Blogs » Politics » A rare Xi Jinping interview from year 2000 translated
Blogs » Politics » A rare Xi Jinping interview from year 2000 translated |
- A rare Xi Jinping interview from year 2000 translated
- China, South Korea: Gangnam Style in Chinese Universities
- China: Medicinal Alcohol
- Cartoon: Grandpa Wen’s Nightmare, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场)
- Ningbo Protests Point to Middle Class Discontent
- Chinese Blogging Superstar’s Strange But Effective Rant Against Over-Construction
- Sensitive Words: Ningbo Protests and Wen Jiabao
- Hexie Farm (蟹农场): Grandpa Wen’s Nightmare
- The ‘New York Times’ Takedown of Wen Jiabao and What It Means
- The Daily Twit – 10/29/12: The NIMBY Winning Streak Continues
- Chinese Musicians Worry Elite Juilliard School Might Be Lost In Translation
- What Does Huawei Think About the U.S. House Intelligence Committee Report?
- PSA: Beware the Impostor
- ELECTIONS MATTER … Even Here
| A rare Xi Jinping interview from year 2000 translated Posted: 29 Oct 2012 10:35 PM PDT Having just read an interview (translated by Nordic Institute of Asian Studies) of Xi Jinping when he was still governor of Fujian Province back in 2000, I am struck by the differences between the current Chinese political system versus the American. Think about Obama before becoming president. The largest budget he's ever managed was probably his 2008 election campaign. From that, he would inherit a budget in the trillions of dollars. In contrast, Xi went from village to cities, and then provinces. He would be placed into bigger challenges as he excelled, and not to mention, observed in the seat of the vice president for a full term before the National Peoples Congress formally anoints him into president. As much as the Western press would like to criticize the Chinese system, it is a genuine form of meritocracy. Today's Romney or when President Obama was still a senator would probably not stand a chance becoming president in China. I should say, it is not clear which system works better. Some take solace in the idea that anyone (okay, provided if you are somebody within the Democratic or Republican parties) can become president. Look at how dominant America has been in these last couple of centuries. If that is not testament to success, then what is? Fair point. Someone else may say, look at the last few millenia and count the number of centuries when China has been dominant. Fair point too. Xi's response on why he avoids public interviews is also telling the stylistic difference between the two systems. However, both systems claim to serve the people. Below is Xi's articulation of that concept:
|
| China, South Korea: Gangnam Style in Chinese Universities Posted: 29 Oct 2012 08:12 PM PDT  Screen capture of the video: Gangnam Style at Nanjing Hehai University, featuring 3,700 dancers uploaded by Beijing Cream. South Korea PSY pop, Gangnam style has landed in China. Around 3,700 people danced the Gangnam Style together at Nanjing Hehai University and a few dozen students danced on the stage of the Peking University International Cultural Festival… But Ooops, the stage collapsed. (Via Beijing Cream) Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
| Posted: 29 Oct 2012 08:00 PM PDT  Screen capture from Youtube video: "The League" 3 Penis Wine Infomercial Derek introduces the tradition of medicinal alcohol in China, in particular the three-penis alcohol that enhances man's power. There is a youtube video showing a brand of three-penis alcohol available for sale in North America. (via 300 Shots at Greatness) Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
| Cartoon: Grandpa Wen’s Nightmare, by Hexie Farm (蟹农场) Posted: 29 Oct 2012 06:54 PM PDT  Grandpa Wen's Nightmare © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Ningbo Protests Point to Middle Class Discontent Posted: 29 Oct 2012 03:29 PM PDT Over the weekend, residents took to the streets in Ningbo, Zhejiang, to protest plans to expand a paraxylene (PX) plant in their city. Following the protests, which lasted three days and sometimes turned violent, the local government announced it would not go ahead with the planned expansion. By Monday, calm seemed to be restored to the city. But following similar protests in other cities (see: Xiamen, Dalian, Shifang) followed by concessions from the government which were not always implemented, some residents are skeptical of the government claims. From the Financial Times (via the Washington Post):
In Business Week, Christina Larson looks at the similarities between the Ningbo protests and those elsewhere in China:
The Ningbo protest is notable because – like Xiamen and Dalian – it is a prosperous area and the protesters were largely middle-class, urban residents. AP looks at the challenges for the government in managing this particular segment of the population when they take to the streets:
Throughout China, environmental protests were up 120% from 2010 to 2011. How the Chinese government will manage such conflicts between economic growth and environmental concerns was the topic of an Al Jazeera in depth report: Read more about environmental protests in China, via CDT. © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Chinese Blogging Superstar’s Strange But Effective Rant Against Over-Construction Posted: 29 Oct 2012 01:29 PM PDT  (via Weibo) We've seen this movie before, and so has the rest of China. On Saturday, October 27, Tea Leaf Nation reported that protests were heating up in the coastal city of Ningbo as locals expressed opposition to the construction of a chemical refining project they feared would pollute their hometown environment. On that same day, prominent blogger and critic Li Chengpeng took to Sina Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging platform, to post a blog entry explaining his take on the series of protests that have spruing up across China this year. Li's essay has already been re-posted over 100,000 times. Although Chinese authorities have since said they would back down from the proposed project, Li's angry and vivid description of Chinese government remains relevant–and, for that matter, unblocked by Chinese censors. Weaving political commentary, personal experience, and powerful (if conflicting) metaphors, it is a classic example of viral political speech in China's blogosphere. Li begins by describing his childhood encounter with environmental degradation. He writes how a tobacco factory for a popular Chinese cigarette-maker seemed to spring up overnight in his home town. "Every day, we would use our red scarves to cover our noses as we ran on around the track, and our teacher would yell at us: 'Don't you support national construction? How can you be afraid of a little smog?'… At that time, it was a serious crime not to support national construction." Perhaps because residents were cowed by potential charges of being "unsupportive," Li's own neighborhood began to change. "Little by little, neighborhoods turned into factories, and our hometown turned into an industrial area. Little by little, we lost the right to make decisions about our own lives, lost it as if we had never had it at all." Li then asks rhetorically, "How many years now has 'supporting national construction' taken precedence over our ability to control our own lives?" Li draws a parallel between the "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) protests that occurred in Shifang in early July, Qidong in late July, and now Ningbo. He writes, "Just looking at pictures, I can't tell the difference between these three cities … masses of people running, young people being beaten, old people crying, and 'brave warriors' dressed in mighty black uniforms, dragging the women they have just arrested across the ground, throwing them in armored vehicles." The problem that links all of these incidents is what Li calls an inability of Chinese to control their own destinies. But construction should be about more than short-term gain. Li writes, "As far as 'supporting national construction,' goes, I think that first and foremost it should mean protecting the health of the next generation; that's the most far-sighted interpretation of it. When you want to build something, but we have the right to keep it from being built—that's the best kind of national construction."  Li Chengpeng (Weibo) At one point in his post, Li describes how locals in one Western city were beaten when they rallied against a planned chemical factory. Li spoke with the local cadre, who "shook his head and sighed, 'You see…These days, people are so selfish, and they don't understand science. This project will be good for them too, you know.'" Li ultimately concludes that "the Chinese model for power is too arrogant. The more arrogant it is, the lonelier it becomes." Li makes an odd but vivid analogy: China's government is like an "autistic giant," one "incapable of interacting with society, incapable of allowing society to help it." Li believes that a failure to interact lies at the root of the decay of the Chinese Communist Party's "model." He complains, "They have forgotten, with the passage of 63 years, their promise to consult with the people about important matters." Li lays out a framework for the development of "recent events" in China, which appear to refer to civic disturbances and "NIMBY" uprisings. Tea Leaf Nation has helpfully numbered this seemingly typical progression: 1. The government quietly decides on a project; 2. The scattered masses gradually find out about it; 3. The government pays them no mind; 4. Even more people take to the streets; 5. The government beats and arrests people; 6. It goes viral on Weibo; 7. The whole country gets angry; 8. The government says it will "patiently and attentively listen to the people's voices and fully consider the people's demands for change." At play, Li writes, is something called "the Lucifer effect." He compares the Party government to a fallen angel, "who thought he was always right." He writes, "Our officials think they represent the truth, that they are fighting a holy war, and that they stand for the interests of the people. In the end, plunder is called development and thieves are called angels." Li closes by assailing the government's apparent efforts to be more responsive. He believes the question is not whether the government sometimes "listens attentively," but whether it ever "has the power to punish those who hold opposing views." As long as it keeps that power in reserve, Li writes, it will continue to be an autistic giant—or is that a fallen angel? |
| Sensitive Words: Ningbo Protests and Wen Jiabao Posted: 29 Oct 2012 12:16 PM PDT The following search terms are blocked on Sina Weibo (not including the "search for user" function):  Flower wreaths for a college student who was allegedly beaten to death by Ningbo police. Ningbo Protests: More blocked terms have accumulated over the weekend and Monday, even as the city government has postponed the planned expansion of a local petrochemical plant. See also Sensitive Words: Ningbo Protests and More and Weibo Blocks Photo Uploading in Ningbo. Blocked as of October 28:
Blocked as of October 29: - Liu Ji (刘奇) Read more about the protests here.
