Blogs » Politics » China: “Most Awesome Nail House” Stands In Middle Of Highway
Blogs » Politics » China: “Most Awesome Nail House” Stands In Middle Of Highway |
- China: “Most Awesome Nail House” Stands In Middle Of Highway
- China: Re-education through Labour System Under Fire
- 79th Tibetan Self-Immolation Reported
- NEW TEAM IN BEIJING, NO CHANGE LIKELY FOR HONG KONG
- Chinese Maoists in North Korea: Paradise Lost
- China: Last Words of 19 Tibetans Who Committed Self-Immolation
- Taiwan Blocks Dalai Lama Visit
- Censorship Vault: Beijing Internet Instructions Series (15)
- Photo: “… Beijing Spirit, Promote the Capital’s Scientific Development”, by Marko Kudjerski
- Wen Jiabao: Please Forget Me
- Op-Ed: China’s “Lucky Ones” All Share Blame For Death of “Dumpster Boys”
- Upcoming Canada-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement – Lessons Learned from Korea
- Can Volunteer Program Clean Up Donor System?
- A Chinese Woman’s “Money Dress” Ignites Online Fury, With a Gendered Twist
- The Crooked Cost of a Chinese Education
- China Capital Account Restrictions Loosened for Foreign Investors
- Huawei Might Need Some PR Help in the UK
| China: “Most Awesome Nail House” Stands In Middle Of Highway Posted: 22 Nov 2012 08:29 PM PST
Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
| China: Re-education through Labour System Under Fire Posted: 22 Nov 2012 07:59 PM PST A number of state-controlled media ran articles criticizing the re-education through labour system and some netizens are speculating if this is a sign for legal reform under the new leadership of the Chinese Communist Party after the 18th Party Congress. (more from China Media Project) Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
| 79th Tibetan Self-Immolation Reported Posted: 22 Nov 2012 10:56 PM PST Exile news site Phayul reports the tenth self-immolation in Tongren (Rebkong) this month, bringing the overall total since 2009 to 79. The Dharamshala-based site also claims that Chinese officials have been ordered to deter further protests by punishing family members.
CNN reported more broadly on the self-immolations on Thursday. The network's Paul Armstrong suggested that the difficulty of verifying news of the protests with journalists and independent monitors barred from the region has suppressed the level of media coverage abroad:
At Global Voices Online, Oiwan Lam translated messages left behind by 19 of the self-immolators, originally compiled in Chinese by Woeser. Two of the 19 were from Tongren:
Nyankar Tashi's message, like that of 18-year-old Nya Drul, stresses the importance of language and dress as defiant expressions of Tibetan identity. The widespread fear, both within Tibet and in exile, that such identity will be extinguished has given rise to the 'Lhakar' movement. From Lhakar Diaries:
See more on Tibet and the self-immolations there via CDT. © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| NEW TEAM IN BEIJING, NO CHANGE LIKELY FOR HONG KONG Posted: 22 Nov 2012 09:44 PM PST After years of planning and preparation, China's once-in-a-decade leadership transition has been accomplished. The new team sworn in on November 15 at the conclusion of the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is headed by Xi Jinping [習近平] and Li Keqiang [李克強]. They will hold office for five year terms, scheduled for renewal in 2017, if all goes well. Once their corresponding government positions have been confirmed at the next annual meeting of the National People's Congress in early 2013, the two men will also be head of state and head of government, or president and premier, respectively. Xi is replacing Hu Jintao [胡錦濤] currently president and until last week head of the party. Li will replace Premier Wen Jiabao [溫家寳] who has also just stepped down from his leading party post. FROZEN IN TIME Hong Kong newspapers including even that one-time colonial mainstay, the South China Morning Post, are now covering such events so carefully that they conjure up memories of graduate school days when taking a course in Chinese government and politics meant having to master all those intimidating organization flow charts. They featured pages of interlocking vertical and horizontal party and government positions extending everywhere from the center downward to the smallest three-person branch in what now seems like some archaic design from an almost forgotten era … forgotten everywhere but here. Unlike the old days, national party congresses are now held regularly once every five years. The week-long 18th Party Congress brought together 2,307 delegates selected from among the CCP's 80 million members. Delegates were chosen by local leaders in a months-long filtering process earlier this year that extended upward from the branches to committees at county, city, and provincial levels. Military units and state enterprises did the same. Bottom of the lists, number-wise, was the 28-member "Hong Kong and Macau Work Committees and All-China Taiwanese Association" (SCMP, Nov. 10). Most members of this combined delegation were not named in deference