Blogs » Politics » Fareed Zakaria GPS bashes China with The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos using Gangnam Style
Blogs » Politics » Fareed Zakaria GPS bashes China with The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos using Gangnam Style |
- Fareed Zakaria GPS bashes China with The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos using Gangnam Style
- A Recessionary Tale
- Chinese celebrities shine at Elegance Ceremony in Beijing
- Family of Wen Jiabao Holds Hidden Fortune
- Photo: Smoking at Night, by Jonathan Kos-Read
- Photo: Smoking at Night, by Jonathan Kos-Read
- Bo Booted from NPC, But Trial May Wait
- The Myth of China’s “Meritocracy”
- Breaking New Ground: A Live, Interactive Online Discussion on U.S.-China Relations
- China: Zero Donations to Government Education Development Fund
- Everything you wanted to know about sex in China, but were afraid to ask
- Why Is It So Hard For Beijing to Un-Clog Its Traffic?
- Ministry of Truth: News Media Battle Lines
- Tokdo/Takeshima Island Dispute: A Call for Educators to Act towards Mutual Understanding
- 竹島・獨島(ドクト)領土問題で教育の果たす役割とは:日韓相互理解へ向けて
- 독도/다케시마 영토 분쟁을 교육적 계기로 활용하자
- Will the Real Chinese Leaders Please Stand Up?
- Beijing and Shanghai Natives Unite to Defend Their Children’s Privilege
- Spotted On Weibo: Evil Kindergarten Teacher Detained
- Test Page With CD
Fareed Zakaria GPS bashes China with The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos using Gangnam Style Posted: 25 Oct 2012 11:25 PM PDT With Gangnam Style gone completely viral and having taken the U.S. by storm, I thought it ludicrous The New Yorker's Evan Osnos would use it as an example of China's supposed state censorship stifling Chinese culture. Few weeks ago he got some 'expert' to offer this view:
Culture and arts flourish when society can afford them. How are the 700 million or so Chinese farmers busy tilling their land suppose to be working on Gangnam Style? The last few decades of hundreds of million of Chinese being pulled out of poverty have allowed many to pursue their dreams. Look at the international art market. Chinese painters are currently the most sought after by collectors around the world. What is even more weird is that he implicitly suggests Gangnam Style is a specimen of great culture. Koreans certainly don't think so, and Oh Young-Jin, managing editor of The Korea Times, wrote that the dance has more to do with Americans than Koreans. The song is even shunned in Japan. (Source: Wikipedia.org) So, what's the criteria? When it's popular in America? That'd be a pretty narrow (and frankly, stupid) interpretation, wouldn't you say? And today, on the Fareed Zakaria GPS program on CNN, he appears presumably as the China 'expert,' daringly proclaims, "Why China can't do Gangnam Stle:"
Look, the running narrative with people like Osnos (and probably Zakaria) is that Chinese government censorship stifles creativity and hence culture. And, it is the same sort of narrative that people like James Fallows peddle when he tried to argue slow access to some U.S. web sites in China is also due to censorship. See my prior post why Fallows is wrong. A simple reason is that those web sites do not have physical servers in China. He would be equally quick to judge hence Chinese creativity is handicapped. China's innovation and creativity have been handicapped by centuries of foreign invasion where the society has been reduced to subsistence. Now that the Chinese are being incrementally lifted out of that, and as Warren Buffett likes to point out, their potential is finally being unleashed. China's censorship has everything to do with actions that are destabilizing to Chinese society or anti-China politically. Outside of that realm, Chinese society is basically very free. One thing I must point out at this point. Notice how Osnos quotes an 'exert' to support his narrative. Next, he then becomes a presumed 'expert' on Fareed Zakaria's show who in turn peddles that narrative. What happened to balance? Couldn't either pieces (Osnos' article and Zakaria's interview) offer some sort of counter-arguments? So, what I find disappointing is that "free" media are so incestuous in parroting each other. As far as I am concerned, that lack of balance in media is cancerous culture and our world is better off with less of it! China is very much about "中庸," as a CCTV editor not too long ago said to a Columbia School of Journalism student. Finally, we should ask, are Osnos and Zakaria genuinely interested in more Chinese culture proliferating around the world? Let's look at one example. By most accounts, the world seemed genuinely impressed with the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. The Chinese were proud of it, because they saw the event as an honor and as an opportunity for China and the Chinese to be better understood. Many people around the world were genuinely impressed with the depth of Chinese history and culture, and how all that materialized at the scale of the ceremonies. During the lead up to the London 2012 Olympics Opening Ceremony, it seemed American and British media were very insecure. They constantly wrote about the London event in terms of how it would not be like Beijing. In another article, Osnos wrote:
So, when China puts on a good show, its "whipped itself into a lather" to do it? It would be one thing if he genuinely appreciated what Chinese culture had to offer, but it is entirely another when he seemed jaded and nitpicking on Lin Miaoke lip-syncing to another girl's voice or the fireworks animation:
So, when there is genuine Chinese success, it must be "a kind of unhinged ambition for the appearance of success." What a mouthful of crap. Going back to Gangnam Style, I wonder if Osnos (and Zakaria) have asked if India has produced something like it. Bollywood produces the most number of movies on this planet. Is that "desperately" wanting to project culture and soft power? I believe in due time, Bollywood will have it's share of block-buster movies that appeal to a global audience. That has much more to do with budget and size of the Indian market and whether Indians are untied from tilling their land to pursue other things. And, looks like Ai Weiwei is capitalizing on Gangnam Style to criticize the Chinese government too. Perhaps if Ai Weiwei would instead enact being sodomized like how Moammar Gadhafi was and shed some light on how miserable the Libyans are today (you know, with the current government being propped into power with NATO bombing), he might actually earn some credibility with the ordinary Chinese for once. |
Posted: 25 Oct 2012 09:25 PM PDT
