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Blogs » Politics » Chinese apologize to Tibetans |
- Chinese apologize to Tibetans
- Cross-Talk, A Ming Dynasty-Era Art Form, Returns From the Brink — And Goes International
- Eastern Promise in Guangzhou’s Little Africa
- In New Macau, Triads Keep the Peace
- Photo: Rainy Night, by Svend Erik Hansen
- Clearing the China Air: Technology and Protectionism
- Tibetans Outraged by Chinese TV Drama on Tibet
- Netizen Voices: Xi Jinping’s Macho Dream
- Hexie Farm (蟹农场): The New Clothes of Reform
- Why China Hands Think What They Think
- Hard Labor Lessons From China’s First South American Mine
| Posted: 28 Jan 2013 09:18 PM PST  A Facebook Page: Chinese Apologize to Tibetans has been set up by activists to collect information about the human right situation in Tibet. Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
| Cross-Talk, A Ming Dynasty-Era Art Form, Returns From the Brink — And Goes International Posted: 28 Jan 2013 09:32 PM PST  Guo Degang (left) performs for the 15th anniversary of De Yun. (YC Gong/Flickr) "As a Chinese citizen…I hereby officially announce that the Australian branch of the De Yun society has been established. The first overseas De Yun will be founded in Melbourne." This post on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, came from Guo Degang (@郭德纲), a cross-talk performer who shot to fame around 2005, courtesy of China's Internet. The post quickly went viral, gaining over 4,000 "Likes," 20,000 reposts, and almost 15,000 comments since Guo shared it on January 23. Most comments showed support for cross-talk's globalization. As @崔德轶-何处染尘 joked: "Old Guo is going colonial! Bad-ass!" User @胡文崧 encouraged Guo to "spread cross talk across the world!" A brief history Chinese cross-talk is an art form that requires of both its performers and its audience a profound understanding of the Chinese language. Usually consisting of a rapid-fire dialogue between two performers, cross-talk liberally exploits the Chinese language's propensity for homonyms to create rich puns and allusions. The cross-talks usually touch on Chinese daily life, with a dash of social commentary. Starting with the Ming dynasty, cross-talk began to grow as comedic performances on streets and in teahouses. However, after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and especially after 1960s, the content of cross-talk dialogue has tended to focus on praising the ruling Communist Party. In the 1980s, as cross-talk became a part of state television programming, the medium was further stripped of its grassroots elements, with ribald jokes and ethnic humor leached out in order to make the programs family friendly. For many years, cross-talk was a regular feature of China Central Television's Chinese New Year's Gala, an slickly-produced annual program on the eve of Chinese Lunar New Year watched by more people than the Super Bowl. But cross-talk's television fortunes declined at the start of the new millennium, as young performers failed to pick up the proverbial baton and audiences grew weary of seeing the same old faces appear again and again, with the same styles and the same jokes. Young audiences reared in the Internet age found the performances boring and didactic. The art form became bureaucratized in the form of the Chinese Ballad Singers Association. A new renaissance But this gloom is now beginning to lift. Guo Degang founded the De Yun society in 1996 with the goal of "returning cross-talk to theaters." The group, now the most famous cross-talk performance group in China, is seen as a savior of sorts for the endangered art form. Guo's old-fashioned strategy, it turned out, was perfect for the Internet age. Guo and his colleagues perform in teahouses, tickets are cheap, and audience members can record the shows and put them online without paying copyright fees. Gradually, Guo and De Yun rose to fame. With his image as a rebel against traditional hierarchy