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Links » Cream » Gary Locke Talks Chen, Drama in China


Gary Locke Talks Chen, Drama in China

Posted: 30 May 2012 12:18 AM PDT

U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke gave an exclusive interview to Newsweek about his posting in Beijing, which has not lacked drama. He first discusses the day that former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun entered the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, seeking asylum:

, known as the Eliot Ness of China for his ruthless campaign against organized crime, told a riveting story of how his one-time mentor, a local party secretary by the name of Bo Xilai, was out to kill him because he knew too much about the alleged poisoning and murder of a British businessman, Neil Heywood, who had known Bo and his wife. It was "fascinating, eye-popping revelations," Locke told Newsweek in an exclusive interview. "My first reaction was 'oh, my God, I mean OH, MY GOD!'"

The next 120 days in the life of the new ambassador—which included dealing with diplomatic fallout after the daredevil escape of blind activist —would be nothing short of historic.

Given Bo's stature within the Communist Party, Wang's presence at the consulate presented a delicate situation. Upping the stakes, Bo—realizing that Wang had gone to the Americans—dispatched armed security forces to surround the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. But Wang was not about to surrender to Bo and instead summoned people he trusted to escort him out of the embassy and onward to Beijing—away from the clutches of the local party chief and his cronies. (Later, Wang was charged with treason, Bo was purged from the top echelons of the Communist Party, and Bo's wife was charged in the murder of Heywood.) "It felt," Locke said, "like something out of a spy thriller."

The 62-year-old Chinese-American would soon find himself at the center of further extraordinary events that would demand the highest degree of diplomatic dexterity by the ambassador, who, when Wang showed up, was just six months into the job.

Chinese responses to Locke vary between admiration and disgust. CDT's Anne Henochowicz put together a slideshow for Foreign Policy which looks at various images of Locke in Chinese netizens' eyes.


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Finding Zen and Book Contracts in Beijing

Posted: 29 May 2012 11:32 PM PDT

On the New York Review of Books blog, Ian Johnson profiles Bill Porter, an American translator of Chinese poetry and religious books, who has become a minor literary celebrity in China:

For Porter, it all started several years ago, when he was visiting the Monastery of the Cypress Grove (Bailinsi) in Beijing to research Zen Baggage. He happened to meet Tang Xiaoming, the manager of Beijing Reader , a private press dedicated mostly to business topics. Like many entrepreneurs, Tang was developing an interest in religion and was fascinated to hear that Porter had found hermits in China's Zhongnan Mountains—a range south of Xi'an long famous as a home for recluses seeking enlightenment. In fact, Porter's book had been published in China in 2001—as Secluded Orchids in a Deserted Valley (空谷幽兰), a poetic reference to people of noble character—but had only sold a few thousand copies. Tang thought that it had been poorly marketed.

"I knew it would work if people realized what he had found," Tang told me. "It seemed like the time was ripe."

The book, which Tang re-released in 2009 under the same title, became a sensation in China, selling 100,000 copies and spurring interest in hermits and other traditions that many Chinese assumed had vanished. The book launched hermit tourism and turned Porter into a celebrity, with his own page on Baidu Baike, China's version of Wikipedia.

That prompted Tang to publish Zen Baggage last year, which has sold 50,000 copies, and to commission from Porter an original work on his travels through China's cultural heartland that has not appeared in English, Yellow River Odyssey, which has an initial press run of 20,000. Another new work of Porter's is due out in Chinese later this year on the Silk Road. Best of all, the publisher is paying advances and royalties. Last year, Porter says, he earned $30,000 from his China book sales, pushing him out of the world of food stamps and into the realm of the tax-paying lower-middle class.


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China, Philippines Agree to Show Restraint

Posted: 29 May 2012 11:36 PM PDT

Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and both countries imposing fishing bans in the Scarborough Shoal, China and the Philippines seem to have reached an agreement to show restraint. This announcement would ease tensions surrounding the two-month long stand-off following accusations from the that Chinese fishing boats were illegally fishing near the shoal. The Straits Times reports:

The defence chiefs of China and the Philippines have agreed to show restraint in their countries' 2-month-old standoff at a disputed shoal in the .

China's Liang Guanglie and the Philippines' Voltaire Gazmin met on Monday on the sidelines of a meeting of Southeast Asian defense ministers in the Cambodian capital for the first time since tensions flared on April 10.

Mr Gazmin said on Tuesday that the two men agreed that both countries should avoid provocative actions and public statements and keep their lines of communication open.