Once upon a time, there was a happy and prosperous kingdom called El Dorado. The climate was mild, the forests gave an abundant supply of unicorn and other game, and in the fields, the genetically-modified corn grew tall and pest free. The people were a contented lot, by and large, and while they may not have loved dour old King PJ, they respected his administrative and management skills. But then one year, the West Wind blew through El Dorado, dumping cold rain on the kingdom for days on end. Trade ground to a halt, the genetically-modified corn was destroyed and, as everyone knows, unicorns can't swim. The laobaixing cried out to King PJ for a solution. And so the King called in his Privy Council for advice. "How do we get this kingdom back on its feet?" he challenged his advisors. "No worries, sire," exclaimed Prime Minister Blatheron. "The pagan tribes along our southern frontier have been quiet for a generation. We can slash our defense budget by discontinuing patrols along The Wall and decommissioning half the army. We plow the savings back into the Kingdom to tide us over until these dark times pass." Without a second thought, King PJ gave the green light to Blatheron's plan, but not six weeks later, the savage Victs and Flagrantes, screaming their terrifying war cry "There Can Be Only One!" invaded, forcing an unprepared El Dorado to sue for peace and allow the marauding tribes to annex the Sudetenland. The Kingdom's fiscal situation was dire, and King PJ once again called in his advisors. This time, Grand Vizier Brent, an efficiency expert from Slough, spoke up first. "I've drawn up a redundancy plan, your Highness. Twenty percent cuts in personnel kingdom-wide, subject to your approval of course." Brent handed King PJ a thick vellum scroll filled with names. Without a second thought, King PJ gave the green light to Brent's plan, but not six weeks later, problems arose. Quality control in the royal kitchens suffered after the head cook was sacked, and seven members of the Chancery succumbed to food poisoning. The Chamber of Commerce complained bitterly to the King after cuts in the royal constabulary led to a sharp increase in property crimes. And perhaps worst of all, the closing of the royal courts had led to creditors taking matters into their own hands; the incidence of broken legs and kneecaps had skyrocketed. El Dorado was in disarray, and King PJ, in a panic, did what he always did in an emergency: he went to the castle's tailor for a new set of robes, knowing this would cheer him up. The King was a bit of a clothes horse, you see. Arriving at the tailor's workshop, King PJ was dismayed to see his tailor nailing boards on the windows and locking the door. Demanding an explanation, the tailor told the King: "After you fired half of the staff, demand for my wares plunged. I'm busted. Frankly, sire, I'm surprised that you approved such a hasty and ill-conceived economic recovery plan. Everyone knows that you must measure twice and cut once." _______________________ Recessions can lead management into making very poor, knee-jerk decisions. A common problem for foreign companies in China is to import austerity plans from other business units abroad, assuming a "one size fits all" approach. Take for example a typical layoff plan. During downtimes, when labor markets are usually slack, it may make sense to furlough part of your staff, knowing that it should be relatively easy to recruit when business picks up again. This has certainly been the case in the United States and many parts of Europe in the past few years. However, although China's economy is slowing down, the labor market has shown surprising resiliency. Companies in China that adopt a cookie-cutter approach to downsizing may realize, a year or two later, that they will have to pay a premium to bring back experienced staff. Obviously targeted cuts may minimize this problem. If instead of firing his head cook, King PJ had sacked Bojangles, his jongleur, or Schtickle, his fool, he could have avoided those costly wrongful death lawsuits from the families of deceased Chancery officials. Legal budgets are often savaged during hard times, and while I would not presume to argue for blanket protection of in-house counsel, there are some choices that are better than others, particularly in the China market. First, business disputes are often allowed to fester. Surely it does not make sense to disrupt your joint venture in the middle of a recession by taking your partner to court, does it? Actually, it might. Not only is it a bad idea to allow business disputes to worsen over time, but during a slowdown when your staff is not working 25/8 filling orders, the effects of a management fight might be somewhat lessened. Is it preferable to disrupt the company when business is booming? Second, putting off registration and enforcement of intellectual property rights can be short-sighted. These processes often require several years to complete as it is, and any delay might mean that even after the recession is over, the company will still be without enforceable IP for a long time. Similarly, the decision to temporarily overlook infringement can be a disaster, allowing the bad guys to consolidate their market share and do lasting damage to brands in the meantime. Third, I would reiterate generally what I said in my previous post: The DIY China Lawyer. There are many things that can be done in the name of cutting costs, but each and every one has potential risks. Cutting corners on contract review and due diligence, for example, may be very attractive in the short term when budget pressures loom large, but eventually conditions will improve, and those poor decisions may impede the rebuilding process. Hard choices need to be made during economic slowdowns, but these should not be undertaken without considering negative consequences and local market conditions. Think twice and cut once. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Chinese celebrities shine at Elegance Ceremony in Beijing Posted: 25 Oct 2012 01:09 PM PDT Oct. 25, the China Elegance Ceremony was held at the Water Cube in Beijing by the fashion magazine L'Officiel. Chinese celebrities, such as Gong Ni, Liu Yan, Huo Siyan, Sun Li, Sun Feifei and others, were invited to walk the red carpet. This year, the fashion magazine focused on Chinese businesswomen, and unveiled a new "Elegant Women" list. Nine outstanding women in Chinese business were named "Elegance Female Role Model" of the year. Chinese celebrities were invited to give away the prizes to these remarkable businesswomen at the grand event. |
Family of Wen Jiabao Holds Hidden Fortune Posted: 25 Oct 2012 08:44 PM PDT A New York Times investigation into business dealings by the family of prime minister Wen Jiabao has prompted the blocking in China of the newspaper's English and Chinese websites. The article, by David Barboza, uncovers billions of dollars of hidden assets in the hands of Wen's immediate and extended family.
