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Blogs » Politics » In Syria, a Rare Chinese Foray into Foreign Policy


In Syria, a Rare Chinese Foray into Foreign Policy

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 10:31 PM PST

After vetoing a resolution that would have imposed sanctions on the administration of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, China has offered a four-point plan to try to end an ongoing civil conflict there. Presented on October 31, the plan has four main points, as summarized by U.S. News and World Report:

The Syrian government and rebel fighters should make every effort to maintain a ceasefire and work with Brahimi's mediation efforts;
Both sides should appoint interlocutors who can negotiate a political transition and maintain governmental stability;
The international community should increase support for Brahimi's efforts and other mediation initiatives, such as "relevant Security Council resolutions";
The international community should increase humanitarian assistance to conflict regions in .

The Washington Post reports on the international response to the proposal:

The U.N. has welcomed the effort, but there hasn't been much international discussion of it. Observers have found it vague, and likely aimed at bolstering China's reputation following criticism of its moves to join Russia in blocking U.N. resolutions aimed at ending Syria's bloodshed, including calls for Syrian leader Bashar Assad to step down.

China's proposal leaves open the possibility of Assad staying on in a power-sharing agreement, and does not significantly add to past peace plans that have failed.

"But then this statement isn't so much about setting forward a concrete proposal for action as about the messaging that underpins it," said Sarah Raine, a consulting fellow for Chinese foreign and security policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "It has become increasingly clear that is worried about the reputational damage its relative intransigence on Syria has been doing to other important relationships, in particular in the Middle East."

The Council on Foreign Relations blog explains further why the impact of the proposal is likely to be limited:

The new plan seems to reflect China's acceptance of the deteriorating situation in Syria and of the possibility of Assad's downfall. By calling for a political transition, the new plan jettisons the traditional Chinese terminology in favor of language more in line with current international opinion. It is a noticeable departure from China's six-point peace plan released in March, which demanded the international community "respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria" and expressed its disapproval of Western attempts at regime change.

Despite these apparent changes in strategy, however, the plan simply reiterates old points and fails to provide a comprehensive path to peace. China continues to leave off the table the possibility of sanctions or other punitive measures as a way to convince the regime to stop the violence. Without them, the Syrian government has no reason to end the bloodshed: it has the upper hand both militarily and politically, and it has more sophisticated equipment and control of government institutions.

While the proposal is unlikely to change the global dynamics surrounding the situation in Syria, Ian Bremmer argues that the existence of the proposal itself is significant because it signifies a new attitude from China toward its role in conflicts outside its borders. From Reuters:

This is what happens in a G-Zero world — a world without any specific country or bloc of countries in charge. China has long been content to watch world events play out and then react, trusting that another country would step in to put volatile situations to rest. But that's not happening with the Syrian conflict and its spillover into the broader Middle East. Americans feel that the issue doesn't affect them enough to intervene. Europeans, as a Union, don't seem to be particularly interested, even if some smaller countries are. And with those powers on the sidelines, suddenly the Chinese have a much bigger problem — a civil war that could metastasize into regional instability. The Chinese have far too much at stake in Iraq and Iran for that to happen: 11 percent of China's oil imports come from Iran, and it is on track to be the chief importer of Iraqi oil by 2030.

And so China stepped in, offering a peace plan. The details — cease-fire, a committee that negotiates a political solution to the war, etc. — are not as important as the plan's mere existence. It's symptomatic of China's new approach, one that hinted at in one of his final addresses as Chinese president. He said China would "get more actively involved in international affairs, (and) play its due role of a major responsible country." In the wake of downturns in the West, there is a new diplomatic structure emerging. China is determined to be one of its architects.

This doesn't mean China necessarily knows what it's doing. is new for the Chinese, who have really only interjected themselves in regional politics and through economic investment abroad. Intervening in other countries' affairs is a tricky thing for a Chinese government that so resolutely believes sovereignty is supreme, even if human rights are being trampled. Beijing tries not to infringe on other countries' sovereignty because it would not allow others to infringe on its own.

Read more about China and Syria via CDT. For another perspective on China's relationship to the al-Assad regime, see Hexie Farm's latest contribution to his CDT series.


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Baijiu, China’s Latest “Food” Scandal

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 09:05 PM PST

If you're keeping score at home (and I know you are), the latest "food" safety scandal involves a well-known brand of baijiu, China's infamous white wine, which as everyone knows is extracted and refined from the tears of liberal economists. Or maybe it's distilled from rice and other types of grains. The news broke a couple days ago that a nasty chemical had been found in Jiugui brand baijiu, a name that can be translated as "drunkard." Classy.

Provincial authorities have confirmed that a high-end band of Chinese liquor contains a harmful chemical, while the liquor association has defended the company saying there is no national standard regulating the use of the plasticizer.

The Hunan Institute of Product Quality Supervision and Inspection announced on Wednesday that up to 1.04 milligrams per kilogram of the chemical, Dibutyl phthalate (DBP), was found in the famous Jiugui brand of the traditional Chinese liquor known as baijiu. The Hunan quality watchdog has ordered the Jiugui Liquor company to determine the source of the plasticizer.

Experts say the chemical used in plastics may cause harm to the human immune and reproductive systems.

Uh oh, not another food safety scandal. Or is it? I'm going to go out on a limb here and give you three reasons why this is not your average food safety problem.

First, the product isn't really food. Yes, some folks ingest this stuff, but the jury's still out on whether this liquid is even really potable. People routinely put stuff in their mouths that isn't safe, like cigarettes and Big Macs. I once saw a guy on a reality show eat musk ox testes; there's no accounting for taste.

Second, the news should not have reported that a toxic chemical was found in baijiu, but that "another questionable substance" was found in the disgusting soup o' gunk that is called baijiu. Look, I'm not a big fan of this particular kind of jet fuel. Granted, I don't drink the hard stuff anymore, not since the Flaming Dr. Pepper Incident of 1990 in Claremont, California, the details of which I am unable to divulge per court order.