to the party's still unacknowledged "underground" status in those three regions where it is not yet the sovereign ruling authority. Among the 16 from Hong Kong, however, about half were reportedly mainlanders working in Beijing's local Liaison Office and elsewhere who were named. The locals were not (Apple, Nov. 7), and one of the Liaison Office officials denied that he was attending in his capacity as a member of the Hong/Macau committee (Wen Wei Po, Nov. 8). During this year's meeting, the 2,000+ delegates selected from among their number a 205-member Central Committee with 171 alternate members. Much has been made in recent years of proposals for introducing intra-party democracy. But the election procedures seem like those for Hong Kong's delegation to the National People's Congress, with recommended short lists through two rounds of voting when the secretariat's pre-determined final version is approved … give or take a few members. For the 18th Central Committee balloting, there were 9% more candidates in the first round of voting than seats to be filled. The final round was a rubber-stamp formality for the 205 remaining candidates. The process was also made easier by the division of candidates into three lots or one each for the leaders of central government ministries and equivalent bodies; provincial military commanders; and their civilian provincial counterparts or party secretaries and governors (Ming Pao Daily, Nov. 15). Even more opaque were procedures for selecting the next step up, namely, the 25-member Political Bureau or Politburo. The outgoing 17th Central Committee reportedly held an unprecedented "democratic recommendation" meeting last spring to indicate the preferences of those ranking party leaders for their successors. From there on it was pure factional bargaining and horse-trading all the way. In fact, wrangling over the succession has been on-going for years and continued almost right up until curtain time with some spectacular scandals, rumor-mongering and salacious gossip heightening uncertainties all around. But the pyramid of power was finally topped out with a seven-man Politburo Standing Committee headed by Xi and Li. Afterward, the official talking points were all about peace and tranquility. Balance was achieved, continuity assured, stability, consensus, orderly succession, and so on. Others called the line-up experienced in economics, politically orthodox, and dead-end conservative. One of the seven was educated in North Korea, of all places, and is known as an old-style hard-line enforcer of party policies. Another acquired a similar reputation as head of the party's propaganda department where he has held sway for the past decade. If this team represents balance and continuity, then prospects for a more enlightened political touch are not very bright. IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG? Key to the wheeling, dealing, and meddling were party elders intent on perpetuating their influence and factional alignments. Outgoing leader Hu Jintao and his predecessor Jiang Zemin [江澤民] headlined all such rumors and reports and Hong Kong's fate now seems destined to fall under the latter's shadow. Hu Jintao's power base is the Communist Youth League but he has been upstaged in the struggle for influence and appointments by his own predecessor, the aging Jiang Zemin. Jiang stepped down in 2002 and seemed to disappear from the political stage only to reemerge as a dominant force in time for this year's congress. His power base was originally Shanghai and now includes the famous "princeling" set or descendents of the revolution's founding fathers. Jiang himself had been the choice in 1989 of then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and is presumably trying to maintain what he sees as the rightful line of succession. Reform-minded liberals have been disappointed by the tenure of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao since they seemed to promise what was not delivered. In contrast, Jiang Zemin's people (five of the top seven new leaders including Xi but not the Youth League's Li) evoke no such hopes so reformers think they know what to expect. And for sure, one thing Hong Kong critics need not expect is the early departure of their newly installed Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying … associated as he is with the Xi Jinping line of descent. Leung has not had a moment's peace since his selection was confirmed last March and a few local pundits keep floating the possibility of a speedy re-deployment. They follow the logic of Democratic Party chairman Albert Ho whose attempt to disqualify CY Leung on grounds he misrepresented himself as a candidate has now been rejected by multiple court judgments. All such ideas were similarly given short shrift as congress delegates gathered in Beijing (Wen Wei Po, Standard, Nov. 9; Ming Pao Daily, SCMP, Nov. 10). Their unexplained reasoning is locked firmly into the victorious leadership line-up there and CY Leung's ties thereto. Earlier this year, some observers had tried to make sense