and the Chinese governmental system, Guo's popularity has ranged far and wide. A search for his name on Youtube — which is blocked in China — calls forth about 20,400 results, and Guo's top video on that platform has been viewed over 200,000 views. On China's version of Youtube, Youku, Guo's most popular video has been viewed over 9 million times. The profusion of overseas Chinese fans is one reason that this distinctly Chinese art form can find an audience abroad. In October 2011, Guo lead a De Yun cross-talk performance in Australia, the first commercial performance outside of China in the history of the art form. Since then, De Yun has performed in Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. cities of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, and New York. Cross-talkers at cross -purposes Guo's rise, however, was not without controversy. In his early work, Guo stood almost opposite the mainstream, with sharp and sometimes biting comments. In an online video of a 2005 performance — perhaps his most radical — Guo said, "Should cross-talk be used as educational material; should it be used for propaganda? This is a huge mistake, one that kills the human spirit." Guo's performances have caused heated debate and attracted criticism from some well-known performers with ties to the Chinese government. Jiang Kun, a famous cross-talk performer who now serves as president of of the Chinese Ballad Singers Association and is a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, critized Guo as "vulgar" after Guo performed traditional cross talk, replete with dirty jokes and ethnic humor. Guo responded that so-called "mainstream" cross-talk performers betray its traditional roots. In a 2011, after his successful first foray into Australia, Guo appeared to be thinking of Jiang when he wrote:
Guo goes mainstream Gradually, doubtless propelled in part by his Internet fame, Guo is going mainstream. Guo used to joke about being invited to present at China's Spring Festival Gala television show; this year, he will be a presenter. He's even joined the Communist party's political consultative conference, a governmental advisory body comprised of well known private citizens. Guo's easing into China's mainstream is a victory, of sorts, for the Chinese grassroots. Some Weibo users seem at peace with Guo's new role as mainstream spokesperson for the masses. As @LuckyShow2012 wrote: "Old Guo is not bad; better than some state-owned enterprises which invested abroad. You are earning overseas money, while they are giving away money overseas." |
| Eastern Promise in Guangzhou’s Little Africa Posted: 28 Jan 2013 07:47 PM PST While China's presence in Africa attracts ever more attention, Kit Gillet explores the other side of the coin in Guangzhou's "Little Africa":
See also Brautigam's comments on the article and more on Africans in China via CDT. © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| In New Macau, Triads Keep the Peace Posted: 28 Jan 2013 07:36 PM PST Benjamin Carlson recaps how the Chinese government reeled in the triad gangs and cleaned up post-colonial Macau, where one former criminal leader emerged from prison recently to find "a city utterly transformed." From Foreign Policy:
© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Photo: Rainy Night, by Svend Erik Hansen Posted: 28 Jan 2013 07:28 PM PST  Rainy Night © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Clearing the China Air: Technology and Protectionism Posted: 28 Jan 2013 06:43 PM PST
If you're picking up my RSS directly or reading this at the China Hearsay home page, you'll see the pic I included, which is the view from my living room window. The air quality this month has lurched past "Blade Runner" and gone straight to . . . well, I don't even have a good popular culture allusion to what we're experiencing now. Historically, I wonder if we're getting on towards a London Great Smog situation, which happened back in '52.