The point is, baijiu is nasty. I'm sure there are plenty of you connoisseurs out there who can wax rhapsodic about the subtle differences in baijiu, explaining how we can all best enjoy the flavor experience. But I bet I can find some gear heads who could give me the same info about the different varieties of gasoline, based on lead content.

What it comes down to is that you can ingest this toxic chemical, which may damage your immune system and turn you into a eunuch, or you can drink unadulterated baijiu and burn/scar the entire length of your alimentary canal (and yes, I mean the entire length).

Third, and this is based on preliminary information at this point, it doesn't sound like the well-intentioned (but, let's face it, evil) folks at Jiugui put this chemical into the baijiu for nefarious reasons. We are by now used to the farmer who injects shit into his livestock to add weight, the retailer who sprays crap on his produce to make it look shiny, and the bastards who added amino acids to their milk products to give it a higher protein content.

In this case, it appears that the plasticizer (i.e., a chemical used to make plastic more flexible) originated in containers used in the production chain. In other words, this might be chemical leaching going on here, not a deliberate addition of a harmful substance.

So, just another food safety scandal? I don't think so. On the other hand, the press has given this story a great deal of attention, so it looks like the government might actually investigate this chemical leaching issue with plastic containers. This of course involves more than just baijiu, so stay tuned for more "revelations" in the coming days.


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中宣部:温家宝总理出访

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 06:53 AM PST

中宣部:有关温家宝总理出访的报道一律严格按新华社通稿刊播。

【数字时代真理部系列:"在这里,了解祖国"

"真理部"是网民对中国共产党中央委员会宣传部和其下属的各省宣传部,以及国家级的国务院新闻办公室,中央文明办,国家广播电影电视总局,出版总署,文化部等一系列言论出版审查机构的总称。】


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Grads Face Tough Job Market

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 04:22 PM PST

On-campus recruitment ad from cell phone manufacturer .

As China's breakneck rate of finally begins to slow, some analysts are holding their breath for the country's "." There are signs that direct foreign investment, consumption and other important indicators are on a downturn. For the country's college students, their future after graduation is uncertain. On top of all this, the government may be under-reporting the slowdown:

You know, China's an enormous country with a lot of regional variations. But one economist based in Tsinghua University, , says that in some areas, he thinks that growth for the whole year might only be 4 to 5 percent; that in fact, these official numbers don't reflect the extent of the slowdown.

The anonymous BBS forum post below describes a sharp decline in on-campus recruiting at in , a coastal city not far from . It compounds Chovanec's concern, adding that the media have remained upbeat in order to smooth the path for "The Meeting" (last week's ). The post seems to no longer be available on NewSMTH.net (水木社区), where it first appeared. But if the censors decided it painted to bleak a picture, then it has years of post-graduation struggle to erase:

On November 7, a report on the employment situation from the Nankai University Employment Counseling Center circulated online. The report shows that Nankai graduates are facing very serious difficulties finding jobs this year. Netizens speculate that college graduates across the nation are also facing formidable challenges.

This year's employment situation is unusually grim in that:

(1) The number of employers recruiting on campus has decreased by more than 40% compared with this time last year. The number of employers that have reserved space for on-campus recruitment in November and December has also declined sharply compared to previous years.

(2) In previous years, several non-local talent-hunting fairs would organize employers to come to our school and other universities for recruitment. More than a hundred employers would eagerly sign up. But this year, it is generally difficult to find just ten employers to participate.

(3) We learned through communication with some conglomerates that many viable enterprises are recruiting less because they face mergers and reorganization. For example, used to easily make dozens of job offers at our school, but made only three this year.

Because of The Meeting and other reasons, the media haven't reported too negatively on the situations of the economy and employment this year. But just as the Employment Counseling Center has seen, the reality is the worst in the last eight years. Even during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, we did not experience such an impact.

Read more about the Chinese economy from CDT.

Via NewSMTH.net. Translation by Mengyu Dong.


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What’s Really Behind China’s Tabloid-Style Coverage of Obama’s Asia Trip

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 11:52 AM PST

Obama plants a kiss on Aung San Suu Kyi. (Via Weibo)

What do people in China really think about U.S. President Barack Obama's historic visit to Southeast Asia? A glance at Chinese mainstream and social media depicts conflicting narratives, with topics ranging from President Obama's now-infamous kiss with Aung San Suu Kyi to geopolitical power dynamics between China, Myanmar, and the United States.

Kisses, flirtatious eyes, and other silliness

One of the most viral related posts on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, is a series of close-up images of Obama embracing and kissing Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi during a press conference in Yangon. Probably not coincidentally, another popular image is a photo of Obama "making eyes" at Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

Some Web users ridiculed these outward displays of affection, including the nationalist publication Global Times. Atop a picture of Obama posing with a seemingly shocked Suu Kyi, the Global Times' Weibo account (@环球时报) played up the theme of romantic pursuit, with the line: "Myanmar is independent … Obama should not assume that he is 'all that.'" The Chinese phrase for 'all that,' zizuo duoqing, connotes unearned swagger and, perhaps, unrequited affection. The phrase repeatedly appeared in mainstream Chinese press and was widely forwarded by microbloggers.

But for others, President Obama's actions appeared to embody a fresh and exciting new kind of politics taking root in nearby Myanmar. Weibo user @马都浮云 wrote, "The light of democracy shines on Myanmar!" Indeed, these unrehearsed images strike a sharp contrast with the pictures of the staid seven-man Politburo Standing Committee that made its debut in China last week.

Puncturing the official narrative

Microbloggers that got past "the kiss" for Suu Kyi and "the eyes" at Shinawatra noted stark contradictions between the reporting in Caijing, a historically reformist magazine, and official state-run media outlets, such as China Central Television (CCTV) and People's Daily.

Behind the online silliness lies a deeper anxiety about the U.S. and China's respective roles in the international community. (Via Weibo)

Consistent with an account offered in the U.S. media, the Caijing blurb accompanying photos of Obama kissing Suu Kyi read: "Obama's visit generated significant excitement among the people of Yangon, and from the airport to the city center several thousand people gathered along the streets to welcome Obama."