Barboza notes that Wen does not appear to have actively wielded his influence to enrich his family. According to an executive quoted in a WikiLeaked cable from 2007, in fact, "Wen is disgusted with his family's activities, but is either unable or unwilling to curtail them"; he is even said to have considered divorcing his wife for taking advantage of their relationship. The subsequent blocking of the Times' websites can have come as no surprise: Barboza's article refers specifically to measures taken against Bloomberg.com following a similar exposé of Xi Jinping's family wealth in June. From Keith Bradsher:
© Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Photo: Smoking at Night, by Jonathan Kos-Read Posted: 25 Oct 2012 08:00 PM PDT © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Photo: Smoking at Night, by Jonathan Kos-Read Posted: 25 Oct 2012 07:58 PM PDT © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Bo Booted from NPC, But Trial May Wait Posted: 25 Oct 2012 07:14 PM PDT As expected, and despite a public letter issued earlier this week by a group of leftists urging the Chinese Communist Party to reconsider, The Associated Press reported on Friday morning that China has formally expelled disgraced former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai from the National People's Congress. But while many believe that such a step paves the way for his trial to be concluded before next month's 18th Party Congress, Bo's lawyer told The Wall Street Journal on Thursday that his day in court may have to wait:
It's unclear, however, how much Li really knows. In a brief telephone interview with Reuters on Thursday, Li said he was unsure if the government would even allow him to take the case after he was only recently hired by Bo's mother-in-law to represent him:
© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
The Myth of China’s “Meritocracy” Posted: 25 Oct 2012 06:59 PM PDT From the time of Sun Yat-sen, through the turbulent Mao years and now into China's modern economic boom years, The Economist traces the thoughts of several "admirers" and challenges the meritocratic label that some have placed on its leadership system:
The term "meritocracy" has indeed popped up in a number of recent pieces of analysis on China as it approaches the 18th Party Congress and its once-a-decade leadership transition. In August, author Daniel Bell touted "the advantages of 'actually-existing' meritocracy in the Chinese Communist Party", though he conceded that China's political system "can and should become more meritocratic in the future". Journalist and China commentator John Pomfret also mentioned the concept in an interview with CNN's Kristie Lu Stout, as part of the network's new "ON CHINA" program which premiered last week:
And just as The Economist points out, The Financial Times' Jamil Anderlini wrote earlier this month that the Bo Xilai scandal exposed to the world that "rot goes right to the top" of China's political system:
© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Breaking New Ground: A Live, Interactive Online Discussion on U.S.-China Relations Posted: 25 Oct 2012 06:55 PM PDT
The timing, we believe, couldn't be better. U.S. President Barack Obama and challenger Mitt Romney are neck and neck as they hurtle toward a November 6 election. China is also preparing for a much-anticipated handover of leadership on November 8. It's an appropriate juncture to discuss the relationship between the U.S. and China, as well as their respective stances on climate change, clean tech, and the environment. This live dialogue is organized in partnership with ChinaDialogue.net, a site "devoted to the publication of high quality, bilingual information, direct dialogue and the search for solutions to our shared environmental challenges." We encourage our readers to tune in live, and submit questions before or during the discussion. For those who miss it, a record of the talk will be available on this site afterwards. The live discussion will include two live, hour-long Q&A sessions with two distinct panels of highly regarded experts. You will be able to post your questions and comments directly to them through TeaLeafNation, or via Twitter (hashtag: #uschinadialogue). Here are the details: Session 1: Tuesday October 30, 9-10 a.m. Eastern time (that's 6 o'clock a.m. Pacific time, 9 o'clock p.m. Beijing time) on Leadership and climate change Themes: Public awareness on climate change and its influence on policy; policy challenges for U.S. and Chinese leaders moving forward; likely policy under Obama/Romney; how the U.S. and China deal with each other in their public rhetoric. Expert panel: Martin Bunzl, Founding Director, Rutgers Initiative on Climate and Society; Wang Tao, Resident Scholar, Energy and Climate Program, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy; Ed Grumbine, Kunming Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Ross Perlin, writer and linguist Session 2: Wednesday October 31, 9-10 a.m. Eastern time (that's 6 o'clock a.m. Pacific time, 9 o'clock p.m. Beijing time) on Clean tech & U.S.-China cooperation Themes: Emissions and energy goals and implementation of the 12th five year plan; state of play for clean tech deployment and financing; international trade negotiations; green jobs; market perceptions of clean tech. Opportunities for collaboration on climate policy and technology; international structures and frameworks that can foster collaboration. Expert panel: Jennifer Morgan, Director, Climate and Energy Program, World Resources Institute; Yang Fuqiang, Senior Advisor on Climate and Energy, NRDC China Program; Angel Hsu, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Members of the public are encouraged to post comments and questions as the debate continues. So please join us for both sessions either to follow the discussion or to make your own contributions. You can also email us questions ahead of the debate with the subject line "live dialogue." If you're a climate and energy expert and would like to join the panel, please also email us. (Our thanks go in particular to Charles Zhu, who has spearheaded organization on the TLN end.) We look forward to seeing you online! |
China: Zero Donations to Government Education Development Fund Posted: 25 Oct 2012 06:20 PM PDT Guizhou is one of the poorest provinces in China and more than 50% of the students in elementary education are living in poverty. The problem of children dropping out of the education system has been very serious. Many private charities have projects that provide scholarships and sponsorship to poor students in Guizhou. Local government authorities also also make regular calls for donation to their governmental funds. Recently, however, the Guizhou Education Bureau's fundraising campaign for its Education Development Fund has received zero response. According to a local report [zh] on 21 October 2012, the fund was established in June 2011 with aims of teacher training, curriculum development and overseas exchanges. The Education Bureau claims that all the donations will be transparent and won't be used for administrative costs. However, out of the 1000 plus letters sent out to local business leaders and celebrities, none has responded to the donation call. The official blames the Guo Meimei and China Red Cross scandal for their failure. Indeed, the issue at stake concerns people's distrust in the government-led charity work which quite often takes donations as extra taxation. Lao Hai from my1510 explains how the "governmental charity practice" works out in China [zh]:
The role of the government has obviously stirred up a lot of distrust. Below is a selection of criticisms from micro-bloggers [zh]:
Some also extend their distrust to the unjust and arbitrary allocation of government's resources:
Legolas points out that charity work should be done in open platforms:
Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
Everything you wanted to know about sex in China, but were afraid to ask Posted: 25 Oct 2012 05:28 PM PDT When I heard that Richard Burger, of The Peking Duck, had written a book about sex in China, I expected it to be a somewhat scandalous introduction to the topic (he had told me that it wasn't meant for China experts). However, I found Behind the Red Door: Sex in China The only gripe I had with the book was when Burger chastised the missionaries of the past for bringing their close minded western views on homosexuality. He highlights a passage from a Jesuit writing in 1610:
Richard uses this to prove his broader point that homosexuality is condemned in the West based on religious views, but in China was practiced freely until missionaries interfered saying, "Chinese passing by on the street would most likely have viewed the male prostitutes as providing entertainment that harmed no one." However Richard writes just a few pages later to say that of the male prostitutes "the most prized were those between 12 and 14 years of age," and that, "unlike concubines who were often treated as family members, catamites (male prostitutes) were often discarded like an old shoe, and many became beggars who took on the most menial jobs and died in poverty." So perhaps the monk was shocked not only by the homosexuality, but also the society's complicit acceptance of child prostitution. However, his coverage of the modern day struggle within Chinese society over the issue of homosexuality seems to be spot on, and is worth the price of the book on its own. He also seems to struggle with how to best present the seeming contradiction that Victorian attitudes toward sex ended China's sexual freedom, but that it is now western openness that has contributed to China's sexual re-liberalization. Richard though does bring this point out toward the end of the book. With that out of the way, I would like to say that I very much enjoyed this book, and found scores of new information about attitudes towards sex in ancient China, as well as several interesting anecdotes about more current events. I was also very pleased to find that Richard's book avoided the ChinaSMACK approach to some of the topics, meaning that he relied more on personal conversations and news accounts than translated comments from Chinese message boards (although not entirely). I feel that this gives a much more accurate view of what's really going on than simply focusing on the most outrageous events. Furthermore, Richard's style, which has been honed over his years of blogging, reads very well, despite the amount of information crammed into every page. Filed under: book review, Life in China Tagged: China, Chinese culture, Peking Duck, Prostitution, Richard Burger, sex, West |
Why Is It So Hard For Beijing to Un-Clog Its Traffic? Posted: 25 Oct 2012 04:42 PM PDT Beijing, a city of 20 million, is planning to take harsh measures against its notorious traffic jams. According to The Beijing News (@新京报), a local newspaper, the Beijing transportation bureau is reviving a radical scheme that could keep half of its private cars off the road by 2013 in order to mitigate the capital's notorious traffic jams. The last resort The "odd-even" license number plan was first implemented when Beijing hosted the Olympics in 2008. From July 20 to September 20, vehicles registered in Beijing were allowed on the roads only every other day during weekdays, depending on whether their license plate numbers ended in even or odd numbers. As a result, the city's normally poor air quality greatly improved during the Beijing Olympics. Since the scheme ended in 2008, a less strict "last-digit" license number policy has been in effect, allowing vehicles registered in Beijing to take to the roads on four of the five weekdays. The last digit of a vehicle's license number determines the day on which it is prohibited. In addition, the local government has tried to limit the number of vehicles through a lottery system for new license plates. As of August 2012, the demand-to-offer ratio was 52.8 to 1. Despite these efforts, the number of vehicles in Beijing has still soared, reaching over 5 million at present, compared to 3.5 million in 2008. According to the Beijing Morning Post (@北京晨报), the "traffic jam index," a measuring tool invented and administered by Beijing's government, was 10.3% higher in September 2012 than it was a year ago. In light of the declining effectiveness of the two policies and worsening traffic conditions, officials are now considering turning to the "odd-even" plan as the last resort. Will it work? Is it legal? On Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, the overwhelming number of commentators have expressed doubt that the "last resort" would work. @小强张世强 pointed out that some drivers, especially parents driving their children to school, would rather pay the fine than comply with the policy. "People would go with it if they cannot drive one day per week. But the 'odd-even' policy will motivate many more people, such as parents driving children to school, to disobey it. The restriction will hardly be effective. The fine is 100 RMB per day, and there are at most twelve 'driving-prohibited' days per month. Many parents would be willing to pay 1200 RMB (about US$192) for their children." @sleaster argued that the regulation would cause two important side effects. "First, the police officers would spend huge amounts of time and energy picking out cars violating the policy. They would not be able to deal with other business. Second, the number of cars on the roads would not decrease significantly. What if people buy two cars and drive them alternately? When the number of vehicles increases, there will be larger demand for parking slots. The parking problem will worsen before the traffic problem is solved." Some netizens have gone further, arguing that such restrictions fail to tackle the fundamental problem. @王冉 offered a vivid analogy: "Using crude, stupid ways such as restricting car-buying and driving to regulate traffic is just like treating constipation by limiting food intake." [1] Car owners are also complaining that the measures equate to an unconstitutional encroachment on their property rights. Like the U.S. constitution, China's constitution requires the government to give citizens compensation when it takes their property. It's a right sometimes ignored in practice, but one that Chinese have not forgotten. @鸡毛蒜皮的大事 wrote, "The Constitution protects private property. We've paid full price for our cars. If you deprive us of half of the right to use our cars [without paying us], your actions are unconstitutional."