While the tensions may be easing, they are part of a larger dispute in the region. From the Voice of America:

China and the Philippines imposed temporary fishing bans in the area earlier this month, in an attempt to lessen the tension. But Manila accused Beijing last week of sending additional ships to the territory, saying some were observed breaking the fishing ban.

China says the islands, known as Huangyan in China, are a key part of Chinese territory, while the Philippines says the shoal is within its internationally recognized exclusive economic zone. China has rejected a request by the Philippines to refer the issue to an international court.

The standoff is part of a wider territorial dispute in the South China Sea, parts of which are also claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei. China claims nearly the entire region, which is thought to contain large amounts of oil and natural gas.

There are also reports that the new envoy to China from the Philippines will work to further smooth out the relationship. From China Daily:

Philippine President Benigno Aquino III has designated career diplomat Sonia Brady as the newambassador to China, deputy presidential spokesperson Abigail Valte said on Saturday, a fewdays after Aquino approved the appointment of Brady on May 23.

Aquino wanted "someone who is already familiar with the politics and the culture of that country.That person can hit the ground running", Valte said of Brady, who will have to pass theCommission on Appointments prior to taking her position.

It is abnormal for the Philippines to have not appointed an ambassador to China for more than one year, said Ren Yuanzhe, a researcher at China Foreign Affairs University. The situation reflects the strained relationship between Manila and Beijing, and any two countries with normal diplomatic relations should exchange ambassadors based on the principle of reciprocity.

Ambassadors are particularly needed when there are difficulties in mutual ties, he said, hopingthe veteran, who served as ambassador in Beijing from 2006 to 2010, could play her due rolein connecting the two countries and achieving a smooth and friendly relationship.

Read more on the South China Sea disputes, via CDT.


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Cartoon: The Wall, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场)

Posted: 29 May 2012 11:18 PM PDT

Chen Xitong: Tiananmen Crackdown was a Tragedy

Posted: 29 May 2012 11:02 PM PDT

Former Beijing Mayor , who was in office during the and was later jailed for corruption, has called the June 4 military crackdown on the Beijing protests a "tragedy," according to a new book of interviews with him. The book is reportedly a response to diaries of former premier Li Peng which called Chen "'the chief commander' of the Beijing Martial Law Command Center." In the same series of interviews, Chen denied the charges against him. From the Guardian:

According to the scholar Yao Jianfu, who says he interviewed the 81-year-old repeatedly for the new book Conversations with Chen Xitong, the former mayor said that while he wanted a swift end to the instability, "nobody should have died if it was handled properly. Several hundred people died on that day. As the mayor, I felt sorry. I hoped we could have solved the case peacefully."

Chen later became party secretary of the capital, but was ousted and then jailed in a major corruption scandal in the 1990s. He was released on medical parole in 2004.

"He was a hardliner … but he is the first one to come out saying he regretted that people died and that it should have been peaceful. That's significant," said Bao Pu, the book's publisher.

Bao's father was the most senior official jailed for his sympathy for the students. "Even Chen Xitong has a sense that people in general don't accept the government's conclusion."

Read more about the 1989 protests, the June 4 crackdown, and Chen Xitong via CDT.


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Hexie Farm (蟹农场): The Wall

Posted: 29 May 2012 02:43 PM PDT

For his latest entry to his CDT series, cartoonist Crazy Crab of Hexie Farm depicts the invisible walls of and , as well as dictatorship and servility. The dictator is barking commands which the figures underneath obey.

Read more about Hexie Farm's CDT series, including a Q&A with the anonymous cartoonist, and see all cartoons so far in the series.

[CDT owns the copyright for all cartoons in the CDT series. Please do not reproduce without receiving prior permission from CDT.]


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Wine from Gobi Desert Aims At Market

Posted: 29 May 2012 02:49 PM PDT

As China's local wine market grows and foreign labels are running vineyards in China, wine from the Gobi desert is aiming at the booming market. The Gobi desert is located in the Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang region. Although the region seems unlikely for the location of a vineyard, the desert has several different types of climates that are conducive to making. Rueters reports:

Just a few hundred metres from towering sand dunes, workers unearth row upon row of grapevines buried under the sand to protect them from temperatures as low as -20 degrees Celsius (-4 Fahrenheit).

Chateau Hansen, which first planted vineyards beside the Gobi in the early 1980s, says the hot, dry summer and plentiful water from the nearby Yellow River make the location among China's best for wine production.