of Leung's candidacy by interpreting the contest between him and already anointed front-runner Henry Tang as an extension of the national level maneuvering between Hu Jintao's allies and Jiang Zemin's "Shanghai gang." Speculation about CY Leung's possible admission to the Youth League in the 1980s gave credence to this idea as did the fact that Henry Tang's tycoon family hailed originally from Shanghai and had connections with Jiang Zemin. This speculation ended a few months later with the revelation that Jiang Zemin's people were in the frame for both Hong Kongcandidates. Besides what was actually going on in Hong Kong (Tang's mistakes and Leung's superior campaign), the balance tipped in Leung's favor thanks to the backing of his old mentor Tung Chee-hwa. CY Leung had worked with Tung throughout his tenure as Hong Kong's first Chief Executive (1997-2005). Tung has recently emerged as a close advisor to Xi Jinping with special reference to Hong Kong and the United States where Tung has long-standing business and political ties (Oct. 9 post). Additionally, Xi himself has for the past five years headed the party center's small group on Hong Kong. This group was set up after the big 2003 demonstrations against Article 23 national political security legislation that shocked Beijing into realizing all was not going smoothly here. Thereafter, Beijing did not back off but has instead redoubled its efforts with a more hands-on approach via mainland Liaison Office personnel here and the promotion of multiple cross-border integration projects. Xi is therefore entirely familiar with the Hong Kong scene and the years of his oversight are those when that approach and emphasis have continued to strengthen. CY Leung would hardly be removed so soon after being installed with backing from the very highest level of Beijing authority, especially when he has been so forthright both in promoting the integration projects and in his Liaison Office associations. Nor is he likely to be removed for failing to address Hong Kong's pro-democracy concerns when neither his old mentor here, nor his mentor's patron in Beijing, have demonstrated any concern for such reforms on either side of the border. That Xi Jinping should rely on the advice of Tung, who was regarded by all as being tone-deaf to local politics, is probably the best indication yet of what Beijing's priorities will be for Hong Kong under Xi's leadership. HARMONIZING DISSENT Besides reaffirming the security of CY Leung's tenure, the second message from the Party Congress for Hong Kong is that Beijing is not primarily concerned with Hong Kong but with China's sovereignty, security, and economic prosperity. It follows that the endorsement of CY Leung is good only for now. If Hong Kong on his watch becomes a drag in any of those respects he knows what to expect. The experience of his mentor, Tung Chee-hwa, is a constant reminder that even backing from the very highest level in Beijing will not be enough to save him if, for example, protesters on the ground in Hong Kong reach the proportions provoked during Tung's tenure as Chief Executive. Jiang Zemin was still party leader when Tung was approved for his second term despite widespread local discontent with his administration. But after its bungled 2003 attempt to force through Article 23 legislation made Hong Kong essentially ungovernable, the center stepped in and removed Tung mid-way through that second term. CY Leung has thus inherited a difficult balancing act. He must keep local tensions in check, by whatever standard, while continuing to promote Beijing's mandate that now includes overt ongoing integration. The Party Congress tried to show him the way it's supposed to be done … by talking peace and good will on the one hand, while reaffirming Beijing's goals on the other. Conversely, there is a message for pro-democracy protesters and activists as well … about the dynamic of dissent and the value of protest. "Harmony" has become a favorite code-word in recent years but it is only the latest variation on old (frozen-in-time) ways of selling the party line. Beijing officials adapted the concept to paper over negative events and dissenting opinions. Internet protesters try to outwit the censors by satirizing the antics of "river crabs" since the characters for harmony sound the same in Chinese but are written differently. Ignoring the mockery on both sides of the border, officials in Beijing … and here … do their best to "harmonize" the growing mood of discontent by adapting the old catch-phrases and formulas. These attempt to discredit dissenters by dismissing them as only "a very small minority" of unhappy citizens, while the great silent majority go along with the official intentions that are provoking the few bad apples. This approach to dissent goes all the way back to revolutionary class-struggle days so it sounds very odd to hear current and retired Hong Kong officials (like Education Minister Eddy Ng and Professor Emeritus Lau Siu-kai who has just retired after a long stint as chief official pollster) using identical phraseology