDT On the New York Review of Books blog, Ian Johnson profiles Bill Porter, an American translator of Chinese poetry and religious books, who has become a minor literary celebrity in China:
© Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
China, Philippines Agree to Show Restraint Posted: 29 May 2012 11:36 PM PDT Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and both countries imposing fishing bans in the Scarborough Shoal, China and the Philippines seem to have reached an agreement to show restraint. This announcement would ease tensions surrounding the two-month long stand-off following accusations from the Philippines that Chinese fishing boats were illegally fishing near the shoal. The Straits Times reports:
While the tensions may be easing, they are part of a larger dispute in the region. From the Voice of America:
There are also reports that the new envoy to China from the Philippines will work to further smooth out the relationship. From China Daily:
Read more on the South China Sea disputes, via CDT. © Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Cartoon: The Wall, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场) Posted: 29 May 2012 11:18 PM PDT © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Chen Xitong: Tiananmen Crackdown was a Tragedy Posted: 29 May 2012 11:02 PM PDT Former Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, who was in office during the 1989 protests and was later jailed for corruption, has called the June 4 military crackdown on the Beijing protests a "tragedy," according to a new book of interviews with him. The book is reportedly a response to diaries of former premier Li Peng which called Chen "'the chief commander' of the Beijing Martial Law Command Center." In the same series of interviews, Chen denied the charges against him. From the Guardian:
Read more about the 1989 protests, the June 4 crackdown, and Chen Xitong via CDT. © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Posted: 29 May 2012 02:43 PM PDT For his latest entry to his CDT series, cartoonist Crazy Crab of Hexie Farm depicts the invisible walls of censorship and self-censorship, as well as dictatorship and servility. The dictator is barking commands which the figures underneath obey. Read more about Hexie Farm's CDT series, including a Q&A with the anonymous cartoonist, and see all cartoons so far in the series. [CDT owns the copyright for all cartoons in the Hexie Farm CDT series. Please do not reproduce without receiving prior permission from CDT.] © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | One comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Wine from Gobi Desert Aims At Market Posted: 29 May 2012 02:49 PM PDT As China's local wine market grows and foreign labels are running vineyards in China, wine from the Gobi desert is aiming at the booming market. The Gobi desert is located in the Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang region. Although the region seems unlikely for the location of a vineyard, the Gobi desert has several different types of climates that are conducive to wine making. Rueters reports:
Although Chateau Hansen mainly sells in China, they will also be present at the Vinexpo Asia Pacific 2012. Winemakers attending the expo, held in Hong Kong, hope to break into the Chinese market. AFP adds:
Read more about wine in China, via CDT. © Melissa M. Chan for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-29 Posted: 28 May 2012 08:59 PM PDT
© Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-29 Posted: 28 May 2012 08:59 PM PDT
© Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Is Li Xingong Arrest Another Victory for China’s Weibots? Posted: 29 May 2012 08:41 AM PDT You may have been following the sensational case of Li Xingong, the former number two Party official in Yongcheng city, Henan, who is alleged to have raped a number of underage girls. According to Xinhua, Li's arrest was formally approved earlier today. As lurid as this case is, I wouldn't normally comment on a criminal matter like this, even noting that Li used to be a higher-up government official. This was not a case of corruption, misuse of public funds, etc. If the allegations are true, the man is a sex offender, and his actions (unless we learn something new) were not directly related to his public responsibilities. That being said, there is another twist to this case that I'm frankly still trying to unravel: the role of public pressure. As you know, I have a great deal of interest in cases where the public seemingly exerts an influence on the judiciary, prosecutors or the police, usually in criminal matters. As I've said many times, the general trend disturbs me; the criminal justice system should generally be immune to public pressure. If not, scary things can happen. So does the case of Li Xingong fit into this category? That's certainly the message I get from reading the foreign press, which includes the following writeups: AFP: China ex-official held over rapes after online anger Reuters: China detains official for rapes after online uproar ANI: Chinese political leader arrested on charges of raping minors following bloggers outrage Keep in mind that these articles, particularly AFP and Reuters, were picked up by a very large number of foreign media outlets. So what's the message we are supposed to pick up from these headlines? Correct me if I'm wrong, but it sounds to me like a government official was held/arrested only after the authorities were pressured into doing so by "bloggers" (most likely a reference to microbloggers on platforms like Sina's weibo — let's call these guys "weibots" to keep it simple). Because virtually every person in the world outside of China who read about this case in English now thinks that this is yet another notch in the belt of weibots who are keeping the cops "honest" in China, I thought I'd read a bit further and see how this public pressure played out in this case. Imagine my surprise when I couldn't find any evidence whatsoever that Li's arrest/detention was the result of online pressure. I am seriously confused. I went back to take a look at the English news and saw that the articles themselves talk about the case