This moderate-sized vineyard near Wuhai city, 670 kilometres (416 miles) west of Beijing, now boasts 250 hectares of Merlot, Cabernet Sauvignon and Cabernet Gernischt grapevines.

To raise its profile, Hansen has built a grand European-style chateau, which includes a hotel, and enlisted the help of a French wine expert who acts as winemaker.

Although Chateau Hansen mainly sells in China, they will also be present at the Asia Pacific 2012. Winemakers attending the expo, held in Hong Kong, hope to break into the Chinese market. AFP adds:

Organisers of the three-day Vinexpo Asia-Pacific expect demand for imported wine to weather the slowdown in Chinese , forecast to fall to 7.5 percent this year from 9.2 percent in 2011.

A deep dip in prices of Bordeaux's most prestigious, investment-grade wines last year suggests the Chinese-driven speculative bubble may have burst, but the market for more modest mid-range wines will open up, they said.

"The promise of the Chinese market and the Asian market continues to be very high. The growth is still there," Vinexpo chief executive Robert Beynat told AFP.

China is the world's biggest drinker of spirits, with 995 million cases guzzled in 2010 — almost double the volume consumed in 2006, according to Vinexpo.

Read more about wine in China, via CDT.


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The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-29

Posted: 28 May 2012 08:59 PM PDT


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The Daily Twit (@chinahearsay Twitter feed) – 2012-05-29

Posted: 28 May 2012 08:59 PM PDT


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Is Li Xingong Arrest Another Victory for China’s Weibots?

Posted: 29 May 2012 08:41 AM PDT

You may have been following the sensational case of Li Xingong, the former number two Party official in Yongcheng city, Henan, who is alleged to have raped a number of underage girls. According to Xinhua, Li's arrest was formally approved earlier today. As lurid as this case is, I wouldn't normally comment on a criminal matter like this, even noting that Li used to be a higher-up government official. This was not a case of corruption, misuse of public funds, etc. If the allegations are true, the man is a sex offender, and his actions (unless we learn something new) were not directly related to his public responsibilities.

That being said, there is another twist to this case that I'm frankly still trying to unravel: the role of public pressure. As you know, I have a great deal of interest in cases where the public seemingly exerts an influence on the judiciary, prosecutors or the police, usually in criminal matters. As I've said many times, the general trend disturbs me; the criminal justice system should generally be immune to public pressure. If not, scary things can happen.

So does the case of Li Xingong fit into this category? That's certainly the message I get from reading the foreign press, which includes the following writeups:

AFP: China ex-official held over rapes after online anger

Reuters: China detains official for rapes after online uproar

ANI: Chinese political leader arrested on charges of raping minors following bloggers outrage

Keep in mind that these articles, particularly AFP and Reuters, were picked up by a very large number of foreign media outlets.

So what's the message we are supposed to pick up from these headlines? Correct me if I'm wrong, but it sounds to me like a government official was held/arrested only after the authorities were pressured into doing so by "bloggers" (most likely a reference to microbloggers on platforms like Sina's weibo — let's call these guys "weibots" to keep it simple).

Because virtually every person in the world outside of China who read about this case in English now thinks that this is yet another notch in the belt of weibots who are keeping the cops "honest" in China, I thought I'd read a bit further and see how this public pressure played out in this case.

Imagine my surprise when I couldn't find any evidence whatsoever that Li's arrest/detention was the result of online pressure. I am seriously confused. I went back to take a look at the English news and saw that the articles themselves talk about the case as "sparking online anger" and "prompting outraged comments" from the weibots, but nowhere is there any explanation of how that anger/outrage was at all instrumental in Li's detention.

As usual with a case like this, the facts are unclear. Several local news accounts claim that Li was caught in the act near a Middle School on May 8. He appears to have been formally arrested last Friday, or about 2.5 weeks after he was initially detained for suspicion of rape. An announcement of the arrest was made on Sunday, and the approval of the arrest was issued today.

If the above timeline is accurate, it means that the formal arrest occurred almost three weeks after he was caught in the act. Were the cops dragging their feet? If there was public pressure involved here, that would be my assumption, but the news reports and online chatter I've read do not focus on any time delay or outrage with police procedure specifically. (If anyone with criminal procedure experience in China is reading, feel free to chime in if something sounds suspicious here.)