[2] Surprisingly to many, even the state-run Xinhua News Agency (@新华社中国网事) agrees. "When the 'odd-even' policy is revived this time, a question is unavoidable: What legal path the local government should follow to restrict citizens' right to use their property. If this question is ignored, the negative impacts it brings will exceed the heavy traffic itself. "[3] Possible alternative solutions Of course, when policy questions arise, China's Internet commentators usually do not stop at blaming government. They often actively discuss what the right measures might be. Web users were not shy in this instance. In a country where laws are strict but enforcement often lax, commentators particularly focused on the ability of traffic police to put rules into practice. @-尼古拉斯-王- wrote, "The key issue is not that there are too many cars, but so many drivers [are] ignorant of traffic laws. They drive in whatever way they desire, and veer whenever they want! The key is to emphasize [existing] traffic laws and regulations more." @米小猫 agreed. "If law enforcement is not strengthened and the cost of violations does not go up, Beijing will be stuck in the bottleneck." Some netizens, including @上下都是双眼皮, blamed the unlimited use of government-owned vehicles. "Why not start with the government itself and try restraining use and abuse of government-owned vehicles for private purposes? If that does not work, then we can consider other methods." In recent years, the government has already taken measures to limit the number of government vehicles and go after cases of abuse. The Xinhua News Agency reported on October 25 that since April 2011, nearly 2 million unregistered state-owned vehicles have been removed from the roadways. Yet web users like @范玄英 felt the problem remains unsolved. "Driving restrictions for all is not a good solution. The key issue is that many state-owned cars on the roads are not for public purposes. Officials and their families drive those cars to go shopping, dine out or to travel." Other commentators have pinned their hopes on the development of a more robust public transportation system. @空空的湿乎乎's tweet is representative. "I'm really not sure how the 'odd-even' policy would play out. It's more realistic for me to hope that the opening of Subway Line 6 [would make my travels easier.]" @010危险男孩, wrote, "my personal experience tells me that more runs could be added during the subway rush hours. There is enough demand for that." Long-term dilemmas The policy debate sheds light on two significant dilemmas behind a rapid urbanization and development process that has stretched the skills of China's urban managers to the limit. As cities grow in size and population, the chaos and inefficiency generated by mismanagement and flawed planning make life difficult for urban residents. In order to tackle problems that emerge from the growth of cities, the government needs to adopt new urban planning philosophies. For example, @费厄泼赖 identified one possible direction for change: To decentralize functions and populations in the "core area" of urban centers. "[The government] could separate the functions of the core area of a city and build up multiple centers. Just like a CPU: The more cores it has, the faster its speed is. There would be no bottleneck then." Yet, the more fundamental problem lies in huge flows of centripetal migration. Already overcrowded, several metropolises such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou still see exponential population growth. As @刁总2011_09_21 complained, "What is the real cause of heavy traffic? Doesn't the government know the truth? Isn't it the growing population in Beijing?" Indeed, a population explosion in metropolises reflects the long-term inequality inherent in China's development. As the government continues to invest most of its resources in big cities, residents in a few metropolises enjoy higher wages, better working conditions, and superior education and healthcare. The contrast between abundant development opportunities in major cities and a limited outlook for the rest becomes the powerful magnet pulling people to metropolises from all over the country. What the government really needs to do is to alter an unbalanced development strategy that encourages over-centralization of resources in metropolises. Otherwise, the traffic gridlock will only be one of many severe headaches afflicting China's giant cities. Footnotes (? returns to text) |
Ministry of Truth: News Media Battle Lines Posted: 25 Oct 2012 03:15 PM PDT The following example of censorship instructions, issued to the media and/or Internet companies by various central (and sometimes local) government authorities, has been leaked and distributed online. Chinese journalists and bloggers often refer to those instructions as "Directives from the Ministry of Truth." CDT has collected the selections we translate here from a variety of sources and has checked them against official Chinese media reports to confirm their implementation. Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. The original publication date is noted after the directives; the date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. Journalism is a tough profession the world over, but Chinese journalists face a special set of obstacles. Juggling the needs of the public and the demands of the government, they struggle to report the news without overstepping the censors' ever-shifting boundaries. There are, of course, certain stories they can never tell: about Tiananmen, for example. But reporters were also barred from visiting the site of last year's high-speed rail crash, despite the government's public dismissal of corrupt Railway Ministry officials whose negligence lead to the tragedy. A number of prominent players in independent media were reshuffled or quit this summer after running "sensitive" stories, leading some to wonder if restrictions on the media will continue to tighten. The instructions below offer a glimpse of what Chinese media professionals are up against. Issued jointly by various municipal propaganda and media bureaus in March to the media of "a certain city" (the Shandong capital Jinan is mentioned several times), the document outlines everything from conducting interviews to airtime for commercials, from licenses to microblogs. Some of the guidelines are reasonable enough: verify sources, tell the truth, don't accept bribes. Then there are vague injunctions to "propagate advanced culture." And then, tucked among the common sense and the jargon, are prohibitions like these:
No one rule is particularly surprising, but the totality of these instructions show just how much of a gulf lies between a free press and what exists in China today. A Certain City is exhorted to draw the "news battle line" in the fight for public attention, to advance towards the "grassroots" in order to keep the public under its control. The media are to foster a "positive, healthy and progressive mainstream public opinion" which loves reality and shuns reality shows. In the war for hearts and minds, sometimes the media is its own worst enemy. Read the original document at CDT Chinese.