Wen Jiabao's Family Wealth: The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the New York Times report on the Wen family's personal wealth "blackens China's name and has ulterior motives." The Wen family lawyers issued a statement published in the South China Morning Post, claiming "the so-called 'hidden riches' of Wen Jiabao's family members in The New York Times' report does not exist." See also Sensitive Words: Wen Jiabao's Family Wealth.  "PX is not okay!" (PX BX: PX不行！ PX bù xíng!) Blocked as of October 28: Note: All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results. CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information. To add words, check out the form at the bottom of CDT Chinese's latest sensitive words post. © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Hexie Farm (蟹农场): Grandpa Wen’s Nightmare Posted: 29 Oct 2012 10:31 AM PDT For his latest installment of the Hexie Farm CDT series, cartoonist Crazy Crab illustrates an imagined nightmare of outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao. At the upcoming 18th Party Congress, during which Wen is expected to cede his position to Li Keqiang, Wen is delivering a work report. However, in this nightmare, he instead finds in his hands a copy of the New York Times exposé of his family's vast wealth, and he is naked. In the background, the other representatives are laughing at Wen, but they are also naked. "Naked officials," a term that denotes cadres whose ill-gotten wealth (and family) has been shipped overseas, appear frequently in Crazy Crab's cartoons.
Read more about Hexie Farm's CDT series, including a Q&A with the anonymous cartoonist, and see all cartoons so far in the series. © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| The ‘New York Times’ Takedown of Wen Jiabao and What It Means Posted: 29 Oct 2012 09:19 AM PDT  No doubt about it, David Barboza of the New York Times has achieved a journalistic coup. His deep dive into the financial wherewithal of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's family exposed a total net worth of a staggering $2.7 billion. Other journalists, of course, have investigated the family holdings of other Chinese leaders: a team of Bloomberg reporters broke the secrecy barrier with reports on the wealth of Bo Xilai's family and last June published an in-depth look into the burgeoning financial holdings—almost $400 million—of soon-to-be Chinese president Xi Jinping's extended family. Frankly, anyone who spends much time in China knows about the oligarchic nature of the Chinese elite, but the extent and distribution of the Wen family wealth is eye-opening. The implications of the NYT article, moreover, go well beyond simply another story about the ability of another Chinese leader's family to profit from political connections. The piece has the potential to influence significantly the broader near-term Chinese political landscape in a couple of respects. First, the bad news. The political reformers have taken a serious hit. Unless Wen steps forward publicly to declare his family's financial holdings, open their books to the public, and indicate the willingness of his family to face up to the legal consequences of any financial improprieties, his legacy will be tainted and the opportunity for him to shape future political events severely constrained. This would be a shame since Wen, alone, has been the torchbearer for political reform within the current leadership. Even more devastating, the fall of Wen could harm the political prospects of the up-and-coming reformers such as Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang. Thus far, Wen has reacted like any western politician: hiring a law firm to fight back against the article's claims; denying that his mother had personal wealth of $120 million; and arguing that his family's business is its business, not anyone else's. This strategy may help preserve Wen's public face, but it won't prevent the longer term political fallout within top political circles. Now, the good news. Shining a bright light on the intricate relationship between wealth and power in China ratchets up the pressure on the new leadership for real change in the political system. There have now been three significant investigations into the wealth of the families of three of the country's most senior leaders, and certainly there will be more to come. Compounding the problem for the Chinese leadership, the annual 2011 Hurun report on the wealthiest Chinese reveals that the top seventy members of the National People's Congress are worth a combined total of $89.8 billion; in contrast, Bloomberg News calculated the net worth of the top 660 U.S. officials as only $7.5 billion. Anti-corruption campaigns cannot address the political rot within the system—that will require far more fundamental political reform. Finally, there may also be some implications for U.S.-China relations. The emerging picture of China as an oligarchy—or worse, a kleptocracy—should help put to rest the notion that the United States needs to learn from the current Chinese political model. In recent years, Chinese officials, as well as some Western scholars, have taken to criticizing Western democracy and touting the advantages of the Chinese political system. In discussing the current U.S. election, for example, the Chinese journalist Ding Gang wrote, "History proves that the more mediocre a political system is, the more it relies on votes." And when I was in Beijing this past summer, a senior Chinese official explained to me that the Chinese model was superior in part because of the absence of money in the political system. Oops. Certainly, the American system of governance has significant shortcomings, but in its current form "socialism with Chinese characteristics" hardly seems to offer a way forward. |