Instead, online comments talk about cover-ups and delays without really explaining when or how that happened. One assumption seems to be that it's simply not possible that Li could have engaged in this sort of behavior for so long without authorities knowing about it (and covering it up). Maybe, but again, I don't see where this is all coming from aside from reflexive distrust. Could Li have raped a large number of girls for years without his colleagues knowing about it? Well, why not? I assume he tried to keep his activities secret.

One other thing to note on procedure is that between May 8 and the formal arrest, an investigation was conducted, which included searches of Li's personal possessions, and interviews of witnesses. Moreover, and I haven't been able to determine this from what I've read so far, I assume that Li wasn't just released on his own parole during this time but was in custody.

I'm not seeing where the weibots come into the picture. The anger and outrage are real and significant, but did this have any effect on what the police were doing? Is there any evidence that the cops were sitting on this case or somehow being lenient with Li because of his government status? I just don't see it.

One issue that has been raised by many is the number of alleged victims. The authorities and state-run press seems to have settled on "more than ten" or, as Xinhua stated, eleven. Other sources, including online chatter, puts the number much higher, with one report saying "hundreds." David at Tea Leaf Nation finds fault with the local authorities:

Making matters worse, local authorities either hid, or completely failed to understand, the extent of Li's crime. A press release by Yongcheng authorities just two days ago said that "According to investigation, Li Xingong is suspected of raping over ten girls." But according to the anonymous reporter, "A survey of victims' families lasting over ten days revealed the number of Li's victims far surpassed those recorded on his computer, most likely numbering close to 100." Police have explained that Li himself admitted to over ten.

When in doubt, I'd normally go with David's opinion. But playing devil's advocate for a moment, I can also see why the authorities would be conservative with those numbers. I've seen this back home with cases involving multiple victims. The cops will often tally up the alleged victims based on those cases for which they think they have irrefutable evidence, even if it appears as though there were many other victims.

In other words, the cops might be in effect saying "At this time, we think we can prove 11 counts of rape, although there may very well be additional victims." Certainly a possibility, although as David mentions, the weibots are definitely not predisposed to give the local authorities the benefit of the doubt. And let's face it, no one would ever take that lower number and say "Give the guy a break. He only raped eleven underage girls, not a hundred. He's not that bad." I don't think so.

I don't usually like to churn out 1,000+ words only to end with "I don't know," but that's where I am with this case. The point is that I fail to see how this can be correctly characterized as an instance where the weibots somehow forced to cops to act. If I'm right, the foreign press, or at least the editors over at AFP and Reuters, screwed this up royally and came to an erroneous conclusion.

More disturbing than any media failure is the rush to judgment by the weibots. The automatic assumption that Li's actions had somehow been known and covered up prior to May 8 or that the local authorities would definitely try to cover up his crimes even after he was detained, is troubling. It suggests severe credibility problems of local officials, although that's not exactly news. The level of distrust that is illustrated by these types of cases is startling.


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Chinese Democracy Has its Benefits

Posted: 29 May 2012 07:41 AM PDT

A recent study suggests that China's village elections have led to some concrete improvements for local residents since the early 80s, despite widespread meddling by Party officials. Among the reported benefits are greater and more equitable investment and a significant reduction in . From China Real Time Report:

… [T]he economists found some solid pluses for local . Villages with elected officials spent substantially more on irrigation, primary schools, roads and trees plantings – and agreed to tax themselves to pay for the improvements. The economists figure that about 70% of the funding for these improvements came from the villages.

Villages with elections also showed a substantial reduction in income inequality. "Elections caused the households that were the poorest before the election to gain the most income, 28%, and the households that were the richest before the election to lose the most income, 29%," they calculate. The argue that elected leader improved irrigation, which helped those with the worst land, and divied up fields in a way that helped the poorest villagers. Similarly income from village enterprises was redistributed on a more equal basis ….

But the positive gains don't necessarily portend a bright future for democracy for China. Village democracy could have the opposite effect. If elections reduce local grievances, the ruling Communist Party may feel less pressure to change. If that's the case, the economist write, the elections could become "an instrument for local governance that improves citizens' satisfaction of [sic] the autocratic central regime."

made global headlines earlier this year when Wukan held its first votes since a dramatic stand against local officials in December. has been trumpeted as a potential model for the rest of China, but there are others: 's Yantian, for example, where the migrant workers who make up 97% of the population are excluded from elections by the original inhabitants, or the village in Beijing's Daxing district where an independent campaign was allegedly derailed last year by bribery and police intimidation.