to dismiss Hong Kong protesters. But the old formulas were on clear display as curtain time approached for the Party Congress … with their lessons for both CY Leung and for his pro-democracy detractors. News reports immediately before and during the Party Congress were filled with such harmonizing platitudes whenever questions about Hong Kong were raised. Several weeks before, however, two retired Beijing officials, local loyalists, and multiple editorials in the pro-Beijing press had conveyed some highly provocative views on Hong Kong's new autonomy movement, the use of colonial emblems at demonstrations, opposition to national education, and so on. The officials, Lu Ping and Chen Zuo'er, are well-known here for their roles in pre-1997 Sino-British preparations for the return to Chinese rule. Chen said it was "heartbreaking" to see colonial-style flags being carried in protest demonstrations 15 years after reunification. Yet such sentiments, he said, were "spreading like a virus." Lu Ping was angry enough to write a letter to the SCMP calling protesters "sheer morons" and he accused them of agitating for independence. Later he said they should pack up and leave Hong Kong if they didn't like being Chinese (SCMP, Oct. 12, 26, 31, Nov. 1). Loyalist Lew Mon-hung, famous for all kinds of explosive comments, provoked an angry uproar when he told a public forum that the autonomy movement was treasonous for advocating separatism. He said the Basic Law's Article 23 (stipulating that legislation be passed against treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and foreign intervention) should be implemented forthwith in order to ban the expression of such sentiments (Ming Pao Daily, Apple, Oct. 29). Then suddenly the inflammatory rhetoric ceased. Another more highly placed loyalist, Rita Fan, came forward to say that Hong Kong enjoyed free speech, guaranteed in another of the Basic Law's articles, and waving colonial flags was no big deal so no legislation was needed to prevent it (Apple, Oct. 30, Nov. 4). Although (presumably) not a party member herself, she then lent her voice to the endorsements of CY Leung by congress delegates. And all who were asked replied that Article 23 legislation was not on the agenda for his first term. Prof. Lau Siu-kai said that, in any case, only a "very small number" of Hong Kongers entertained separatist sentiments. Hu Jintao nevertheless reaffirmed, in his "farewell" address to the congress the same direct message he had delivered here in person on July 1 (July 20, 2012 post). In this harmonized synopsis of that July speech emphasizing integration and patriotism, Hu said: "The basic goal of the central government's general and specific policies for Hong Kong and Macau is to safeguard the nation's sovereignty, security, and development interests while maintaining the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macau." He then went on to repeat the usual promises about the "one country, two systems" principle with a high degree of autonomy, mutual support, harmony, and so on. Next, he noted how the central government is acting and intervening to help the two regions: by supporting their governments, promoting their economic development, improving people's livelihood, and advancing the cause of "orderly democracy," while also increasing economic ties and trade with the mainland, promoting exchanges and cooperation with the mainland in all fields, promoting patriotism, and guarding against the intervention of "foreign forces." Finally, he concluded the Hong Kong section of his address by saying that the center is convinced local compatriots have the ability to govern their regions while participating actively in national affairs and "sharing with other ethnic groups in China the dignity and glory of being Chinese" (text: Wen Wei Po, Nov. 9; English trans., Global Times online, Nov. 18). CY Leung has been given leave to pursue all his intervention projects … so long as they do not undermine the security and economic interests of the greater whole, which is Beijing's number one concern. Meanwhile, pro-democracy advocates have been given a five-year window of opportunity to try and secure basic rights and freedoms before the specter of Article 23 closes in again. … Or maybe not. … Yesterday's main pro-Beijing newspaper here published a lengthy article by a deputy director of the central government's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing. He accused "external forces" of interfering in Hong Kong elections and called for Article 23 legislation to prevent it (Wen Wei Po, Nov. 22). |
| Chinese Maoists in North Korea: Paradise Lost Posted: 22 Nov 2012 07:22 PM PST Despite an apparently strong showing at this autumn's anti-Japanese protests, times are hard for China's New Left. Bo Xilai awaits trial, Mao's legacy faces erosion and pollution, leftist websites are under attack by "the forces of darkness", and the country continues to hurtle down the capitalist road. The Economist accompanied a small group of beleaguered leftists seeking brief respite in North Korea.