| The Daily Twit – 10/29/12: The NIMBY Winning Streak Continues Posted: 29 Oct 2012 06:30 AM PDT As the U.S. braces for a killer storm, which thanks to climate change we should get used to, China is dealing with more neighborhood-level environmental challenges. We appear to have had yet another victory for NIMBY (not in my backyard) protesters, this time in the city of Ningbo, where the government has suspended work on a chemical plant. Reuters: Police disperse east China chemical plant protesters — A report from Saturday before the local government capitulated. Guardian: Chinese protest over chemical factory — Wire service coverage from Sunday. Ministry of Tofu: Following Ningbo's civil protests over chemical project on Weibo — Photos, descriptions from folks in Ningbo, etc. Danwei: Ningbo will 'resolutely not have the PX project' — Neither the protest nor the suspension of the project made the local papers in China, but it did receive prominent treatment by the Ningbo Daily. Associated Press: China steps carefully with protesting middle class — Why was this protest, and others like it, successful? Timing issues aside, it was nonpolitical and local. Caixin: Background: NIMBY movements in China — Nice infographic, if you're into that sort of thing. BBC News: Renewed protests against China chemical plant — Looks like these guys are not ready to call it quits just yet. Apparently there is some distrust over the "suspension" announcement. I'm not exactly shocked. If you want to read some non-NIMBY-related China news: Michael Pettis: Will a weaker yuan necessarily aid the Chinese economy? — Answer: no. Export competitiveness is not just about the value of the currency. Stanley Lubman: Reading Between the Lines on Chinese Judicial Reform — Prof. Lubman takes a look at the judicial reform white paper that was issued last week. China Daily: Campaign aims to overhaul antibiotics use — We've been hearing about this problem for years now, but it does appear as though an actual system will be put in place to start limiting the use of antibiotics. Enforcement is always a problem, though, and without an overhaul of the way hospitals are operated in China, I have my doubts about this new program. Gordon Chang: The Great Chinese Stampede: Hot Money Leaving the Country — Yet another article on the Global Financial Integrity report. Chang thinks the GFI numbers are too high and yet sees significant risk here. LA Times: 'No' tops the agenda ahead of China's 18th Party Congress — Amusing/scary look at some of the security measures implemented for Beijing in the run up to the 18th Party Congress. Wall Street Journal: Romney Ad Escalates China Auto Controversy — This might be the last big China bashing push of the 2012 election cycle. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Chinese Musicians Worry Elite Juilliard School Might Be Lost In Translation Posted: 27 Oct 2012 08:33 PM PDT  Lincoln Center, a gathering place for classical music lovers in New York. (Robert Mintzes/Wikimedia Commons) In June of this year, The Juilliard School, an elite performing arts conservatory, announced plans to partner with governmental and educational entities in Tianjin, China, to explore the creation of an educational institute there. With the assistance of the Tianjin Innovative Finance Company, the Tianjin Municipal Education Commission, and the Tianjin Conservatory of Music, Juilliard seeks to establish an institute, focusing initially on classical music education and performance, which hews to the same high standards as its famous campus on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. In many ways, this is a natural development following recent trends that have emerged not only at Juilliard, but in the classical music world at large. Much has been written about the rapid growth of classical music study in China; a 2007 New York Times article noted a massive increase in students of classical music, the production of instruments, and schools and performing arts centers during the past generation. China has been tapping its reserves of man-power and economic might to create a new generation of musical talent, which has gone on to find a home in conservatories, orchestras, and opera houses all around the world. The Juilliard School enjoys a reputation as the most elite institution of musical learning in the world, and the name carries even more weight in China, with its obsession of admission to "name schools." Juilliard has experienced an increase in the number of students enrolling from China every year since 1995. Opening a branch in China seems to be the next logical step in this evolution. Juilliard's President, Dr. Joseph W. Polisi, stated that, "We envision the Institute will be an elite center for performing arts education serving all of East Asia, a destination for all performing artists worldwide, and a hub for all of Juilliard's activity in this region." However, in interviews with Tea Leaf Nation, several Chinese alumni from Juilliard and other top schools of music indicated that bringing Juilliard to China is not as simple as building a new facility and inviting big-name faculty. These musicians noted many differences between the musical worlds of China and the United States, identifying obstacles that this institute would have to overcome to truly fulfill its mission of teaching music at a high level in China. The most common reaction evinced hope that this institute would reflect the ideals and learning environment of the United States, even with its location in Tianjin, a manufacturing hub and China's third-most populous city. Yuan Ma, a graduate of Bard College and Masters candidate at the Yale School of Music in violin, noted, "The classical music environment in the [U.S.] is so much more current and fast-changing. It would be good to have teachers from the United States and a refined music-school system to help Chinese conservatory students get rid of the old-fashioned style, and to bring them [into] more direct contact with the newest stream of classical music." It is unclear how the make-up of the teaching faculty will influence the pedagogical flavor