Translation by Little Bluegill. At the 2010 Asia Media Summit, Communication University of China Vice President Hu Zhengrong declared, "we are facing a battle against fake news, paid news, and soft advertising in news." The New York Times reported in April on Chinese media organizations accepting payment from businesses for positive coverage. Back. A letter intended for the National People's Congress and available online [zh] claims that 70,000 former military cadres in Jiangsu Province were illegally stripped of their cadre status and the government support to which it entitles them. Back. © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
Tokdo/Takeshima Island Dispute: A Call for Educators to Act towards Mutual Understanding Posted: 25 Oct 2012 02:47 PM PDT Memo #184 (Japanese and Korean translations available) By Hee-Ryong Kang (left, kang.heeryong [at] gmail.com) and Keita Takayama (right, ktakayam [at] une.edu.au)
This diplomatic skirmish is an important pedagogic moment for those who teach subjects like history, citizenship, geography, and political economy in the two countries. Educators should encourage students to critically assess a world divided along national borders and consider what this view obscures. History teachers might focus on the rich economic and cultural interactions among those who reside on the rim of the enclosed ocean known as East Sea (동해) in Korea and the Sea of Japan (日本海) in Japan. Understanding these interactions allows us to see this ocean not as a division but a long-standing medium for transnational interaction. When students learn to see this disputed island as a critical node in a larger, transnational network, they might be less inclined to support the jingoistic nationalism of current political leaders. Just as students can learn to question nationalism, they can gain a better understanding of Japan's colonial legacy and Korea's responses to the remnants of Japanese colonial violence. But this history must be taught. Japanese history textbooks, which spend no more than one page on the topic, must increase their coverage. Fortunately, a sign of positive change is emerging. Since the 1990s, some Japanese and Korean history scholars and teachers have worked together to develop a shared historical narrative and history lessons. We cannot suspend such laudable efforts towards mutual understanding. We need to extend it to ensure that future generations develop a healthy national consciousness with a transnational imagination. Keita Takayama – teaches sociology of education in School of Education, University of New England, Australia. Memo #47 Memo #132 Hee-Ryong Kang – teaches curriculum theory and evaluation in School of Education, Chonbuk University, South Korea. If you enjoyed this memo, subscribe to our e-newsletter for free and receive new memos 2+ times per week via email. Japanese nationalists protest against a visit by South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak to a group of islets known as Dokdo In Korea, and Takeshima in Japan. (Source: AFP) Young Koreans protest against Japan's claim on Dokdo in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Sept 9. (Source: The Korea Times). Links:
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竹島・獨島(ドクト)領土問題で教育の果たす役割とは:日韓相互理解へ向けて Posted: 25 Oct 2012 02:46 PM PDT Memo #184 (English and Korean translations available) By 高山敬太(ニューイングランド大学、オーストラリア)、姜熙龍(全北大學校, 大韓民国)
今回の領土問題は、ナショナリズムを超えた市民意識の育成という点では、現場の教師たちに絶好の機会を提示している。例えば、歴史家、故網野善彦が描いた日本海(日本側呼称)・東海(韓国側呼称)沿岸に暮らす人々の豊かな交流史に目を向けることができよう。国境に沿って過去と世界を分割することに慣れ親しんだ子どもたちは、この視点が不可視化するもう一つの現実、つまり、日本海・東海が日韓の交流を隔てるものではなく、むしろそれを促す役割を脈々と果たしてきた現実に気がつく。こうした国境を越えた交流史のなかに論争の渦中にある小島を位置づけるとき、子どもたちは両国の一部の政治家が鼓舞する内向きなナショナリズムから距離をおくことができるのかもしれない。 また、日本の朝鮮植民地化に関する教科書記述の内容と量に関して、二国間で著しい差があることにも教師たちは注意しなければならない。とりわけ、韓国国民が抱くこの過去の出来事への感情を真摯に理解するには、より詳細で充実した記述が日本の教科書に求められよう。 日韓の歴史教育問題に関しては、90年代以降、共有の歴史認識を構築しそれを学校教育において生かすため、両国の歴史家と教師の間で多くの対話が交わされてきた。外交のみならず草の根の日韓交流までもが冷え込む今日、こうした地道な試みを閉ざしてはならない。将来の世代に国境を越える想像力と健全な国民意識を養うには、教育を通じた日韓の対話と相互理解を更に推し進めていくことが求められている。 Keita Takayama – teaches sociology of education in School of Education, University of New England, Australia. Memo #47 Memo #132 Hee-Ryong Kang - teaches curriculum theory and evaluation in School of Education, Chonbuk University, South Korea. If you enjoyed this memo, subscribe to our e-newsletter for free and receive new memos 2+ times per week via email. Japanese nationalists protest against a visit by South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak to a group of islets known as Dokdo In Korea, and Takeshima in Japan. (Source: AFP) Young Koreans protest against Japan's claim on Dokdo in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Sept. 9 (The Korea Times). Links:
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Posted: 25 Oct 2012 02:46 PM PDT Memo #184 (English and Japanese translations available) By 다카야마 케이타(호주, 뉴잉글랜드대학교) & 강희룡(한국, 전북대학교)