But CCTV and People's Daily suggested the opposite. People's Daily reporters claimed not to see much in the way of welcome signs or banners and not to feel a noticeable buzz of excitement. The official report played down President Obama's presence in Myanmar, emphasizing that the visit lasted only six hours, and was one that Suu Kyi initially did not endorse. More provocatively, the report suggested that "some Myanmar people" have interpreted Obama's decision not to visit the new capital, Naypiydaw, as a purposeful jab to "avoid giving [Myanmar's people] too much face."

Microbloggers were quick to point out the inconsistency. "Once again, Caijing sings a different tune," noted @霸气的捣乱. "[CCTV] said that the response of the people of Myanmar was flat and the reception of the government of Myanmar was lukewarm."

The truth behind the chatter

Of course, the proxy battles over Obama's glad-handing and between dueling media reports ultimately strike at power dynamics among China, Myanmar, and the United States. The Global Times ran a November 20 editorial musing on the implications of Myanmar's opening up and possible democratization. "Sooner or later Myanmar was going to open up to the outside world… but the extent of any change to come is certainly limited." The rationale behind this assertion boils down to economic analysis. "Southeast Asia's economic reliance on China is greater than its reliance on the U.S. This trend will continue … Obama has promised [Myanmar] US$170 million in aid, but unless he can duplicate that amount every month, this bargaining chip cannot change the fundamental nature the Chinese-Myanmar relationship."

While trade and investment are critical components of a country's power and influence, the perspective set out in Global Times focuses almost single-mindedly on dollars and cents. A comment on the "kiss" photo by @剑佩萧 unintentionally echoes this sentiment: "The world's most expensive kiss; Obama uses $170 million to buy a kiss from Ang San Suu Kyi."

When it comes to Myanmar, the diverse, sometimes trivial images and debates on display in China's blogosphere beg a larger question: How do softer factors–such as values, aspirations and identity–stack up against economic incentives in determining political dynamics among Asian nations? Put more bluntly, can great powers simply buy their friends? China's rise has been awe-inspiring, but China has not yet articulated a compelling narrative about what it stands for within a broader community of nations.

As to whether cameras will ever capture new Chinese leader Xi Jinping embracing Aung San Suu Kyi at some point over the next 10 years; only time will tell. If it happens, it will be the culmination of a complex process involving China's wealth, its influence, and its role as either exemplar or cautionary tale on the world stage. After President Obama's visit ends this week and the tabloid-like chatter recedes into the background, it will be time to kiss the simple answers goodbye.

Chongqing, a Slippery Stepping Stone

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 02:08 PM PST

The CPC Central Committee has appointed Sun Zhengcai to fill Bo Xilai's former position as Chongqing's Party chief, following interim secretary Zhang Dejiang's appointment to the Politburo Standing Committee last week.

Sun, 49, was elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee after the 18th CPC National Congress last week. Born in Shandong Province, he served as Minister of [agri]Culture for three years before being transferred to Northeast China in 2009 as secretary of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee.

, vice premier and former member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, covered Bo's position from March as secretary of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Committee, after Bo's wife Bogu Kailai was found to have been involved in the murder of British citizen .

[…] According to media reports, Zhang had been trying to differ from Bo's tenure by redirecting Chongqing's economic and social development in a low-profile manner. Bo's red song campaign was also discontinued. Zhang urged Party officials to draw lessons from the Bo scandal, take better care of their spouses, children and staff and ensure they are held to the highest standards.

With the transition to a new generation of leadership still underway, Sun's assignment will prepare and test him for an anticipated key role in the next. From Brian Spegele at The Wall Street Journal:

The appointment of Mr. Sun, a former agriculture minister and party chief of northeast Jilin province, is an early indication that rising party leaders will be given reins of some of the country's most important—and most problematic—areas, analysts say. In Chongqing, for example, Mr. Sun will face deeply vested business interests, continuing concerns over organized crime and still-strong support for the ousted Mr. Bo.

The appointment—and a number of others that are expected to follow in the coming days and weeks—points to a major shuffling at the top ranks of China's ruling party following last week's Communist Party Congress, where succeeded President as party chief. That shuffle will provide important insight into a generation of rising cadres—known as the sixth generation, following the Xi-led fifth generation—who are expected to lead the party when Mr. Xi and other newly appointed leaders likely retire a decade from now.

The outlook of the new generation could be significantly different from the previous. Unlike Mr. Xi's generation, which came of age during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Mr. Sun and his contemporaries grew up during the period of relative openness following economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

Cheng Li's biographical entry on Sun at The Brookings Institution highlights his PhD, a year spent studying in the U.K., and a "humble" family background, another difference between him and princelings like Bo and Xi.

[…] There have been different explanations for the quick rise of and his relationships with senior leaders. Some believe that Sun has been Jia Qinglin's protégé, as he advanced his career largely in , where Jia served as mayor and party secretary from 1996 through 2002. It also has been speculated that Sun is a protégé of , who played a direct role in Sun's promotion to minister of agriculture and then party secretary of Jilin Province. Both explanations, however, may be correct.

Modest background is shared by Hu Chunhua, or "Little Hu". Both men have just received seats on the "outer" Politburo, are relatively young at 49, and are strongly tipped for future leadership. From Cheng Li at Brookings:

established his patron-mentor relationship with Hu Jintao in when the latter served as party secretary there (1988–1992). Hu Chunhua has been widely regarded as "a carbon copy of Hu Jintao" [to whom he is not related]. Both come from humble family backgrounds, both were student leaders in their college years, both advanced their political careers primarily through the CCYL, both worked in arduous work environments such as , both served as provincial party secretaries at a relatively young age, and both have low-profile personalities. Hu Chunhua's parents were farmers in a poor village and he has six siblings. Hu got married in and the couple have one daughter.

Hu the Younger's current role is as Party secretary for Inner Mongolia: see 'Little Hu and the Mining of the Grasslands' on CDT. He is now widely expected to take over as Guangdong Party head, though it was rumoured last month that he was also a contender for the Chongqing position. Both he and Sun may then rise to the in 2017, when five of the seven current members are due to retire. Last week, Bloomberg traced their likely trajectories.