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Some Data on Reverse-Merger Class Action Lawsuits

Posted: 29 May 2012 06:15 AM PDT

If you have been following the various issues/scandals involving reverse-merger US-listed Chinese companies, CFO magazine recently ran a brief update about where things are at the moment, particularly with regard to class action suits and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Here's a taste:

Driven in part by abundant reverse-merger filings by firms in China resulting in listings on U.S. exchanges, the number of securities class-action filings involving accounting allegations rose in 2011 over 2010, according to a new report by Cornerstone Research.

Of the 188 securities class-action lawsuits filed in 2011, 70 included accounting allegations. That compares with 46 in 2010, the lowest number of accounting case filings in recent years, according to the report, "Accounting Class Action Filings and Settlements—2011 Review and Analysis."

The rest of the article is here. This story is not going away anytime soon.


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Xinhua: No “Massive Stimulus”

Posted: 29 May 2012 04:29 AM PDT

State-run Xinhua News Agency announced Tuesday that China will not introduce a large stimulus similar to the one it implemented during the 2008 financial crisis, tempering expectations following a call last week by Premier Wen Jiabao to prioritize . From Bloomberg:

"The Chinese government's intention is very clear: it will not roll out another massive plan to seek high economic growth," Xinhua said in the seventh paragraph of a Chinese- language article on economic policy. "The current efforts for stabilizing growth will not repeat the old way of three years ago."

Premier 's call last week to focus more on boosting economic growth has spurred speculation the nation will step up measures to boost expansion that's set to slow for a sixth straight quarter. Economists at Credit Suisse Group AG and Standard Chartered Plc said yesterday that stimulus is likely to be smaller than the 4 trillion yuan ($630 billion at today's exchange rate) package announced in 2008.

Credit Suisse economists said spending on investment will probably range from 1 trillion yuan to 2 trillion yuan. Standard Chartered said China is starting a "mini-me" version of the prior stimulus.

Smaller stimulus doesn't mean no stimulus, however, and the government has already made policy announcements this week aimed at promoting growth. The has agreed to revive a "cash for clunkers" program that gives consumers financial incentive to trade in their cars, and the announced that it will offer subsidies ranging from 100 to 400 yuan on energy-efficient televisions and air conditioners sold beginning June 1.

The Wall Street Journal reported today that Asian stock markets have rallied on hopes of a China stimulus.


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Echoes of Zhu Rongji? China’s New Privatization Push

Posted: 29 May 2012 03:58 AM PDT

China's new push to open state controlled industries may look bold after a decade of stuttering privatisation progress, but Beijing faces stiff resistance from vested interests in its effort to extend its World Trade Organisation dividend.

Beijing's leaders, its top think-tanks, the World Bank and private sector economists all largely agree that for China to build on reform-fired growth after its first decade of WTO membership, state firms must be more competitive and capital better allocated. (Reuters)

If you go back a decade or so and peruse China WTO entry lore, you'll find several explanations for why China joined the trade organization. Of course China was looking forward to an increase in trade and investment, which I think we can all agree has happened, in a spectacular fashion.

In addition to the obvious gains, China's leaders realized that the country was in a precarious position. The economic reforms put into place since the late 1970s, solidified by Zhu Rongji's crucial contribution to the process in the mid-90s, had yielded dramatic progress, most notably seen in the rise in per capita income and GDP growth. However, those reforms were yet to be set in stone, and conservative critics were still lurking about the halls of government, waiting for the opportunity to roll back changes.

The WTO presented itself with an excellent opportunity. If China submitted to a set of external rules in order to achieve additional economic gains, many of those reforms would then be impossible to roll back, at least not without violating WTO law. Reformers like Zhu could then answer his critics with a shrug of the shoulders and a "Hey, it's out of my hands. We already agreed to abide by all of those rules."

Win.

For quite a few years, steady liberalization and privatization proceeded apace. And the gains of WTO membership were quite apparent. In addition to significant increases in trade and investment, domestic enterprises, including huge State-owned enterprises, responded to (or prepared for) foreign competition with a wave of consolidation, streamlining, and innovation. This was all by design of course. China's economy gurus in the 90s guessed that foreign competition would be a positive kick in the ass to SOEs that needed to get to the next level in terms of efficiency and quality.

In the last few years, however, with the implementation of an economic strategy that focused on the build-up of State-owned champions in key market sectors (e.g. auto, energy, heavy industry), many critics have bemoaned the seeming rollback of the spirit of Zhu-era privatization.

So has the pendulum swung once again back to privatization? That's what everyone is wondering, and certainly the government seems to be pushing for more private capital in certain sectors. But does that mean a return to the mindset of the late 90s?