예를 들어, 사회 교과를 담당하는 양국의 교육자들은 독도를 둘러싸고 벌어지는 양국간의 갈등을 교육의 기회로 활용할 수 있다. 독도 분쟁에 대한 교육은 학생들에게 국경을 기준으로 세계를 이해하는 것이 가지는 한계점을 비판적으로 점검해 볼 수 있는 기회를 제공할 수 있다. 역사 교사는, 아미노 요시히코 교수가 제안한 것처럼, 근대적 의미의 국경이 형성되기 이전에 동해를 둘러싸고 벌어졌던 다양하고 풍부한 경제적, 문화적 교류에 대해서 관심을 기울일 수도 있다. 동해에 대한 이러한 이해는 학생들로 하여금 동해를 양국을 분리하는 단절의 바다가 아니라, 양국을 이어주는 연결의 바다로 새롭게 인식하게 할 것이다. 만약 한일 양국의 학생들이 독도를 국경을 초월하는 휴먼 네트워크의 중요한 한 연결점으로 이해하게 된다면, 그들은 현재 양국 위정자들에 의해서 조장되고 있는 국수주의로부터 보다 자유로워질 수 있을 것이다. 바다의 역할에 대한 재인식과 더불어 교육자들이 반드시 재고해 보아야 할 것이 있는데, 그것은 양국의 교과서가 일제의 강점을 다루는 양과 방식의 차이다. 한국측의 교과서와는 다르게, 일본 측의 교과서는 일제의 한반도 강점과 그 유산에 대해서 한 페이지 이상을 다루고 있지 않다. 일본 학생들에게 그들의 가장 가까운 이웃이 일제의 한반도 강점에 대해서 어떻게 생각하는지를 이해하게 하는 것은 매우 중요한 일이다. 이를 위해서는 일본의 역사 교과서가 일제가 행한 식민지배의 폭력성과 그 유산에 대해 보다 많은 정보를 제공해야 한다. 독도를 둘러싸고 벌어지고 있는 이 분쟁은 양국 간의 문화적, 학술적, 그리고 경제적 교류에 있어서 적지 않은 손실을 초래하고 있다. 이에 대해서 교육자들은 필요한 조치를 취해야 한다. 물론, 교육이 동아시아에서 벌어지고 있는 영토 분쟁과 그로 인해 촉발된 위험천만한 민족주의의 부상, 그리고 외교적인 마찰에 대한 유일한 해결책이 될 수는 없다. 하지만, 교사 교육을 담당하고 있는 우리를 포함하는 모든 교육자들은 이 긴장 상태를 완화하기 위해서 일정한 역할을 담당 할 수 있다. 그것은 학생들에게 민족주의 위험성을 소개하고 글로벌 시민의식을 배양하게 하는 것이다. 이런 활동을 통하여 교육자들은 양국 사이에 대화를 촉진하게 할 수 있을 것이다. Keita Takayama – teaches sociology of education in School of Education, University of New England, Australia. Memo #47 Memo #132 Hee-Ryong Kang - teaches curriculum theory and evaluation in School of Education, Chonbuk University, South Korea. If you enjoyed this memo, subscribe to our e-newsletter for free and receive new memos 2+ times per week via email. Young Koreans protest against Japan's claim on Dokdo in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Sept. 9 (The Korea Times). Links:
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Will the Real Chinese Leaders Please Stand Up? Posted: 25 Oct 2012 02:22 PM PDT For more than two decades beginning in 1956, CBS and then NBC aired a television show "To Tell the Truth," in which a panel of celebrities attempted to identify which one of three contestants was telling the truth about who he/she was. I always found the show rather painfully gripping as I waited for the final reveal, when the host would ask, "Would the real [so and so] please stand up?" That pretty much sums up how I feel about the Chinese leadership succession process. I am more than ready for the host of the Chinese Communist Party to ask, "Will the real Chinese leadership please stand up?" It has been an exhausting process, trying the patience of even the most dedicated Pekinologists. As China watcher Francesco Sisci has noted, there are still "so many elements up in the air," including: how many people will be in the standing committee? Will there be a woman? Will Hu Jintao stay as chairman of the Central Military Commission? I will confess that for me, the greatest source of frustration—dare I say upset—stems from the most recent set of names being bandied about for the next Politburo Standing Committee. The list includes the expected Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and Wang Qishan, along with Zhang Gaoli and Yu Zhengsheng. However, instead of Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, there is Liu Yunshan and Zhang Dejiang. If you have not been following the succession process closely, who sits where may not sound that significant, but actually, the future of the country could well hinge on the differences between the two sets of men. Zhang Dejiang and Liu Yunshan have made their careers by serving as the protectorates of Party orthodoxy. Zhang, who was trained in economics in North Korea, is most well-known for suppressing the flow of information during the SARS outbreak while serving as Guangdong Party Secretary and holding oversight responsibility for the corruption-plagued, money-losing high speed rail program. Central Committee Propaganda chief Liu, in turn, has been partly responsible for the Party's multi-billion dollar outreach effort to spread the Chinese media's version of truth to the rest of the world. In the face of democratic uprisings throughout the Middle East, Liu claimed, "The hostile forces in the world have intensified their infiltration into our ideology by constantly changing their tactics." In contrast, Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao line up as the Energizer bunnies of reform. As Guangdong Party Secretary, Wang has made it easier for non-governmental organizations to be legally registered, pushed reforms that have made the bureaucracy more transparent, and advocated strengthening intellectual property rights. He also won widespread kudos for managing social unrest in his province with a light hand, arguing in the process that officials need to "balance maintaining stability and basic rights while helping people to express their needs." Li Yuanchao, now head of the Party's Organization Department, used his previous position as Jiangsu Party secretary to push through a different set of important social and political reforms. He sought the public's opinion when hiring and firing government leaders, ensured that Jiangsu provided education for the children of migrant workers, and closed thousands of polluting