of the institute. Rosemary Reyes, Manager of Global Initiatives at Juilliard, told Tea Leaf Nation that the Tianjin faculty will be drawn from an international pool, including a number of Juilliard alumni based in China or willing to move there, and may also include current Juilliard faculty members working on one- or two-year contracts. Students also commented on the perception that the classical music world in China has become corrupted by a large influx of money over recent decades. One recent Juilliard graduate, who chose to remain anonymous, decried the collapse of integrity in the relationship between Chinese teachers and students. "When we were in school, the teachers were more focused on teaching, and it was a more pure environment. Now, schools and teachers are more motivated towards making money. Instead of accepting students who are more talented, teachers can be tempted to accept those that come from richer families, and to teach them multiple lessons each week. When I was in school we got extra lessons, but there was no charge for it." She also reported stories of music teachers also selling instruments on the side, and pressuring students to purchase those instruments during lessons. Another interviewee, who requested to remain anonymous out of concern for his future employment opportunities, shared a story of coming face-to-face with this corruption. This recent graduate of an American conservatory returned to China to try to find a teaching job. When he had an interview and an audition for a teaching job at a well-known conservatory in China, he was told that in order to secure the teaching position, a bribe of 400,000 RMB (about US$64,000) would also be required.  Outside Juilliard, LED displays tout upcoming performances. (Robert Mintzes/Wikimedia Commons) Besides the difficulty of creating an environment where high musical standards trump economic concerns, another major hurdle remains: Creating and nurturing an appreciative audience for classical music. On one hand, there has been a frenzy of concert hall construction in many parts of China, with enormous venues by big-name architects springing up in every major city. Yet the tradition of classical music appreciation has yet to truly permeate a culture relatively new to the medium. As Shijun Wang, a recent Masters graduate from Juilliard, put it: "There is no classical market in China. We all know that. The problem is that only a few people like it. I don't think any high-level [institution] can solve this problem. Instead, what China really needs is a project of building interest towards classical music and introducing the basic aspects of why classical music can be so beautiful." It should be noted that even in the U.S., many cultural institutions invest as much in outreach projects and "listener development" as they do performance. Ms. Reyes said that the efforts of the Juilliard Institute in China will initially focus mostly on training-based programs, and not outreach, although Julliard is very focused on outreach in other initiatives around the world, including Brazil and Mexico. Noted pianist and composer Peng-Peng Gong, currently a piano and composition student at Juilliard, offered a more optimistic view of the project. "I have yet to see anything negative, and I think this could be a good opportunity for Juilliard to expand its reputation to the one place that is burning with classical music potential." On the other hand, he notes the prevalence of "stage moms" intent on making their child the next Lang Lang, China's preeminent pianist, who might blame the school or faculty "if their kids meet any obstacle along the way." A few alumni also questioned the choice of Tianjin as the site of this initiative, rather than the twin cultural powerhouses of Beijing and Shanghai. Ms. Reyes noted that Juilliard was initially approached with a proposal for Tianjin, and mentioned that Tianjin is located near Beijing but does not have to compete directly with an established school like the Beijing Central Conservatory. One student asked, "Would the students still be required to take mandatory classes on subjects like the theories of Chairmans Mao, Deng, and Jiang?" One common theme united the opinions of everyone interviewed: The proposed Juilliard Institute in Tianjin has great potential to help classical music blossom in China and throughout Asia. The institute plans to emphasize chamber music and orchestral training in its curriculum, two areas sorely lacking in Chinese arts education. At its best, should it overcome its many obstacles, the Julliard Institute in Tianjin presents a chance for great musical thought from one high-level institution to nourish a whole generation of Chinese musicians. |
| What Does Huawei Think About the U.S. House Intelligence Committee Report? Posted: 29 Oct 2012 05:40 AM PDT
CNN has the goods on this story, scoring an interview with Scott Sykes, Huawei's vice president for corporate media affairs. I'm not going to cut and paste the entire interview, but I'll give you the questions and the gist of the answer, with a few comments of my own thrown in for entertainment.
What followed was a list of all the ways Huawei cooperated with the investigation. As I said a few weeks ago, I tend to believe them. They did give the investigators unprecedented access, and as a result may indeed be slightly dumbfounded at the result. However, this is a company that has had transparency issues for years, and "unprecedented access" did not translate into "adequate access." Sykes also suggests that Huawei should be treated the same as any foreign telecom company. I agree in principle. I would also guess, however, that if Ericsson was scrutinized in the same way, it would probably be more transparent and therefore pass muster quite easily. It sucks and must seem incredibly unfair to Huawei (and a lot of other folks), but from the perspective of the U.S. government, the problem really is that Huawei is a Chinese company.