For a near mirror image of The Economist's report, see 'The Grand Tour' at The New Yorker, Evan Osnos' account of an excursion around Europe with 37 ardent Chinese consumerists. © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| China: Last Words of 19 Tibetans Who Committed Self-Immolation Posted: 22 Nov 2012 04:53 PM PST [All links lead to Chinese-language websites unless otherwise noted.] On November 24, 2012, the number of self-immolations since February 2009 committed by Tibetans in protest of Chinese rule of the Tibet Autonomous Region reached [en] 79 (since February 2009). Even though United Nations human rights chief has finally spoken out and urged [en] the Chinese government to address the grievances of Tibetans, discussion about the religious and cultural oppression of Tibet as well as the the rash of self-immolations by Tibetans continues to be banned in the online and offline public sphere by the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) [en] because of its political sensitive nature. Dissent writer Woser, who reports on the human rights situation in Tibet, has collected 19 last wills and testaments of Tibetans who self-immolated to help people understand their grievances.  Nyankar Tashi's last words. Image from Woeser. 1. Songye Tsering (桑德才让), a 24-year-old herdsman, self-immolated outside the local government in Zeku County, Qinghai Province:
2. Nyankar Tashi (娘尕扎西), 24 years old, self-immolated on November 24, 2012 in Tongren County, Qinghai Province. He left a letter to Dalai and Panchen Lama as well as to six million Tibetans:
 Tingzin's portrait. Image from Woeser. 3. Tingzin (丹珍措), 23-year-old herdswoman living with her parents and her six-year-old son, self-immolated on November 7, 2012 before the 18th National Chinese Communist Party Congress in Tongren Province. She left her last words to her father:
4. Lhamo Kyap (拉莫嘉), a herdsman in his 20s with two young daughters, self-immolated on October 20, 2012 near Bora Temple in Xiahe County, Gansu Province. A Tibetan friend of Lhamo recorded the details of a conversation he had with him on the date of Lhamo's self-immolation:
5. Dhondup (頓珠), a 61-year-old herdsman, self-immolated on October 22, 2012 at Labrang Monastery in Xiahe County, Gansu Province. According to Voice of Tibet:
6. Gudup (古珠), a 43-year-old Tibetan writer, self-immolated on October 4, 2012 in Biru County, Tibet. He left his last words in an update to his QQ account, a popular Chinese social networking site. Below is an excerpt:
7-8. Tenzin Kedhup (丹增克珠), a 24-year-old herdsman and a former monk. Ngawang Norphel (阿旺诺培), 22 years old. They self-immolated together with the Tibetan national flag in Chindu County, Qinghai Province. They recorded their last words together:
9. Tamding That (旦正塔), a 64-year-old herdsman, self-immolated at Jainca County outside a military office in Qinghai Province. He left a short note:
 Rechok's portrait. Image from Woeser. 10. Rechok (日玖), a 33-year-old herdsman with three children, self-immolated on May 30, 2012 near the Grand Lamasery of Dzamthang, Sichuan Province. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights received his last words on August 18:
11-12. Soinam (索南), a 24-year-old student. Choephak Kyab (曲帕嘉）, a 25-year-old student. The two self-immolated near the Grand Lamasery of Dzamthang, Sichuan Province, at different spots on April 19, 2012. Their last words was released on YouTube. Below is an excerpt:
13. Sobha Rinpoche (江白益西), a 27-year-old exiled Tibetan from Dawu County, Sichuan Province, self-immolated in Delhi a protest against the Chinese president's visit to India on March 26, 2012. Below is an excerpt of his last will:
14. Tsering Kyi (才讓吉), a 19-year-old student, self-immolated in a market in Maqu County, Gansu Province. According to a reporter's account:
15. Nya Drul (朗卓), an 18-year-old student, self-immolated on February 19, 2012 in Camtang County, Sichuan Province. He wrote his will in the form of a poem:
16. Sobha Rinpoche (索巴仁波切), 42 years old, self-immolated in a square in Gade County, Qinghai Province. His last words, which are accessible here, reaffirmed his religious faith:
17. Tenzin Phuntsog (丁増朋措), a 41-year-old peasant and former monk, self-immolated in front of the district government in Qamdo County, Tibet, on December 1, 2011. He left behind four notes. Below is his last note:
18. Phuntsog (彭措）, a 19-year-old monk at Gulden Temple, self-immolated in Ngawa County, Sichuan Province on March 16, 2011. According to an interview with other monks in the Temple, he told them:
19. Tapey (扎白), a 20-year-old monk in Gulden Temple, self-immolated on February 27, 2009 in Ngawa County, Sichuan Province. According to an article published on June 2, 2012 [en] in The New York Times, Tapey left a note behind saying he would kill himself if the government stopped an important prayer ceremony that very same day. Written by Oiwan Lam · comments (0) |
| Taiwan Blocks Dalai Lama Visit Posted: 22 Nov 2012 04:03 PM PST Taiwanese authorities have refused to provide a visa for the Dalai Lama, who was due to address a women's organisation there next month. From the AFP:
A planned visit in 2008 was blocked on similarly vague grounds, though another the following year was allowed to proceed after much deliberation. From Shih Hsiu-chuan at Taipei Times:
Beijing responded by cancelling a number of joint events, despite Taipei's efforts to explain itself. Heightened tensions amid a long series of self-immolation protests—for which Beijing has blamed the Dalai Lama himself—can only have increased the risk of hurt feelings this time. China routinely and vigorously protests international visits by the Dalai Lama: embassy officials in London threatened to boycott a pre-Olympic training camp this summer, for example, over a scheduled appearance at a private business conference nearby. Taiwan is not alone in yielding to the pressure. South Africa refused the Dalai Lama a visa to attend Desmond Tutu's birthday celebration last year, while in June the Italian city of Milan cancelled plans to award him honorary citizenship. On the other hand, Beijing's protests can add fuel to domestic political demands that leaders do not "placate Chinese tyrants". Closer ties to China have been a hallmark of Kuomintang president Ma Ying-jeou's administration, but the Economist reported last week that they have somewhat backfired, driving property prices up as Ma's approval ratings have tumbled:
The newspaper referred to Ma as "an ineffectual bumbler". In response, a KMT legislator told the South China Morning Post that "I feel bad and also sad some foreign media would launch such a criticism against our national leader, but there are some facts in the magazine's report that President Ma must reflect upon." © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| Censorship Vault: Beijing Internet Instructions Series (15) Posted: 22 Nov 2012 04:15 PM PST In partnership with the China Copyright and Media blog, CDT is adding the "Beijing Internet Instructions" series to the Censorship Vault. These directives were originally published on Canyu.org (Participate) and date from 2005 to 2007. According to Canyu, the directives were issued by the Beijing Municipal Network Propaganda Management Office and the State Council Internet management departments and provided to to Canyu by insiders. China Copyright and Media has not verified the source. The translations are by Rogier Creemers of China Copyright and Media.
These translated directives were first posted by Rogier Creemers on China Copyright and Media on November 22, 2012 (here). © Anne.Henochowicz for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| Photo: “… Beijing Spirit, Promote the Capital’s Scientific Development”, by Marko Kudjerski Posted: 22 Nov 2012 03:06 PM PST  "… Beijing Spirit, Promote the Capital's Scientific Development" © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| Posted: 22 Nov 2012 02:45 PM PST "China's best actor" Wen Jiabao gave a surprising performance this week. From Josh Chin at China Real Time Report:
Wen's remarks have been read as an "assertion of integrity" following a New York Times investigation into the multi-billion dollar fortune amassed by his family during his time in power. Wen himself is said to have ordered an official inquiry into the exposé's claims. From Shi Jiangtao at South China Morning Post:
See more on Wen via CDT. © Samuel Wade for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| Op-Ed: China’s “Lucky Ones” All Share Blame For Death of “Dumpster Boys” Posted: 22 Nov 2012 01:30 PM PST  There's hope for China's future, but it will require persistence. (Lisa Tancsics/Wikimedia Commons) [Note: The following is a Tea Leaf Nation op-ed, and does not necessarily represent the opinions of the editors.] Writing an article for Tea Leaf Nation about five children who recently died in a dumpster in Bijie, China, reminded me of what Michael Lewis said in his baccalaureate remarks at Princeton in 2012: "You owe a debt, and not just to your Gods. You owe a debt to the unlucky." The sentiment is echoed by Yang Jiang (杨绛), a famous contemporary Chinese writer, in her short story "Lao Wang" (老王) about an ordinary rickshaw driver almost three decades ago. The last line of the story: "This is a guilt piece from the lucky ones to the not–so-lucky ones." Indeed, this is a guilt piece too–my guilt stemmed from the realization that I didn't do enough for the needy and that I am one of the "adults"–the parents, teachers, government officials, and average Internet users–whose neglect allowed this tragedy to happen. The case quickly turned China into a binary nation of fragile children and should-be-responsible adults, and most of us are on the adult side. I believe the same feeling of self-blame has been more or less shared by most Chinese adults over the past few days. Activists have already started urging users of China's Weibo microblogging platforms to donate warm clothes to children in the coming winter. But while touched by the kindness, I somehow feel unsettled, even somewhat fearful. I am afraid this story will become another fast-food item to feed the starving drama-hunting media and the so-called "public intellectuals" craving outlets and attention. In this social media era, emotions are strong, memories are short, and information is fragmented. As Bai Yansong (白岩松), a well-known television host, once commented on "Touching China," the Chinese version "CNN Heroes": "On the show, you would see tons of people moved to tears in the studio as well as in front of their TVs each year; they must have made so many beautiful wishes [to help others]. But when the sun rises again the next morning as usual, all the wishes just vanish, only to be remembered again during the next episode of 'Touching China.'" Yes, undoubtedly, we are shocked, we are frustrated, we are disappointed and we are angered by the tragedy in Bijie, but will these feelings last long enough to keep us motivated to do good deeds? Will these feelings be strong enough for us to