factories in a bid to improve the local environment. China's next leaders face a set of stark challenges: what to do about vested interests and the future of economic reform; what to do about a foreign policy that is repelling rather than attracting other countries; what to do about 500 million Weibo users who want a say in the future of their country; and perhaps most important, what to do to shore up the legitimacy of the Communist Party in the face of ongoing scandals and corruption? There can be little doubt that the solutions proposed by Zhang and Liu will differ fundamentally from those advocated by Li and Wang. Of course, as many of China's neighbors have proved over the years, significant reform can arise from the most unlikely sources. I'll hold on to that thought on November 8, if Zhang and Liu rather than Li and Wang are the ones marching into the Great Hall of the People behind Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and the others. |
Beijing and Shanghai Natives Unite to Defend Their Children’s Privilege Posted: 25 Oct 2012 10:03 AM PDT A student from Henan protested outside Peking University on stilts--symbols of the "leg up" he didn't get Beijingers and Shanghai'ers usually have zero love for each other, but lately some natives of China's two top metropolises have presented a united front — against migrants from other parts of China. Beijingers usually refer to them as "provincials" (外地人), while Shanghai'ers prefer "country folk" (乡下人). Migrants from other provinces in China, who may have worked in these cities for decades without the elusive resident registration, or hukou, are petitioning local governments to allow their children to take the college entrance exam in Beijing and Shanghai, because the test score cutoff for test-takers from Beijing and Shanghai is usually lower at China's elite universities. Many provincial capitals, including Guangzhou, are drawing up plans to allow children of migrant workers to take the exams, but Beijing and Shanghai, the two cities with the best educational resources and some of the lowest test-score cutoffs in China, have held out. Natives are incensed by what they perceive as an encroachment upon their children's birthright. A minor scuffle broke out when two groups of parents confronted each other in a mini-protest outside Beijing's Education Commission on October 18. The debate continues to gather steam on China's microblogs as both sides marshal arguments to defend their corner. Xu Yilong (@徐一龙), the vice editor in chief of China Weekly, tweeted, "You have no objections when outsiders work as nannies in Shanghai. You have no objections when they build skyscrapers in Shanghai. You have no objections when they clean the trash off the streets in Shanghai. Of course you have no objections when they become Shanghai's mayor and party boss either. These outsiders have children too. They also love their children and cannot leave them. Now, their children want to take the college entrance exam in the city where their parents work, you are raising objections! Weren't your parents and grandparents outsiders in Shanghai in the past? [1] While Mr. Xu's sentiment is echoed by many who favor free movement of labor and equal rights, some natives of Beijing and Shanghai still voice strong xenophobia against their own countrymen. @北京高爷, a lawyer in Beijing, responds in kind, "You have nothing to say when natives go to overcrowded hospitals. You have nothing to say when native children face higher school fees. You have nothing to say when natives are restricted from buying cars [due to overcrowding]. You have nothing to say when cultural monuments in Beijing and Shanghai are destroyed. You have nothing to say when Beijing and Shanghai have too many people and too little resources. You have nothing to say when outsiders treat the one-child policy as a farce! You liberals, can you get your wives out of the nightclubs first before shaming yourself?" [2]
What underlines the bitter argument is the concentration of educational resources in Beijing and Shanghai and unequal treatment based on one's hukou. @吳小帥叔叔 relates his personal experience: "When I took the exam a few years ago, I saw that students from Beijing can go to a good school with my score but I had to settle for a bad one. It's not a huge deal for me, but I worry about students from poor regions — they put in the same amount of work, but will have different futures." [4] Footnotes (? returns to text)
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Spotted On Weibo: Evil Kindergarten Teacher Detained Posted: 25 Oct 2012 09:50 AM PDT An appalling photo of a kindergarten teacher pulling a screaming boy off the ground by his ears recently emerged on China's social media. Outraged Internet users soon found personal details of the unlicensed teacher, Yan Yanhong, through the "human flesh search engine." She has been detained by the police. |
Posted: 25 Oct 2012 06:10 AM PDT |
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