If the two do assume top leadership posts 10 years from now, their advancement within the party's top echelons may follow the path of Hu Jintao, whose grooming began when he was named to the Politburo's Standing Committee at age 49 in 1992, said Bo Zhiyue, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore's East Asia Institute who has written a research paper on Hu Chunhua and Sun.

By contrast, Xi Jinping, who was named Communist Party general secretary […], and Li Keqiang, who is forecast to take over from Premier Wen Jiabao in March, were elevated into the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 without serving in the broader Politburo. Communist Party leaders may have decided the next generation will need more time to prepare, Bo said.

"I think this time around they are doing a better job of bringing younger people into the Politburo so they can start this grooming process," Bo said in a phone interview. "In the case of Hu Jintao it was 10 years, but in the case of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang it was only five years. In Chinese politics five years seems a little bit rushed."

Nothing about future leadership transitions can be taken for granted, however, as the current Party secretary in Guangdong and Sun's predecessor in Chongqing might attest.


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Photo: Forbidden Detail, by Mark Hobbs

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 01:30 PM PST

Forbidden Detail


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Ministry of Truth: Power and Air

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 12:53 PM PST

The following examples of instructions, issued to the media and/or Internet companies by various central (and sometimes local) government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. Chinese journalists and bloggers often refer to those instructions as "Directives from the ." CDT has collected the selections we translate here from a variety of sources and has checked them against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The original publication date is noted after the directives; the date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.
Guandong Department: The media must not continue to report on being cast as the imaginary enemy at the Air Show. (November 19, 2012)

广东省委宣传部:媒体上不可再出现有关珠海航展模拟把台湾当成假想敌的相关报道。

Guandong Propaganda Department: The County government has again issued public announcements and public participation advertisements for the launch of the environmental impact assessment of the No. 4 Natural Resources and Thermal Power Plant (formerly the Panyu Life Waste Incineration Power Plant). All media are to report in accordance with news wire copy provided by Panyu. To not comment on or hype the story. (November 19, 2012)

广东省委宣传部:番禺区政府再次发布广州市第四资源热力电厂(原番禺生活垃圾焚烧发电厂)进入项目环评第二次公示和公众参与阶段的公告,各媒按番禺区提供的新闻通稿内容报道,不评论,不炒作。


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Ministry of Truth: Spirit of the 18th Party Congress

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 12:00 PM PST

The following example of instructions, issued to the media and/or Internet companies by various central (and sometimes local) government authorities, has been leaked and distributed online. Chinese journalists and often refer to those instructions as "Directives from the ." CDT has collected the selections we translate here from a variety of sources and has checked them against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The original publication date is noted after the directives; the date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.

Central Department: As the undertakes its first collective study session of the implementation of the spirit of the , all media will use wire copy and report the meeting prominently. Headlines must not be changed. (November 18, 2012)

中宣部:中央政治局就深入学习贯彻党的十八大精神进行第一次集体学习,各媒体用新华社通稿,作突出报道,标题不得改动。


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Word of the Week: Soy Sauce

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 12:00 PM PST

Editor's Note: The CDT Grass-Mud Horse Lexicon is a glossary of terms created by Chinese netizens and frequently encountered in online political discussions. These are the words of China's online "resistance discourse," used to mock and subvert the official language around and political correctness. The features Lexicon entries old, new and timely.

If you are interested in participating in this project by submitting and/or translating terms, please contact the CDT editors at CDT [at] chinadigitaltimes [dot] net.

"What the f**k does it have to do with me? I was just out buying ."

打酱油 (dǎ jiàngyóu): getting soy sauce

This means "no comment" or "none of my business." It is a humorous way for netizens to distance themselves from a sensitive or political topic.

The word came into popular usage after Television interviewed a local resident about the Edison Chen photo scandal. The man answered, "What the f**k does it have to do with me? I was just out buying soy sauce."

See also soy sauce committee members.


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Censorship Vault: Beijing Internet Instructions Series (14)

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 11:04 AM PST

In partnership with the China Copyright and Media blog, CDT is adding the "Beijing Internet Instructions" series to the Censorship Vault. These directives were originally published on Canyu.org (Participate) and date from 2005 to 2007. According to , the directives were issued by the Municipal Network Management Office and the Internet management departments and provided to to by insiders. has not verified the source.

The translations are by Rogier Creemers of .

17 April 2006, 9:36, Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

The result of the Tianjia Medical Expense: Party Committee Secretary and others dismissed from position – if the first source of this article is Caijing, please completely delete it.

18 April 2006 (Tuesday), 9:05

The new Canadian Foreign Minister says there are 1,000 Chinese spies in his country – this article comes from the Straits Metropolitan Daily, and is not within the scope of reprinting, please speedily delete it.

18 April 2006, 9:00 Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

(1) Today, the visit of to the has begun, all websites are requested to strictly use standard copy, at present, there still are articles from Dongfang Net, please immediately delete them.

(2) All websites are requested to speedily reprint the following articles in the special section on beginning the trend of network civilization: Youth Who Lost Their Way Accuse Network Poison – 300 Website Editors Are Deeply Shocked (http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9050.htm, http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9037.htm)

High-school students strive to abide by honesty and become "Network Civilization Disseminators" and "Examination Supervision Exempt Class," Huiwen High School Students Fix Eyes upon Practicing the View of Honour and Dishonour," (http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9041.htm, http: //epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9052.htm)

(3) "Run the Web in a Civilized Manner, Use the Web in a Civilized Manner" Arouses Huge Social Reverberations, The New Wind of Network Civilization Is Rising Up and Flourishing"

Beijing: Give Networks a Clear Space (http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/?pageStart=0&pageEnd=10&currentpage=0) – This is a special contribution to a special section, please reprint the entire article.

Please indicate the source, Net – when reprinting the above articles.

18 April 2006, 9:55, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

The article "China Maritime Bureau: Sailing Prohibition During Period of East Sea Oilfield Expansion Works" from today's Jinghua Times is an untrue report, please speedily delete it.

18 April 2006, 9:58, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

Beijing Taxi drivers: our greatest ideal is driving black cars – please speedily push this to the back stage.