Maybe I'm just too cynical, but it seems to me that the House investigation was the opportunity to do just that, and it didn't work out. I'm therefore not all that optimistic that a near-term PR blitz is going to help Huawei all that much.
Sykes answered in the negative, and I'm not sure at this point whether that would help all that much anyway. Yes, listing would force Huawei to disclose certain information, but the main sticking point, Huawei's relationship with the Chinese government (or lack thereof) wouldn't be resolved with the kind of disclosure required by an IPO.
I wonder whether this would have helped the House investigation? I'm skeptical. Keep in mind that the House report basically says that the worry was future activities, and that the investigation was not necessarily looking for evidence of past/current wrongdoing. Looking towards the future, this might help, but again, so much damage has already been done that I'm not even sure when Huawei will even be in the position to offer up its source code in the hopes of getting a stamp of approval.
If neither side brought it up during the investigation, perhaps that tells us something, hmm? Actually, several possibilities, including: 1) it wouldn't have mattered anyway; 2) the House committee wasn't looking for current problems; and/or 3) Huawei wasn't throwing out creative solutions of its own.
Sykes responded with a "no," saying that since the parts of the report that cover these issues are classified, Huawei doesn't even know how to respond. He then talked about rule of law, how the evidence should be released, etc. I understand Huawei's frustration, particularly since these vague charges were just thrown out there, and Huawei was left to twist in the wind with no way to respond. If the House committee was looking to intentionally screw around with Huawei's public image, they certainly did a good job of it. But that's the House committee. If there is indeed an investigation being conducted by the Justice Department, that agency has a formal procedure, and Huawei will be notified at the appropriate time if and when this is going to proceed to something serious.
I'm not sure what Sykes means by "impact," and whether it's good or bad. And I'm not trying to be flippant here. This House investigation was a huge setback, so it's hard for me to take this statement seriously. I know Huawei has spent a few years, and a lot of money, on PR and lobbyists, but I'm simply not seeing the concrete results. Originally, I thought the investigation and committee hearing was the fruition of all that effort, but that did not exactly go as planned, did it?
I'm sorry, but this seems like wishful thinking. Sykes does admit that it will take time. So I guess the question is what kind of timeline are we looking at here?
If pressed, I think I could come up with a good reason. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | 2 comments | Add to del.icio.us |
| Posted: 28 Oct 2012 10:53 PM PDT Just a very quick thing: it has come to my attention that someone is using my name (Charles Custer) to comment on China articles at various news sites (see this and this for examples). This person is not me. For the record, any comment you see on any news site using my name is not by me. I don't comment on news articles like that. If I had a comment, it would be posted as a blog post here, or it would be something I posted to Twitter. I do not comment on news sites, so any comments like this that you see are not by me. It's just someone using my name because they're too cowardly to use their own. VN:F [1.9.10_1130] Rating: 10.0/10 (1 vote cast)  |
| Posted: 28 Oct 2012 11:26 PM PDT Soon after the September 9th Legislative Council election, Tam Yiu-chung who heads the main pro-Beijing political party (Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, or DAB) took a victory lap through his New Territories West constituency. DAB candidates had won more seats in that district than in any other, and pan-democrats lost more. The Democratic Party was especially hard hit. Tam rubbed salt in the wounds by declaring that he and his allies would use their combined Legislative Council majority to change the rules. Their aim: to block pan-democrats' newly mastered filibustering skills used during the last session to compensate for their minority status. With typical bravado, People Power legislator Albert Chan Wai-yip who led the filibuster effort last May said in effect so what: if filibustering was banned they would find other ways to disrupt council business (Sept. 18 post). But legislators have just been sworn in for the new 2012-16 term and the consequences of their election cannot be so easily dismissed. Pan-democrats immediately found themselves up against a solid block of opposition determined to curb their limited margins for maneuver. SPOILS OF VICTORY However powerless the Legislative Council might be, its approval is needed for all government bills. These can be subjected to indefinite delays at the committee stage and it is at this stage that conservatives are now determined to make their influence felt. The DAB, its Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) partner, and conservative business allies joined in some hard-ball winner-take-all maneuvers that jettisoned the customary genteel arrangements designed to share the fruits of electoral victory. "In the past," complained the Democratic Party's Emily Lau Wai-hing, "Legco members from the pro-democracy and pro-Beijing camps were able to work out a roster in which they took turns to chair the various panels and committees." But not this time. Of the 20 Legislative Council panels and sub-committees, pro-Beijing members and their allies had just divvied up 16 chairmanships among themselves, leaving pan-democrats with only a few crumbs of comfort. Pan-democrats had already been eliminated for the three most important Legco posts: that of president plus the Finance and House Committee chairmanships. In her "Letter toHong Kong" broadcast, she railed against such an "arrogant" attempt to "seize control" at the committee level, while pan-democrats could still claim to represent a majority of the voting public.