Perhaps. It might be that some reformers have taken a hard look at some areas of the economy and decided that an influx of private capital might be what's needed to increase profitability. On the other hand, there's a lot of backstory with some of these sectors (e.g. health care, railways, and highways) that shouldn't be overlooked. Motivation for opening up some of these areas might have less to do with competition than other, sector-specific, factors. With health care reform, for example, the government faces a herculean task; this industry needs all the help it can get. Contrast that with the rail sector, which has been slammed by high-profile quality and corruption scandals in the last couple of years. If there is a common theme here, it's elusive.

Lastly, a cautionary note for foreign investors who are easily excited by the use of the word "privatization." One must not equate that with an opening up to foreign capital. Yes, some of these reforms might pave the way for increased opportunities for offshore investors. However, in many instances, this influx of private capital will be limited to domestic investors only. These days, China is blessed with a great deal of domestic private capital and a growing pool of talent from private industry that can be utilized to solve problems in the State-owned sector; this is a luxury Zhu Rongji never had.


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Urban Wages See Double-Digit Growth in 2011

Posted: 29 May 2012 03:57 AM PDT

The announced Tuesday that average for urban Chinese workers in both the private and non-private sectors rose by double digits in 2011, according to The China Daily:

The data was based on a survey of 1.48 million non-privately owned organizations and 620,000 private companies, the NBS said.

Wages for workers in the nation's more developed eastern regions and major cities were the highest, while the central provinces of Anhui, Henan and Hubei ranked lowest, according to the NBS.

The finance, telecommunication, computer service and software development sectors offered the highest salaries, the NBS said.

Feng Nailin, director of the population and statistics department under the NBS, said last year's stable and rapid helped buoy wages.


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Sina Weibo “User Contracts” Go Live

Posted: 29 May 2012 03:07 AM PDT

The New York Times reports that Chinese microblogging site has rolled out "user contracts" with a points-based system to better facilitate the monitoring and punishment of inappropriate comments by its 300 million :

Points can be deducted for online comments that are judged to be offensive. When a blogger reaches zero, the service stated, a user's account will be canceled. Users who suffer lesser penalties can restore their 80 points by avoiding violations for two months.

Deductions will cover a wide range of sins, including spreading rumors, calling for protests, promoting cults or superstitions and impugning China's honor, the service stated.

Most notably, the contracts also will punish time-honored tactics that bloggers have used to avoid , like disguising comments on censored topics by using homonyms (where two different Chinese characters have nearly identical sounds), puns and other dodges.

Jon Russell, Asia Editor of The Next Web, wrote this morning that he saw "no obvious sign of the points system being introduced as yet," and called out one of a number of clauses in the contract that he believes are "open to fairly broad interpretation." The "user contracts" went live following a trial period that began three weeks ago, and represent the latest attempt by state regulators to control the flow of information and limit the spread of sensitive rumors online after Sina failed to effectively implement the state-mandated "real name registration" policy.

Reflecting on a just-completed visit to Sina Weibo in Beijing, Slate's Jacob Weisberg writes that the old model of control is evolving as figures such as , Koonchung Chan and continue to influence China's "evolving free-speech landscape":

Sina's biggest fear seems to be not that users will complain about the limits placed upon their activity, but that that its failure to police the site itself will provoke the authorities to close it. Party officials have paid admonitory visits, and suspended commenting for three days last month in response to proliferating rumors about the Bo Xilai scandal. But shutting down Weibo (which refers to the Chinese version of microblogging, as opposed to Sina, which is the biggest company that provides a platform for it) would now count as an outsized act of repression, difficult for the government to get away with. China's biggest blogging and micro-blogging platform has 324 million registered users, and there are millions more on competing services. Constrained though it is, Weibo has become a boisterous national conversation. Stopping it at this point would both infuriate its users and deny the security services their best tool for gauging public opinion.

The Chinese government's can't-live-with-it, can't-live-without-it relationship to Weibo epitomizes the paradoxical condition of free expression in China apparent during our trip. State censorship is no longer just a question of dissidents testing the boundaries of what is permissible and regularly running afoul of the authorities—the old, familiar model. It has become a matter of authoritarian innovation as well, with the one-party state experimenting in with ways to constrain and control its explosive new media environment.

Finally, China Media Project's David Bandurski reminds China watchers that official bureau's and agencies have seized on microblogs as a valuable tool as well.

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