18 April 2006, 21:44,

Everyone, information concerning this edition of the American Pulitzer News Prize and "Female German Chancellor Changes Clothing in Public" is not to be reprinted or reported without exception by all website, where it has been reprinted, delete it.

19 April 2006, 9:00, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

If " Brings Up the Incident of a Diplomat Committing Suicide for Illicit Love Again – States Our Diplomats to Be Summoned to Court" appears, please delete it with the highest speed.

19 April 2006, 11:31, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

Please note: please change all articles concerning the Beijing taxi price increase without exception into copy from the Beijing Daily: http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060419/200604/t14298.htm, http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060419/200604/t14303.htm. Please indicate that the source is Beijing Daily, please acknowledge receipt, thank you. Please speedily change them.

19 April 2006, 12:00, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

Reports concerning the matter of Beijing taxi price adjustment, news trackers may now be opened, apart from discussions attacking the government not being permitted to be published, positive and negative opinions may both be posted.

19 April 2006, 21:49, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

Please reprint the Qianlong Net information "Taxi Price Adjustment Hearing Representative Discussion- Attacking Black Cars Becomes Focus Point," (http://beijing.qianlong.com/3825/2006/04/19/134@3128582.htm).

19 April 2006, 12:00, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

All websites are requested to reprint this article in the network civilization special subject section: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-04/19/content_4449507.htm.

20 April 2006, 11:27, Beijing Municipal Information Office, Fan Tao

Please timely reprint the People's Daily People's Commentary in the special subject section: "What Is It that Shocked 300 Network Editors?"(http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/40604/4314195.html). Please acknowledge receipt.

2006年4月北京网管办发出的禁令(二)

2006年4月17日9时36分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

哈尔滨天价医费案结果公布:党委书记等被撤职——此稿如果稿源是第一财经的,请全部删除。
2006-4-18 (星期二) 9:05

加拿大新外长称本国有千名中国间谍——

此稿为海峡都市报的,不在转载范围,请迅速删除。
2006年4月18日9时 分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

1、今天胡锦涛访美开始,请各网严格使用规范稿源,目前还有用东方网的稿件,请立即删除。

2、请各网在大兴网络文明之风专题内迅速转载以下文章:失足少年控诉网络毒害三百网站编辑深受震撼 (http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9050.htm、http: //epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9037.htm)

高中生争作"网络文明传播者""考试免监班"信守诚信
汇文中学学生小处着眼践行荣辱观(http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9041.htm、http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/200604/t9052.htm)

3、"文明办网、文明上网"激起巨大社会反响,网络文明新风正在蔚然兴起
北京:还网络一个洁净空间 (http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060418/?pageStart=0&pageEnd=10&currentpage=0)——这是一个特稿专版,请转载全部文章。

以上稿件在转载时,请注明出处京报网——北京日报
2006年4月18日9时55分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

今天京华时报的稿件《中国海事局:东海油田扩建作业期间禁航》为不实报道,请迅速删除。
2006年4月18日9时58分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

北京出租车司机:我最大的理想是开上黑车——请迅速压到后台。
2006年4月18日21时44分 陈华

各位,关于本届美国普利策新闻奖和"德国女总理当众换衣"的消息,各网站一律不转载报道,已转的删除
2006年4月19日9 时 分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

如有"日本重提外交官桃色自杀事件 称将传唤我外交官"请以最快速度删除。
2006年 4月19日11时 31分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

请注意:关于北京出租车涨价的稿件,请一律换为北京日报的稿件:http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060419 /200604/t14298.htm http://epaper.bjd.com.cn/rb/20060419/200604/t14303.htm请注明来源为北京日报,收到请回复,谢 谢。请迅速更换。
2006年4月19日12时 分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

关于北京出租车调价一事的报道,现在可以打开跟贴,除攻击政府的言论不准放行外,正反意见均允许上贴。
2006年4月19日21 时 49 分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

请在新闻中心首页要闻区中下位置转载千龙网消息《出租车价调整听证代表质询 打击黑车成焦点 》(http://beijing.qianlong.com/3825/2006/04/19/134@3128582.htm)
2006年4月19日12时 分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

请各网站在文明办网专题转载:http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-04/19/content_4449507.htm 此文章
2006年4月20日11时27 分 北京市新闻办公室 范涛

请及时在专题内转载人民日报人民时评:《让三百名网络编辑震撼的,是什么 》(http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/40604/4314195.html)收到请回复,谢谢。

These translated directives were first posted by Rogier Creemers on on November 21, 2012 (here).


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The Key to Bringing Democracy to China

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 10:32 AM PST

At Foreign Policy, MIT's Yasheng Huang suggests that the best way to promote democracy in China would be to stress elite self-interest over moral values. Huang also challenges the argument that asking China to democratise after thirty years of massive under Party rule is, in 's words, "like asking Apple to turn itself into RIM."

It's time for the to pivot to a new approach toward influencing China's political future: explaining that produces concrete benefits such as balanced growth, stability, and personal security — even for top Communist Party officials. This performance-based argument will resonate with many of China's economic and intellectual elites and may have a chance to influence the thinking of and his fellow top officials.

But first, it's necessary to dispel the widespread myth that China's current political and economic system is uniquely responsible for China's growth. Yes, in the last 30 years, China has done a remarkable job of lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but we must keep this achievement in perspective. One reason the post-Mao leadership lifted so many people out of poverty is because Mao Zedong kept so many Chinese poor. (In 1979, showing remarkable candor, the Chinese Communist Party itself publicly acknowledged that per capita grain consumption of Chinese remained stagnant between 1957 and 1978.) Second, the poverty threshold is commonly defined as living under $1 a day. Living above that line is an improvement — not prosperity. Based on data provided by the World Bank in 2008, roughly 30 percent of China's population, or 390 million people, lived below $2 a day. By this measure, China has a comparable percentage of people living in poverty as Honduras, a country that never experienced China's rapid GDP growth.

[…] Chinese political elites implicitly understand that democracies provide security of property and of persons. When ousted by Bo, , the former police chief of , did not turn to the Chinese Ministry of Justice but the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. Other Chinese elites outsource their personal security by sending their family members to study and to reside in the United States; wouldn't they like a little more of that security closer to home? For democracy to work for China, it has to work for China's most powerful. There is no other way.