* On September 9, pan-democrats won 27 of Legco's 70 seats; the combined forces of the opposition won 43. Their 60% seat majority thus became an 80% win of committees and panels. But in terms of direct popular representation: pan-democrats won 18 of the 35 Geographic Constituency seats with 56% of the popular vote. Additionally, three of the 27 seats won by pan-democrats were of the hybrid experimental super-seat variety elected by everyone's second vote. The three pro-democracy candidates won with 51% of the ballots cast for these five super-seats. Why did pro-establishment legislators use their committee majorities to elbow out pan-democrats in so deliberate a fashion? The aim is to nip in the bud filibusters and all such delaying tactics at the committee level. Attempts to do so can be approved there by simple majorities in individual committees, without going to Legco as a whole where the "two-house" voting mechanism would give pan-democrats veto power. In fact, the Legislative Council president who is again DAB founder Jasper Tsang Yok-sing, serving in the position at Beijing's behest, has the power to cut off debate within the chamber as a whole at any time. This new tactic is aimed at sparing him the opprobrium that would come from invoking that power, which he did finally use to end Albert Chan's filibuster last spring. Among the first motions in the all-important Finance Committee was one raised by DAB member Ip Kwok-him to amend the procedures. This committee is gate-keeper for all funding proposals submitted by the government that must ultimately be approved by Legco. Ip wants to make filibustering impossible in this committee by allowing each member the right to table only one motion on any single funding proposal. People Power legislator Albert Chan responded with a threat to filibuster indefinitely by moving amendments to Ip's proposed amendment before it can be put to a vote. Voting has now been postponed until Nov. 2. PERSONALITIES IN THE CHAIR The reasons for Emily Lau's anger were two-fold. One was the deliberate committee power grab itself; the other added insult to injury since the pro-Beijing camp had deliberately pre-selected some especially provocative candidates for the panel posts. This is a new Beijing-inspired practice that Hong Kong has now seen at work several times. Whenever pan-democrats succeed in making a political point and winning an argument, ways are found to counteract the victory by re-appointing their target to some equally prominent post. In this way, the public is reminded that Beijing's authority must be seen to supersede that of local actors whose political initiatives and victories must not be allowed to stand unchallenged. The re-emergence of politically disgraced former chief executive Tung Chee-hwa as a top advisor to Beijing's top leader Xi Jinping is the most recent case in point. Among others are the legislators tapped to lead Legco's most important panels plus one of its two main standing committees (Finance and House). The Finance Committee is now chaired by the Liberal Party's Tommy Cheung Yu-yan who is a Functional Constituency legislator representing the catering industry. This seat was last contested in the 2004 Legco election when he won with all of 2,488 votes. He has held it, uncontested, ever since. A man of ample girth, Cheung is most famous for his determined fight against a minimum wage. During the 2008-12 legislative session he made headlines with his suggestion that if the rate was set higher than HK$20 per hour, many of his restaurant owner constituents would be forced out of business and unemployment would rise. After years of agitation, a minimum wage was finally fixed at HK$28 per hour with no adverse effects whatever on Hong Kong's low 4% unemployment rate. Now he is arguing against any further upward adjustment. Legco's order-of-business is set by the House Committee. Its new chairman is Functional Constituency legislator Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen who belongs to the Liberal Party's conservative breakaway offshoot, Economic Synergy. He seems never to have stood in any kind of a contested election including either that for the House Committee chair or his seat in Legco, which he has held since 2004. Among the 20 panels and sub-committees, the most important for pan-democrats are Justice/Legal Services and Constitutional Affairs. Civic Party veteran Margaret Ng had long chaired the legal panel and her long-standing retirement plan came with two worries: finding a pro-democracy candidate to succeed her as legal Functional Constituency representative and leaving Legco's legal panel in safe hands. Her candidate, fellow Civic Party member Dennis Kwok, ultimately won the seat with votes to spare but her legal panel objective failed spectacularly. Pro-establishment legislators succeeded in thumbing their noses at the prevailing pro-democracy