as "sparking online anger" and "prompting outraged comments" from the weibots, but nowhere is there any explanation of how that anger/outrage was at all instrumental in Li's detention. As usual with a case like this, the facts are unclear. Several local news accounts claim that Li was caught in the act near a Middle School on May 8. He appears to have been formally arrested last Friday, or about 2.5 weeks after he was initially detained for suspicion of rape. An announcement of the arrest was made on Sunday, and the approval of the arrest was issued today. If the above timeline is accurate, it means that the formal arrest occurred almost three weeks after he was caught in the act. Were the cops dragging their feet? If there was public pressure involved here, that would be my assumption, but the news reports and online chatter I've read do not focus on any time delay or outrage with police procedure specifically. (If anyone with criminal procedure experience in China is reading, feel free to chime in if something sounds suspicious here.) Instead, online comments talk about cover-ups and delays without really explaining when or how that happened. One assumption seems to be that it's simply not possible that Li could have engaged in this sort of behavior for so long without authorities knowing about it (and covering it up). Maybe, but again, I don't see where this is all coming from aside from reflexive distrust. Could Li have raped a large number of girls for years without his colleagues knowing about it? Well, why not? I assume he tried to keep his activities secret. One other thing to note on procedure is that between May 8 and the formal arrest, an investigation was conducted, which included searches of Li's personal possessions, and interviews of witnesses. Moreover, and I haven't been able to determine this from what I've read so far, I assume that Li wasn't just released on his own parole during this time but was in custody. I'm not seeing where the weibots come into the picture. The anger and outrage are real and significant, but did this have any effect on what the police were doing? Is there any evidence that the cops were sitting on this case or somehow being lenient with Li because of his government status? I just don't see it. One issue that has been raised by many is the number of alleged victims. The authorities and state-run press seems to have settled on "more than ten" or, as Xinhua stated, eleven. Other sources, including online chatter, puts the number much higher, with one report saying "hundreds." David at Tea Leaf Nation finds fault with the local authorities:
When in doubt, I'd normally go with David's opinion. But playing devil's advocate for a moment, I can also see why the authorities would be conservative with those numbers. I've seen this back home with cases involving multiple victims. The cops will often tally up the alleged victims based on those cases for which they think they have irrefutable evidence, even if it appears as though there were many other victims. In other words, the cops might be in effect saying "At this time, we think we can prove 11 counts of rape, although there may very well be additional victims." Certainly a possibility, although as David mentions, the weibots are definitely not predisposed to give the local authorities the benefit of the doubt. And let's face it, no one would ever take that lower number and say "Give the guy a break. He only raped eleven underage girls, not a hundred. He's not that bad." I don't think so. I don't usually like to churn out 1,000+ words only to end with "I don't know," but that's where I am with this case. The point is that I fail to see how this can be correctly characterized as an instance where the weibots somehow forced to cops to act. If I'm right, the foreign press, or at least the editors over at AFP and Reuters, screwed this up royally and came to an erroneous conclusion. More disturbing than any media failure is the rush to judgment by the weibots. The automatic assumption that Li's actions had somehow been known and covered up prior to May 8 or that the local authorities would definitely try to cover up his crimes even after he was detained, is troubling. It suggests severe credibility problems of local officials, although that's not exactly news. The level of distrust that is illustrated by these types of cases is startling. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Chinese Democracy Has its Benefits Posted: 29 May 2012 07:41 AM PDT A recent study suggests that China's village elections have led to some concrete improvements for local residents since the early 80s, despite widespread meddling by Party officials. Among the reported benefits are greater and more equitable infrastructure investment and a significant reduction in income inequality. From China Real Time Report:
Village elections made global headlines earlier this year when Wukan held its first votes since a dramatic stand against local officials in December. Wukan has been trumpeted as a potential model for the rest of China, but there are others: Dongguan's Yantian, for example, where the migrant workers who make up 97% of the population are excluded from elections by the original inhabitants, or the village in Beijing's Daxing district where an independent campaign was allegedly derailed last year by bribery and police intimidation. © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Some Data on Reverse-Merger Class Action Lawsuits Posted: 29 May 2012 06:15 AM PDT If you have been following the various issues/scandals involving reverse-merger US-listed Chinese companies, CFO magazine recently ran a brief update about where things are at the moment, particularly with regard to class action suits and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Here's a taste:
The rest of the article is here. This story is not going away anytime soon. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Posted: 29 May 2012 04:29 AM PDT State-run Xinhua News Agency announced Tuesday that China will not introduce a large stimulus similar to the one it implemented during the 2008 financial crisis, tempering expectations following a call last week by Premier Wen Jiabao to prioritize economic growth. From Bloomberg:
Smaller stimulus doesn't mean no stimulus, however, and the government has already made policy announcements this week aimed at promoting growth. The State Council has agreed to revive a "cash for clunkers" program that gives consumers financial incentive to trade in their cars, and the Ministry of Finance announced that it will offer subsidies ranging from 100 to 400 yuan on energy-efficient televisions and air conditioners sold beginning June 1. The Wall Street Journal reported today that Asian stock markets have rallied on hopes of a China stimulus. © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Echoes of Zhu Rongji? China’s New Privatization Push Posted: 29 May 2012 03:58 AM PDT
If you go back a decade or so and peruse China WTO entry lore, you'll find several explanations for why China joined the trade organization. Of course China was looking forward to an increase in trade and investment, which I think we can all agree has happened, in a spectacular fashion. In addition to the obvious gains, China's leaders realized that the country was in a precarious position. The economic reforms put into place since the late 1970s, solidified by Zhu Rongji's crucial contribution to the process in the mid-90s, had yielded dramatic progress, most notably seen in the rise in per capita income and GDP growth. However, those reforms were yet to be set in stone, and conservative critics were still lurking about the halls of government, waiting for the opportunity to roll back changes. The WTO presented itself with an excellent opportunity. If China submitted to a set of external rules in order to achieve additional economic gains, many of those reforms would then be impossible to roll back, at least not without violating WTO law. Reformers like Zhu could then answer his critics with a shrug of the shoulders and a "Hey, it's out of my hands. We already agreed to abide by all of those rules." Win. For quite a few years, steady liberalization and privatization proceeded apace. And the gains of WTO membership were quite apparent. In addition to significant increases in trade and investment, domestic enterprises, including huge State-owned enterprises, responded to (or prepared for) foreign competition with a wave of consolidation, streamlining, and innovation. This was all by design of course. China's economy gurus in the 90s guessed that foreign competition would be a positive kick in the ass to SOEs that needed to get to the next level in terms of efficiency and quality. In the last few years, however, with the implementation of an economic strategy that focused on the build-up of State-owned champions in key market sectors (e.g. auto, energy, heavy industry), many critics have bemoaned the seeming rollback of the spirit of Zhu-era privatization. So has the pendulum swung once again back to privatization? That's what everyone is wondering, and certainly the government seems to be pushing for more private capital in certain sectors. But does that mean a return to the mindset of the late 90s? Perhaps. It might be that some reformers have taken a hard look at some areas of the economy and decided that an influx of private capital might be what's needed to increase profitability. On the other hand, there's a lot of backstory with some of these sectors (e.g. health care, railways, and highways) that shouldn't be overlooked. Motivation for opening up some of these areas might have less to do with competition than other, sector-specific, factors. With health care reform, for example, the government faces a herculean task; this industry needs all the help it can get. Contrast that with the rail sector, which has been slammed by high-profile quality and corruption scandals in the last couple of years. If there is a common theme here, it's elusive. Lastly, a cautionary note for foreign investors who are easily excited by the use of the word "privatization." One must not equate that with an opening up to foreign capital. Yes, some of these reforms might pave the way for increased opportunities for offshore investors. However, in many instances, this influx of private capital will be limited to domestic investors only. These days, China is blessed with a great deal of domestic private capital and a growing pool of talent from private industry that can be utilized to solve problems in the State-owned sector; this is a luxury Zhu Rongji never had. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | 5 comments | Add to del.icio.us |
Urban Wages See Double-Digit Growth in 2011 Posted: 29 May 2012 03:57 AM PDT The National Bureau of Statistics announced Tuesday that average wages for urban Chinese workers in both the private and non-private sectors rose by double digits in 2011, according to The China Daily:
© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Sina Weibo “User Contracts” Go Live Posted: 29 May 2012 03:07 AM PDT The New York Times reports that Chinese microblogging site Sina Weibo has rolled out "user contracts" with a points-based system to better facilitate the monitoring and punishment of inappropriate comments by its 300 million netizens:
Jon Russell, Asia Editor of The Next Web, wrote this morning that he saw "no obvious sign of the points system being introduced as yet," and called out one of a number of clauses in the contract that he believes are "open to fairly broad interpretation." The "user contracts" went live following a trial period that began three weeks ago, and represent the latest attempt by state regulators to control the flow of information and limit the spread of sensitive rumors online after Sina failed to effectively implement the state-mandated "real name registration" policy. Reflecting on a just-completed visit to Sina Weibo in Beijing, Slate's Jacob Weisberg writes that the old model of control is evolving as figures such as Ai Wei Wei, Koonchung Chan and Han Han continue to influence China's "evolving free-speech landscape":
Finally, China Media Project's David Bandurski reminds China watchers that official bureau's and agencies have seized on microblogs as a valuable tool as well. |
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