But I actually didn't want to simply bitch and moan about the weather, which by the way my forecast describes as "Fog." More interesting, or at least optimistic, is the story of what will happen when all of this gets cleaned up. As a native of Los Angeles who grew up in the smoggy '70s, I know that these things can get better through government action. I sincerely believe that the Chinese government will fix all this, although I'm not sure exactly how or when. Officially, China has been working on environmental solutions for many years, but we're not yet seeing the fruits of those labors. I do know, however, that the best way to do so in the near term will involve some measure of foreign technology, and this presents a problem for China's industrial policy. (Yes, we're back to that.) Consider an article, attributed to Bloomberg, that I grabbed off the Shanghai Daily RSS feed. They helpfully entitled it "Foreign automakers may profit from smog." Here's the thesis:
Now let's expand that out to a wide variety of clean technologies, and the point still holds true: foreign manufacturers and owners of intellectual property are dominant. If China wishes to clean things up here, the first few years at least will involve foreign technology. Yes, there are other options. China could, for example, utilize its much-publicized compulsory licensing rules to force some foreign IP owners to share cleantech with local manufacturers. However, I'm not losing too much sleep over this possibility. The law probably allows for this draconian measure, given an environmental emergency, but I don't see China making a move that would serve to give up much of the ground it has taken in recent years in the IP PR war. No, China will continue with the policy it has been implementing for a long time now when it comes to cleantech: inward technology transfer. And that brings us back to the Shanghai Daily/Bloomberg article. This policy just isn't all that favorable to domestic firms. So will we see increased local protectionism as more money is doled out to environmental projects? I think that's a real possibility, and it shouldn't surprise anyone. We're talking about significant public expenditures, and folks never like to see such funds being spent on foreign firms. I recall back in the days following the 2008 Great Recession, when Washington actually appropriated a small amount of money for infrastructure and other public projects, that there was significant criticism over government expenditures going to foreign contractors. Keep in mind that the U.S. doesn't even really have an industrial policy. If local protectionism rears its ugly head, what will it look like? There are a lot of ways this can happen. For example, while we might not see compulsory licensing, I wouldn't be shocked to see certain valuable foreign cleantech IP experience trouble when it comes to specific instances of enforcement against infringers, particularly in secondary or tertiary cities. We might also see provincial/local governments get more aggressive when it comes to approval of foreign investment projects in related industries, perhaps informally pushing for additional tech transfer. At the State level, Beijing might revisit incentive programs somewhere down the line. The complaints over the indigenous innovation program have finally died down, after Beijing walked back the more troublesome IP transfer requirements, but there are still a variety of programs out there in the cleantech sphere (e.g., tax incentives). New programs or protectionist enforcement patterns are both possibilities. All of my technology transfer clients get the usual speech from me about protection of IP. The ones in the cleantech sector, however, get a souped-up, aggressive and slightly paranoid version of those cautionary comments. Themes stressed include IP registrations, partner due diligence, strong contract language, ongoing market investigations, and (as always) a reliance on non-legal, practical ways of protecting IP/technology. Now more than ever. Just look up at the sky, and you'll see why. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Tibetans Outraged by Chinese TV Drama on Tibet Posted: 28 Jan 2013 04:50 PM PST In China, a recently screened TV drama, Tibet's Secret (西藏秘密), caused outrage amongst many Tibetans, critical of the director, Liu Depin, for what they perceive as a distortion of Tibetan culture and religion. Since the drama was broadcast on the state-run China Central Television (CCTV), in early January 2013 via CCTV channel 8 in prime time 7:00pm, the controversy has intensified, and somewhat inevitably, begun to turn political in nature. The main character in Tibet's Secret, a 46 episode drama, is Tashi, a Tibetan Lama who speaks on behalf of the Tibetan people about the history of Tibet during the period between the 1930-40s, a time before the Chinese Communist Party liberated Tibet. The character of Tashi was himself involved in the overthrow of the rural slavery system in Tibet during that period.  Screen capture from Tibet Secret via Youtube. While Tibet is an extremely sensitive topic and heavily censored in both online and offline media outlets in China, the CCTV's drama is an important source for Han Chinese to understand the Tibetan history, culture and religion. Indeed, commentaries from entertainment pages in various media outlets have routinely stressed the the drama is an honest representation [zh] of the Tibetan culture and history and that it has won the recognition of Tibetan scholars. Yet, to many Tibetans, the drama is a highly distorted source of insight. For example @泽仁多真 criticizes [zh]:
Tsewang Thar believes [zh] that the drama will harm the relations between Han Chinese and Tibetan:
A lengthy article written by a Han Chinese woman has been widely circulated [zh] online, also criticizing the director:
While the director has claimed that he will begin shooting a second series, many netizens have begun spelling out their opposition. @康巴潮人 invites other micro-bloggers [zh] to join the effort in the campaign against the production of a second series:
To defend himself against criticism, the director posted a page from a book called "Tibet encounter" (西藏奇遇） and claimed that he referenced the book, which is a 1986 translated version of "Seven Years in Tibet", the English version of "Sieben Jahre in Tibet" written by Heinrich Harrer. Prominent Tibetan writer Woser decided to cross-check the book page with the original text in Germany and found out that the so-called Chinese translation is a distorted re-writing of the original text:
In the Chinese text that Liu read, it said:
However, the original text in Germany is: Fast jeder Adelige zeigte mir stolz Reliquien vom 13. Dalai Lama, sorgfältig in kleine Seidensäckchen eingenäht, meaning "Almost every noble proudly showed me relics of Dalai Lama 13, carefully sewn in small silk bags". In fact there are many distortions in the translation of "Tibet Encounter" and Liu Depin's "Tibet's Secret" is just a further distortion of an already distorted truth. Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (1) |
| Netizen Voices: Xi Jinping’s Macho Dream Posted: 28 Jan 2013 04:20 PM PST  Is the "emperor" of China man enough to defend the Communist Party at all costs? (@badiucao) Any hope that Xi Jinping would prove himself a reformer has been dashed by a leaked internal speech from December in which he asserts the Soviet Union fell because none among its leadership "was man enough to stand up and resist" the uprisings of the late 1980s. In her analysis for Deutsche Welle Chinese, translated by Yaxue Cao, Gao Yu connects Xi's criticism of Gorbachev and Hu Jintao's 2004 denunciation of the Soviet Union's last leader as "the chief culprit of Eastern Europe's transformation and a traitor of socialism." Xi insists that the regime "stand firm on the Party's leadership over the military" lest it succumb to the fate of the old Eastern Bloc. Xi's remarks recall the cold calculation China's leadership made made during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Netizens react on Weibo:
Via CDT Chinese. © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Hexie Farm (蟹农场): The New Clothes of Reform Posted: 28 Jan 2013 02:32 PM PST For the latest installment in his CDT series, cartoonist Crazy Crab of Hexie Farm revisits the fairy tale of the Emperor's New Clothes to comment on a recent speech by Xi Jinping, in which he blasts Gorbachev for overseeing the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party. This speech, which was only released internally to Party cadres, throws cold water on hopes that Xi's incoming administration will permit or even encourage reforms to China's political system. In this cartoon, Xi Jinping, like the emperor from the fable, is surrounded by supporters admiring his fancy new robes of political reform, which don't exist.
Of course, the concept of "naked officials" has another meaning to Chinese netizens as well. Read more about Hexie Farm's CDT series, including a Q&A with the anonymous cartoonist, and see all cartoons so far in the series. [CDT owns the copyright for all cartoons in the Hexie Farm CDT series. Please do not reproduce without receiving prior permission from CDT.] © Sophie Beach for China Digital Times (CDT), 2013. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Why China Hands Think What They Think Posted: 28 Jan 2013 09:23 AM PST  These days, China books are a dime a dozen and so, too, are China analysts. Journalists, scholars, businesspeople, general foreign policy analysts, and random people living in Beijing all have something to say. To stand out, you have to bring something unique to the table—a new finding, a new framing, or, unfortunately, too often, just a willingness to say something controversial. A new book, My First Trip to China, edited by Hong Kong-based journalist Kin-ming Liu, manages to be exceptional in a few respects. At one level, it is a great coffee table book—no pictures, but some truly fascinating reminiscences of first trips to China by a range of great scholars, as well as officials, businesspeople, activists, and journalists. The time span covering the authors' first visits is vast—with the first trip recorded in 1942 and the last in 1986. Through the eyes of people such as Andrew Nathan, Jonathan Mirsky, Lois Snow, Sidney Rittenberg, Jerome Cohen, Steven Mosher, and others, the small details of modern—but not too modern—China come alive. The vast majority of stories are quite engaging and, since many of the authors write for a living, quite well-written as well. At a deeper level, however, what makes this book so valuable is the entry it provides into understanding how some of the most important thinkers and actors in U.S.