concerns of Hong Kong's legal community by electing Priscilla Leung Mei-fun to head the legal affairs panel. She comes across as the most inarticulate and least thoughtful of all Legco's pro-establishment members and was one of the two nominally independent candidates whose pro-Beijing ties were "outed" by Ming Pao Daily just before the September 9th election (Sept. 7 post; Ming Pao, Aug. 27, 28). Leung was a candidate in Kowloon West. The other nominal independent was Paul Tse Wai-chun in Kowloon East. After he won his seat, he admitted he had received backing from Beijing's Liaison Office here and from Beijing loyalist networks in the district. He acknowledged further that he had decided to run for a directly-elected seat so as to be in a better position to defend small-circle Functional Constituencies (South China Morning Post, Oct. 3). He had occupied one such seat during the 2008-12 term. He also said he was liaising with the DAB in hopes of winning a panel position and in this he also succeeded, which was another reason for Emily Lau's chagrin. After losing the Finance Committee chair she had held through two Legco terms, Lau tried to head the Constitutional Affairs panel but lost to DAB chairman Tam Yiu-chung. She then lost again to Paul Tse who was elected vice-chair of the panel. This places him just where he wanted to be … in a good position to defend Functional Constituencies the next time they come up for debate, which they are scheduled to do during the present 2012-16 term. Heading the Development panel is Lau Wong-fat who cannot be dislodged from his sinecure Legco seat representing rural indigenous landowners. Heading the Security panel is DAB hardliner, Ip Kwok-him, who also occupies one of Legco's most secure sinecure seats. DAB stars and stalwarts also head Financial Affairs, Transport, and Public Works. Welfare Services went to FTU veteran Chan Yuen-han and Regina Ip heads Public Services. She is remembered fondly in pro-Beijing circles for her promotion of Article 23 national political security legislation in 2003. The four chairs left to pan-democrats were Information Technology and Broadcasting, Manpower, Environmental Affairs, and Food Safety. THE BLAME GAME Have pan-democrats learned any lessons from the loss of Legco seats due to their own lapses and the consequent loss of influence in Legco? If so, the losses might seem to have served some useful purpose but the answer so far is no. In her "Letter to Hong Kong," Emily Lau said the pro-Beijing camp's Legco power grab "shocked the community." Certainly it shocked her. Her loss to Paul Tse in the Constitutional Affairs panel was especially galling because she had taken credit, along with Albert Ho, for the Democratic Patty's 2010 compromise on political reform. At the time she had been happy to receive the thanks of pro-Beijing partisans. And this was her reward! Meanwhile, within the pro-democracy camp there was neither forgiveness for the Democratic Party's "capitulation" in 2010, nor any move toward reconciliation. "If the Democratic Party admits that it made a mistake in supporting the political reform, there may be a chance of cooperation between us," said newly-elected People Power legislator Raymond Chan (SCMP, Sept. 11; Apple, Sept. 12). No way, said party leaders in response. Emily Lau blamed the party's failure to explain its political reform decision to the public (Ming Pao, Sept. 11; SCMP, Oct. 3). But instead of trying again, she ended her "Letter toHong Kong" with another blast at everyone. The challenge from Raymond Chan came with an extra sharp edge because he had been among her Frontier fighters who kept the name and combined with People Power rather than follow her 2008 move into the Democratic Party. He campaigned wearing her old distinctive Frontier logo, ran for a seat in her New Territories East constituency, and won a thousand more votes than she did. Faced with so much official hostility, she said, "some commentators urge the pro-democracy camp to unite." Actually, most everyone is urging the same thing. But to no avail. Pan-democrats "competed very hard against each other," lamented Lau, and the pro-Beijing camp also gave no quarter. "Thus we have to face attacks from all sides" … with no solutions anywhere in sight. In an October 28 Newsline TV interview she was more blunt. How can we work with them, she said contemptuously, when they have abused us in so ferocious a fashion. For their part, her pro-Beijing adversaries could not even resist gloating over her "embarrassing outburst" after losing to Paul Tse. "Judging by their performances in the Legco panel and subcommittee chair and vice-chair selections, as well as in District Council elections and Legco elections in recent years, the opposition parties are still fixated with petty profits …" and should not even think about trying to govern (China Daily, Oct. 20). Unfortunately for pan-democrats, if present trends continue … from above, below, and within … they will never have a chance to govern. Their only option will be to abandon open advocacy of all controversial political issues and join the governing establishment on its own terms as 1990s liberals Christine Loh, Anna Wu, and Anthony Cheung have now done. * Emily Lau, "Letter to Hong Kong," Oct. 21, 2012: http://programme.rthk.org.hk/
|
| You are subscribed to email updates from Update » Blogs » Politics To stop receiving these emails, you may unsubscribe now. | Email delivery powered by Google |
| Google Inc., 20 West Kinzie, Chicago IL USA 60610 | |
Comments