Huang also explored whether democracy stifles economic growth in a 2011 TED talk. The question of Chinese democracy has been debated recently by Martin Jacques and Zhang Weiwei versus Anson Chan and Jonathan Mirsky at Intelligence Squared, and by Eric X. Li versus Minxin Pei at the Aspen Ideas Festival. Li has been a particularly vocal defender of the Party's record in English-language media, and explained to Rachel Beitarie earlier this year why he believes democracy is not the answer for China. Equally vigorous discussion has centred on the degree of meritocracy in China's current system.


© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us
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China’s Role in Syria: How Beijing Can Help End the Violence

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 06:54 AM PST

U.N.-Arab League peace envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi before their meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing on October 31, 2012.

Will Piekos is a Research Associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry recently announced a "new" four-point peace initiative to solve the crisis in Syria. During a visit to Beijing by U.N. and Arab League mediator Lakhdar Brahimi in October, China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that "political dialogue is the only correct way to tackle this issue," and he added that he hoped the mediation discussions would promote "mutual understanding" and "the appropriate handling of the Syrian issue."

The U.S. News & World Report summarized the four points of China's proposal as follows:

  • The Syrian government and rebel fighters should make every effort to maintain a ceasefire and work with Brahimi's mediation efforts;
  • Both sides should appoint interlocutors who can negotiate a political transition and maintain governmental stability;
  • The international community should increase support for Brahimi's efforts and other mediation initiatives, such as 'relevant Security Council resolutions';
  • The international community should increase humanitarian assistance to conflict regions in Syria.

The new plan seems to reflect China's acceptance of the deteriorating situation in Syria and of the possibility of Assad's downfall. By calling for a political transition, the new plan jettisons the traditional Chinese foreign policy terminology in favor of language more in line with current international opinion. It is a noticeable departure from China's six-point peace plan released in March, which demanded the international community "respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria" and expressed its disapproval of Western attempts at regime change.

Despite these apparent changes in strategy, however, the plan simply reiterates old points and fails to provide a comprehensive path to peace. China continues to leave off the table the possibility of sanctions or other punitive measures as a way to convince the regime to stop the violence. Without them, the Syrian government has no reason to end the bloodshed: it has the upper hand both militarily and politically, and it has more sophisticated equipment and control of government institutions.

So what can China do to signal it is serious about a political settlement in Syria? Given Beijing's reluctance to impose sanctions, a small but significant action would be to recognize the recently formed National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as representative of the opposition movement. Given that the Assad regime seemingly no longer maintains a "monopoly on the legitimate use of force," an integral part of Max Weber's definition of sovereignty, it would not be a stretch for Beijing to admit that the Assad government does not control a sovereign state. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has already conceded as much by calling for "empowered interlocutors" from relevant parties and a "transitional governing body of broad representation."

By simply acknowledging the Coalition's existence, China—a non-Western voice that has foiled previous U.N. action against Assad—can help give the opposition the standing it needs to negotiate a ceasefire or a political transition. The strategy has a chance to hasten a settlement and end the bloodshed without armed intervention, one of China's stated goals throughout the conflict. Most importantly, Beijing will not be just seen as taking a leading role in finding a solution to the 20-month civil war; it might actually be able to do so.

Desensitized in China

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 07:14 AM PST

A few years ago while living in China I went back home to Kansas City for a short trip. One day I was riding in a car with my mother and we passed a child about five years old sitting alone on the sidewalk.

My mom asked if I'd "seen that". I had, but it didn't register what she was referring to.

"See what?" I asked.

"That little boy," she replied. "He was all alone there without his parents."

"Oh yeah," I said dismissively.

"We'd better go back and make sure he's ok," she said as she pulled onto the next street to turn around.

"K…" I answered, just starting to realize what the big deal was.

By the time we got to the boy, another woman had also pulled over to see what was up. We all walked around with the child looking for his parents until eventually we called the police. An officer showed up within ten minutes and took the boy to the station.

As soon as I saw that the other woman had pulled over, it immediately sank in what I'd just done…or rather, what I'd failed to do, and it made me sick. Had I been alone in the car, I would have kept on driving. I was ashamed because it's not something I would have done just a few years earlier. China had desensitized me.

Last week five young Guizhou children were found dead in a dumpster from carbon monoxide poisoning after they'd climbed in and burned coal to stay warm. They'd been missing for three weeks after running away from home. Someone apparently even took a picture of them sitting in a public place the day before their deaths, but still, no social safety net caught them in time.

The five children (maybe) via Sina Weibo user @公民李元龙, via Beijing Cream

I wasn't the least bit surprised. People wrote heartfelt messages of sorrow and disgust online, but I imagine if they'd walked by the kids sitting alone on the street themselves, most would have just kept walking by. It pains me now to say it, but I've done it dozens of times myself.

It's not that people in China are heartless. The sight of children running around alone is just so depressingly common that it's barely enough to raise an eyebrow. Sometimes they're child beggars being exploited by a guardian watching from around the corner. Sometimes they've just been left to run about by parents who've never been warned by the always-harmonious media about China's epidemic of child kidnappers.

These unaccompanied children are ubiquitous and there's been very little done to educate society that this isn't a normal or acceptable thing. Unfortunately, when I entered this society I gradually forgot this myself.

People have been quick to blame the parents, the school principals and local government officials for letting these kids slip through their fingers. Indeed, they all bear some responsibility, but so do all of us who've ever seen a child alone and kept walking. Most of all though, responsibility lies with the system that's allowed us to become desensitized to something that's clearly very disturbing.


A Bold Speech at Elite Chinese University Goes Viral: “Everyone Lies”

Posted: 20 Nov 2012 10:13 AM PST

Li Chengpeng, speaking at Peking University. (Via Weibo)

Freedom of speech has always been a sensitive topic in China. But when a prominent commentator calls for the right to free speech in one of the most famous (and state-controlled) universities in China, it raises the stakes yet further.