-China relations have had their perspectives shaped by their first trip to China. To a one, the authors approached their first trips to China with openness and excitement. Almost immediately, however, differences in outlook emerged. Ed Friedman and Jonathan Mirsky, who traveled as members of delegations and were shown a Potemkin world of China, became skeptics; their writings today reflect a continued skepticism of official Chinese proclamations. (No doubt the fact that Chinese officials locked Mirsky in his hotel room did little to endear official China to him.) There is a special section devoted to first visits to China by Chinese expatriates, such as businessman David Tang, scholar Steve Tsang, and journalist Frank Ching that is quite moving. Each felt a sense of "going home," although by the end of their first visits, their perspectives were radically different: Steve Tsang, for example, developed a stronger "Hong Kong" identity, while David Tang embraced the mainland as his motherland. Still others, such as Steven Mosher and Lois Snow, had their views of China upended by a singular experience: for Mosher, it was bearing eyewitness to a forced abortion campaign; for Snow, it was Tiananmen and the heartbreaking case of Ding Zilin, a Tiananmen mother who lost her son. And of course, no "first visit to China" book could be complete without the story of Sidney Rittenberg, whose chance meeting with a group of children changed his life and made his story one of the great personal dramas of U.S.-China relations. One of my favorite stories is that of my friend and colleague Jerome Cohen, who despite encountering numerous annoyances during his trip—such as having his hotel room bugged—manages to weave together the beauty, darkness, and absurdity of the country and its politics in one thoughtful and humorous account. If I have one bone to pick with Kin-ming's story selection, it is that there are so few stories written by women—only two-and-a-half (since one is a husband and wife recounting) out of thirty. I would, for example, have loved to hear from Jan Berris, who was involved in the 1972 ping-pong diplomacy and has been engaged in U.S.-China diplomacy through her work as the vice president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations ever since. However, this really is my one criticism of an otherwise wonderful book that manages to be a great read for the China novice, the China expert, and everyone in between. |
| Hard Labor Lessons From China’s First South American Mine Posted: 27 Jan 2013 07:52 PM PST  (Joao-Schmidt/Flickr) Marcona is a small town located on the south-west shore of Peru. There sits the only operating iron mine in Peru, and one of China's earliest overseas mining projects. Around 20 Chinese managers live there, running a mine that employs most of the town's population. Although the Chinese staff here eat in their own separate dining room, when I visited the Marcona office of Shougang Hierro Peru, the Chinese seemed to get along well with their Peruvian colleagues. But appearances can be deceiving — in fact, this mining company has had a tortured relationship with its workers, not to mention the Peruvian Ministry of Labor. "We have to sue [the Ministry]. Law is our last weapon to protect ourselves against the illegal actions of the Ministry of Labor," said Aimin Kong, General Manager of Shougang Hierro Peru, in an interview with Tea Leaf Nation in his Lima office. The history of a troubled company In 1992, even before China officially launched its "Going Out" strategy to engage in outbound foreign direct investment, one of China's largest state-owned steel companies, Shougang (首钢), completed one of the first overseas acquisitions by a Chinese company when it bought the poorly-run Marcona Iron Mining from the Peruvian government and made it the first Chinese mining project in South America. Shougang turned Marcona's mine into a profitable business, but has done so amidst 20 years of continuous labor conflicts with its workers' union, making it one of the most notorious mining companies in Peru. "Shougang is famous for poor labor rights and working conditions. As far as I know, it is the only mining company in Peru that has failed to reach agreement with its union for decade. The gap between the company's offer and the union's demand is huge," Paskal Vandenbussche, a consultant in the conflict resolution office of the Ministry of Labor, told Tea Leaf Nation. According to Vandenbussche, any agreement about wage and working conditions must be negotiated and agreed upon between a company and its union. But Shougang has refused to negotiate with its union in most of the conditions that the latter has raised — like working conditions — and stood firm on the few conditions that it is willing to talk about, mostly basic wages. The cost of conflict The failure, or unwillingness, to negotiate has a price. According to a recent comparative study by Tufts University, Shougang's conditions are acceptable when compared to its Peruvian peers. However, Shougang suffers an unusually high number of strikes, costing the company approximately half a million U.S. dollars for every day that a legal strike shuts down production. Some years, the number of strike days at Shougang exceeds 40.  Shougang's offices in Marcona, Peru. (Hongxiang Huang/Tea Leaf Nation) "I do not understand why Shougang has such an attitude against its union. It seems to be much cheaper if they satisfy the union's demands" for benefits unrelated to wages, said Amos Irwin, the American researcher who conducted the Tufts study. Shougang professes to be frustrated with its status quo. Kong insists, "It is not we who do not want to negotiate. It is the union who does not want to negotiate." He and most of the Chinese managers in Shougang have privately portrayed union leaders as "ungrateful" and "using endless fights to score political points" on Shougang's dime. In their eyes, because the union is never satisfied and has asked for impossible concessions, there can be no real agreement. Kong recalled one recent Saturday evening negotiating session, which appeared to end with agreement between the union and the company. Kong says he was so tired afterward that he wanted to head home, but at midnight, union representatives returned to ask for more conditions. "I was very angry — we had already finished our negotiation, hadn't we?" Kong said. According to Irwin's research, Shougang tried its best to satisfy its union until 1996, when the company realized it was more beneficial to say no. Sources within Shougang who have asked to remain anonymous say that the change since 1996 reflects a natural learning process: when Shougang realized the union would never be satisfied, management determined that the Peruvian people have a different mindset and work ethic than Chinese, and began a policy of intransigence in the face of union demands. The blame game "This problem should be blamed on our strong union and on the Peruvian social system. In the foreseeable future, I do not see any solution to our problem. Shougang is still going to suffer many strikes and the costs will be shared between the company and its workers," said a high- ranking Shougang manager who was not willing to disclose his name. Kong also blames Peruvian authorities for failing to establish clear regulations to provide a baseline against which both Shougang and union proposals can be judged. "If the Ministry of Labor sets up clear standards about wage increases and so on, we would be happy to follow," he said. But the Ministry of Labor is not willing to set the wage bar, and it believes it lacks the right to do so. Vandenbussche argues, "This is not government's role. We believe such a negotiation should be conducted between the company and its union." Vandenbussche said he believes the back and forth of negotiation is common, and that Shougang, as a foreign company, has to learn and adapt. But the Ministry of Labor has been adjusting as well as it strives to deal with entrenched and long-lasting problems such as Shougang's. In the past, following failed private negotiations, the government could only try to intervene on issues like basic wages and wage increases, not working conditions or other detailed union demands. However, since 2011, the Ministry of Labor has been trying to impose more powerful regulations on big companies like Shougang, giving the Ministry the ability to force arbitration if it determines a party is not negotiating in good faith. The new regulation was issued in the midst of yet another Shougang-union conflict. The company triggered the statute, and Shougang had to face its first arbitration last year. However, Shougang filed suit against the Ministry of Labor, protesting the new law. The result of the forced arbitration is thus in limbo, pending resolution of Shougang's suit. According to the Ministry of Labor, sending unfavorable outcomes into legal limbo has been Shougang's onging strategy. Chinese investment in Peru is expected to reach US$10 billion in the coming five years. Mining will be the focus of that investment, and it will include Shougang's new expansion, projected to cost around US$1.2 billion, according to the Peruvian Times. As Chinese mining investment floods into Peru, Aimin Kong argues that Shougang has become a model for Chinese companies. Chinese-owned Chinalco, which just started project in Peru, seems to have learned from its forerunner's troubles — it hires mostly Peruvian and international managers. Before any mining operation, Chinalco invests around US$300 million to build living and waste water treatment facilities, and its relationship with the Ministry of Mining is good. Perhaps the future for Chinese mining in Peru will be a more positive one, but Shougang will continue to serve less as a model, and more as a cautionary tale. |
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