On November 18, fresh off of a forced blogging hiatus coinciding with China's leadership handover at its 18th Party Congress, outspoken commentator and blogger Li Chengpeng (@李承鹏) delivered a sharp and powerful speech called "Talk" at Peking University, directly criticizing the lack of free speech in China. On the same day, text of Li's talk (shown below this article) was widely shared on Chinese blogs and social media, with thousands of reposts and comments showing support. One commenter wrote: "He speaks for many people's hearts." Yet some of the shared content on Sina Weibo, China's preeminent microblogging platform, had been censored by the next day.

Li started with a bold statement: " Chinese people are losing the power to talk." He described the 1960s in China, citing examples of how the disastrous Cultural Revolution forced citizens to make a choice: Lie, or shut up. At that age, the whole country lost its ability to talk. "You couldn't talk about your needs: I'm hungry; you couldn't talk about your emotions: I love you; you couldn't criticize your leaders; … you couldn't tell the scientific truth."

He went on to describe the "nonsense" Orwellian terms that the government has used to paper over excesses, including "vacation-style treatment," (休假式治疗) "protective demolition," (保护性拆迁) "bribery out of courtesy" (礼节性受贿) and "confirmatory election" (确认性选举). Li insisted that "we haven't recovered from our inability to talk" due to strict censorship. "Every time I see some department claim that our country has the largest number of books and newspapers in the world, I think, actually we can just say it produces the largest amount of toilet paper. "

Li also cited the recent mass incidents in the cities of Qidong and Ningbo as pointing to further fundamental problems: "These incidents don't have a political purpose; people were just making their voices heard, but it got out of hand. I think the most fundamental problem is the system itself. There's a huge bug in the design at the beginning, and in order to fix the bug, you use anti-virus software, but the software itself has a bug…  the anti-virus thinks people don't have the right to speak, yet it has the power to punish.  [The government] is arrogant, sensitive, and closed-minded."

Li ascribed a circular, theatrical quality to debate in modern China. He said, "We [the citizens] know they [the authorities] are lying, and they know that we know they are lying, and we know that they know that we know they are lying, and they know that we are pretending that they did not lie …. This is the reality. Everyone lies to each other, and this is a lie to make ends meet. … The most terrible thing about a country is not poverty [or] hunger … but people who have lost the right and the ability to speak."

Yet in the end, the fiercely critical Li said he remains optimistic: "I hope that this nation is only temporarily without words. Although words have always been the easiest for power to control, it is always the last fortress to fall in war …  I am always critical of this country yet I am always full of hope for this nation."

(Via Weibo)

Ministry of Truth: Death of Runaways in Guizhou

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 07:03 AM PST

The following example of instructions, issued to the media and/or Internet companies by various central (and sometimes local) government authorities, has been leaked and distributed online. Chinese journalists and bloggers often refer to those instructions as "." CDT has collected the selections we translate here from a variety of sources and has checked them against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation.

The dumpster where the bodies of five boys were found last week.

Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The original publication date is noted after the directives; the date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source.

Central Department: Concerning the five boys who froze to death in Bijie, Guizhou, you may report moderately on the incident according to wire copy and authoritative information released by the local government. Do not put this news on the front page, do not lure readers to the story, do not link to the story, to do not comment on it, and do not dispatch journalists to the scene. (November 20, 2012)

中宣部:贵州毕节5名男童冻死事件可按新华社通稿和当地政府部门发布的权威信息适度报道,不上头版、导读,不链接,不评论,不派记者到事发地采访。

Last Friday, the bodies of five boys between the ages of nine and 13 were found in a dumpster in the city of Bijie, , China's poorest province. Most sources report the children died of carbon monoxide poisoning from a fire they lit inside to keep warm. Their parents had been searching for them weeks before they were found. Several local officials and two school masters have been fired following the incident.


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What Did We Learn From the Aokang Anti-dumping Verdict? Not so Much.

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 04:11 AM PST

Last week, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down a verdict in favor of Aokang Shoes, a Chinese company from Wenzhou that had been pursuing the anti-dumping case in the EU for the past six years. As you can see from the ruling, this is insanely technical legal jargon, and not something you want to tackle without a bottle of scotch at your side. I wasn't planning on any commentary for two reasons: I'm not familiar with EU law in this area, and there wasn't anything obviously interesting/extraordinary about the case.

But the number of news articles in the state press here, as well as a Xinhua Op/Ed advice column, made me rethink my decision.

However, let me first say that any victory by a Chinese company abroad is a healthy indicator that PRC firms are becoming more comfortable with overseas legal systems and business practices. These companies should be encouraged to participate in these disputes, and to the extent that some of these articles from state media were designed to light a fire under domestic enterprises in this regard, I think that's a good thing.

But wait a second. These articles were run in English state media, like China Daily, Xinhua, Global Times, and CCTV. If the point was to educate local companies about their legal options abroad, why so much attention in English? One simple explanation might be that this is a foreign trade story, so it makes sense to run it in English. But I also suspect that there was a subtle cheerleading aspect to all this (i.e., we won! And we can win again in the future!).

I have a limit when it comes to certain kinds of rhetoric, and stuff like this goes way past:

On Tuesday, the spokesman for China's Commerce Ministry, Shen Danyang said that the victory has three big positive impacts on international trade.

"First of all, it has distinguished right from wrong. The EU Court of Justice's verdict has ruled that the European Union has not treated Chinese firms fairly when it carried out the anti-dumping investigations. In the past, the EU did not admit it was unfair, unequal or discriminating towards Chinese enterprises. So the verdict has drafted a clear line between right and wrong. Secondly, it has given out a warning to the EU, which limits the EU's scope to abuse anti-dumping measures. Thirdly it set out good example for Chinese enterprises to protect their own rights through legal actions," Shen Danyang said.

I'll go along with point #3, but this "right vs. wrong" rhetoric is ridiculous. China and the EU are not at war; this was an anti-dumping case, a kind of dispute that is unfortunately all too common. For a company to win an appeal in an anti-dumping case does not exactly mean that the EU was slapped down by an angry court weary of "abuse." I read the ruling and didn't see this as a Manichaeian struggle. Maybe that's just me.

Which leads me back to this Xinhua Op/Ed, which starts off just fine by introducing the case and explaining why the result sets a good example for other Chinese enterprises. Fair enough, and I agree. But this confused me:

This victory is particularly significant now, as the EU and the United States have launched a series of anti-dumping investigations into Chinese solar panels and other solar products.

Yes, these disputes are ongoing and high profile. But what does the Aokang case have to do with them? Is the author of the Op/Ed worried that Chinese solar manufacturers will not pursue their rights in these cases? I seriously doubt it. Too much at stake in this market sector for these charges to simply be ignored. And let's face it, if the government wants these companies to pursue these claims, it doesn't need to make its case out in the public in Xinhua (in English).

Aokang won its case, so other companies can do the same. Sure. But why have so many Chinese companies not bothered to do so in the past? Here's Xinhua's explanation:

In theory, Chinese companies involved in export businesses do not lack professional legal advice from lawyers, but they still need to better understand the laws of other countries and learn how to more effectively apply them in their own defense.

Concerns for costly input into human resources and the uncertainty of winning lawsuits have dissuaded Chinese companies from embarking on potentially long journeys through the legal process.

Mostly true. Cost and lack of familiarity are important reasons why Chinese firms have failed to pursue foreign legal claims. I would also tack on to that list cultural/business factors, such as lack of transparency and inexperience. I know quite a few foreign trade lawyers who have told me scary, and amusing, stories about representing Chinese enterprises in trade cases. The problem is not lack of lawyers, but not knowing how to work with them.

And finally, we have this little nugget:

But companies need to recognize that only by legally defending themselves can they avoid facing similar accusations in the future and expand into even bigger markets.

This presupposes that these companies are being unfairly targeted, partially because they have not fought back in the past. It's the victim mentality which is all too prevalent in state media. I guess the idea here is that once these companies stand up for themselves, the EU and other foreign governments will become less aggressive in imposing anti-dumping duties.

Um, no. I don't think it works that way. Yes, trade disputes can be influenced by politics. But that doesn't mean that there is a master plan out there for dealing with Chinese companies that will be revised if a few PRC firms decide to file appeals. That's a funky conspiracy theory.

The lesson from the Aokang case? Same one I tell my foreign clients who have China disputes: if you use the legal system, you might win. If you don't, you'll definitely lose. Any other rhetoric should be ignored.


© Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us
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Did News Story on Riches of China's Premier Weaken Reformists?

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 12:31 AM PST

This post is part of our International Relations & Security coverage.

Grandpa Wen's Nightmare, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场)

Grandpa Wen's Nightmare, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场) (used with permission)

The hot pot of Chinese politics is still boiling madly after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party and the leadership transition that took place in Beijing on November 14, 2012. Many see the composition of the new Politburo Standing Committee as a defeat for outgoing President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his reformist allies promoted. Moreover, Hu stepped down as the chairman of the Central Military Commission sooner than expected. Were Chinese conservatives stronger than expected or did something weaken the reformists?

Just two weeks before the Congress started the New York Times published a story alleging that members of Wen Jiabao's family have amassed a combined fortune of $2.7 billion by using the Premier's influence and close links between politics and business in China.

With Chinese politics already at boiling point, the New York Times article exploded on Sina Weibo, the social media site that is purported to be a reasonable reflection of public opinion. Comments expressing both surprise and disappointment flooded the Internet, but also many of unconditional support for Wen, reported Rachel Lu on Tea Leaf Nation.

With China's censorship machine ready to stop any "harmony disruption", both the English and Chinese versions of the New York Times website were blocked within hours of the article's publication. However, Chinese netizens know creative ways to jump the Great Firewall and had already been using the code word "Sparta" (which has a similar pronunciation to '18th Congress' in Chinese) in order to access the article. Lily Kuo explores on Quartz how Chinese netizens got around the censors to read the article and discuss the issue. Kuo writes:

Chinese bloggers have been using various homonyms for the New York Times to get by the censors. One that translates to "twisted waist times" (扭腰时报) and sounds like the Chinese name for the paper has already been blocked. But "Cattle Times," another homonym, seems to have gotten through for now.

Some have logically related the news story and its timing to what may be the greatest political scandal in the last months: the fall of high-flying politician Bo Xilai. Despite the Party's efforts to present it as an example of the fight against corruption, many perceived it as a clear sign of internal struggle. Bo Xilai is seen as a representative of the leftist wing of the party (which means conservative in China) that is pitted against reformists represented by Wen Jiabao.

In her post on Tea Leaf Nation, Lu collects some of the comments pointing in that direction:

"What position is the New York Times taking? Have they been bought out by the supporters of Mao?" asked one user. "All sides are making their final moves and positioning their pieces–that is what I think about the NYT's headline today," commented another. Some believe the newspaper is being used as a pawn in the power struggle, "This time NYT really does not understand China–too much of a puppet." Another user wrote: "The information is probably given to the New York Times by left-wing powers in China, and the right-wing deserves it."

Others still admire Wen for being the most senior and the most vocal among those Chinese officials who dare to openly call for reforms. "It doesn't matter if these disclosures are true, I don't expect high officials in the CCP [the Chinese Communist Party] to be clean anyway. I just hope that the liberals and the reformers can start real political reforms," wrote one user.

Though it seems clear that New York Times journalist David Barboza did much research in complicated corporate records, the possibility that someone may have helped him cannot be ruled out. This would not devalue his work, but it could help explain the dominance of the conservative wing once led by Bo Xilai on the new cycle of Chinese politics that now begins.

ISN logoThis post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

Written by Violeta Camarasa · comments (0)
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People Believe China's Hope Depends on Democracy

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 12:17 AM PST

Rachel Wang from Tea Leaf Nation reports on the result of an online poll in Sina Weibo conducted by People's Daily, in which a landslide majority of people vote for democracy as the hope of China's future.

Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0)
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China's Most Expensive Business School

Posted: 21 Nov 2012 12:10 AM PST

Ministry of Tofu translated an info graphic showing the background of the students of the China's most expensive business school, the Cheung Kong Graduate Business School.

Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0)
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