maintain the same sensitivity towards the darkness when we turn off our laptops and go to work and school tomorrow? Can you still remember what happened in China just two years ago? On November 15, 2010, a savage fire destroyed a 28-story high-rise apartment building in Shanghai, killing at least 58 people and injuring more than 70 others. Such big news then, but how many of us remembered that? If that does not convince you, let's look at the present. Merely one day after heated nation-wide discussion on the Bijie children, the topic "David Beckham will potentially join Chinese Super League" became the top story on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter. Mr. Beckham attracted over 30 million mentions, compared to just 4 million mentions of the Bijie tragedy. What would happen later? I asked myself. Will policy discussions really lead to systematic changes? Will the suspended officials quietly return to their positions months later after amnesia sets in? Because at the end of the day, we are "the others." We like to think we become involved in various social issues on social media, but we are just bystanders. As a group, we willingly share the guilt but then shrink the responsibilities. Yes we feel shameful about the systematic loopholes, but we are not the ones who actually created them; yes we feel sorry for the possible scapegoats, but we are not the ones who were suspended; yes we understand the parents' sadness, but we are not the ones who lost kids in the end. Chinese social media pushes an unbearable number of sad stories before our faces every morning. The world of Weibo gives me a sense that China has reached its most dangerous time. A friend who studies sociology explained why she is not a frequent Weibo user: "Surfing Weibo for one hour would consume the positive energy you accumulate in a whole week." Of course, feelings of anger, sorrow, and helplessness are exaggerated on social media. Unfortunately, we often forget about this and take whatever Weibo presents as reality. Diluting the meaning of each sad story becomes protection against depression; selective ignorance prevents us from sinking too deep into the stories. It is okay to turn to ignorance for comfort once or twice, but what scares me is the thought of getting used to it, even addicted. When I chatted with a friend in Shanghai days ago, I was surprised that he did not even know about the Bijie tragedy. After I told him the story, his first reaction was to cite a poem called Dead Water, written by Wen Yiduo, a Chinese poet, in 1925: "Here is a ditch of hopelessly dead water— a region where beauty can never reside. Might as well let the devil cultivate it— and see what sort of world it can provide." While the collective guilt and anger on Chinese social media is completely understandable considering the struggles for basic survival that characterize so many Chinese lives, as well as continuous frustration and distrust of the government, what really scares me is the deeper insecurity and uncertainty beneath the cynicism and hopelessness. As a Chinese person, sometimes it takes courage for me to write about China's social issues. I pore over commentaries and analyses on stories that are sad and frustrating that inevitably bring about emotional torment and self-doubt. However, it's not hope that makes one persist; it's persistence that brings hope. The individual is indeed small and powerless in the larger social context, but the good news is: I am not alone in wanting to write about China's social issues. Every step counts in a long journey. As Long Yingtai, an influential Taiwanese writer, once said: "Don't wait for heroes or heroines; every individual has the power to push down the wall."         |
| Upcoming Canada-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement – Lessons Learned from Korea Posted: 22 Nov 2012 11:52 AM PST Pacific Prospective features the research of graduate students. Memo #192 By Justin Elavathil – justin.elavathil [at] asiapacific.ca
The Canada-Korea negotiations have faltered on two issues: beef and automobiles. Korea's insistence on using tainted beef as an excuse to protect its cattle farmers triggered Canada to withhold reducing its tariff on vehicle imports due to the lack of auto part penetration in the Korean market (or vice versa). While negotiations have progressed, these disagreements have become tit-for-tat issues. Canada and Japan exhibit significant protectionism in agricultural industries, most notably dairy (Canada) and rice (Japan). But these protectionist policies are mutually compatible, as neither has significant exports in these sensitive sectors. Canada's rice exports only make up .07 per cent of its cereal exports, none of which targets the Japanese market. Yet, due to similarities in market supply issues between Japan and Korea, beef and auto parts are potentially contentious points in EPA negotiations. But Japan Business Federation (経団連) experts have asserted that these issues would not be major impediments, arguing that EPAs, compared to FTAs, focus more on an intimate integration of economies rather than one-to-one tradeoffs. If true, there are no major hurdles. An upcoming election looms in Japan. More substantive trade agreements, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, are becoming hot button election topics and causing inter and intra-party divisions. An EPA that features moderate, rather than radical liberalization of trade barriers is easier to sell to respective constituents. Moreover, it is the non-partisan and general ministerial support on both sides of the Pacific that would allow this EPA to be fast-tracked for completion within two years. Both countries are eager for a deal. Justin Elavathil is currently a Post-Graduate Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Memo #43 If you enjoyed this memo, subscribe to our e-newsletter for free and receive new memos 2+ times per week via email.  UBC's MAAPPS students on August 2011 research trip to Japan. Trip included comprehensive negotiation simulation on Canada-Japan EPA. Related Memos:
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| Can Volunteer Program Clean Up Donor System? Posted: 22 Nov 2012 07:22 AM PST A senior health official claimed that China will curb the use executed prisoners as a source of organ transplants while bolstering a volunteer donor program that it hopes will help to limit the much-criticized practice:
Xinhua News has more on the new program and the government's efforts to reduce its reliance on donations from condemned prisoners:
See also CDT coverage on the issue, one of China's most infamous human rights violations, and an article from World Affairs from earlier this year which calls out China's "Organ Donation Nightmare." © Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| A Chinese Woman’s “Money Dress” Ignites Online Fury, With a Gendered Twist Posted: 22 Nov 2012 06:31 AM PST  (Via Weibo) The photos posted online feature a girl, slim and pretty, with long, shiny hair dyed a burgundy red. But what is remarkable about them is the paper dress she wears. According to media reports, it comprises 200,000 RMB (about US$32,000) worth of bills. It's worth noting that the bills do not appear to be Chinese currency, and it is difficult to confirm their actual collective value. But the images have been enough to get China's blogosphere buzzing. According to Zhengzhou Evening News, the girl in the photo is a user with the name "Good Little Child" (@小白儿乖) on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter. When she uploaded the images, she captioned them this way: "In order to celebrate this princess' 21st birthday, my loving daddy gave me a beautiful cream cake; isn't he the cutest! But what I'm most happy about is this stitched-together money dress worth 200,000 RMB, which my sugar daddy really had to work his connections to buy. Isn't it awesome? Girls, don't be jealous. My whole wardrobe of Channel and LV really can't compare!" In Chinese, the term for "sugar daddy" and "godfather" are one and the same: gan die. The first word, gan, contains a range of meanings–some of them crude–which Weibo commenters were quick to pun on. And while the man's identity is currently unknown, commenters evinced both awe and repulsion that he was both rich and profligate enough to give such an ostentatious gift. User "Popular Small Horse Zi" proclaimed, "I gotta find a godmother!" While "Time To Get Up Jeffrey" commented, "In this dynasty we can translate GDP as 'Gan Die Product.'" "Good Little Child" joins a long line of pretty, young Chinese women who have courted the Chinese Web's simultaneous fascination and ire with ostentatious displays of wealth. The most notorious of these must be Guo Meimei, a then 20-year-old Chinese girl who entered the annals of Internet lore last year when she posted photos of herself toting designer handbags and posing next to her Maserati. The images caused a firestorm among Web users who noted she had listed herself as Business General Manager for the Red Cross Society, one of the country's biggest charity organizations. And while Guo Meimei was eventually discovered not to be working at the Red Cross, she has become synonymous with brazen money-flashing, her name invoked every time a similar story emerges. This has included Lu Xingyu, who was suspected of getting rich off the back of her extensive fundraising, and Chen Shoufu whose wealth flaunting and confessions of drunk driving raised eyebrows because her user name listed herself as a member of the military. This phenomenon is invariably applied to women, rather then men. It is only the photos of beautiful, young women posing with big round eyes and flirtatious smiles, appearing to flaunt themselves as much as the luxury goods they pose next to, that appear to interest users. Users gobble the images up, covetous, titillated and furious, then fling out words like "slutty," "vulgar," "fame-hungry," "dishonest," and "shameless." In China, vice and women are still concepts that seem indivisible. And while few of these viral women have been mistresses, they are inevitably suspected of being so, as was the case with Guo Meimei (she wasn't). There is a feeling in Chinese society that among a certain subset–say, the thousands of self-made millionaires over the last three decades–that keeping a mistress is a status symbol equivalent to driving a sports car. And yet these modern-day concubines are reviled as much as they are desired for having traded in a purity of heart all "good" Chinese women are expected to have.  The online avatar for "Good Little Child." (Via Weibo) Something must be said for the timing of these photos, such as it is, just days after the tragic tale of five, impoverished boys in Guizhou suffocating to death in a garbage bin shocked the Chinese Web. With overtones of Hans Christian Andersen's hauntingly sad story "The Little Match Girl", the boys had sought shelter from cold weather, but died of carbon monoxide poisoning after lighting a fire to stay warm. In a touching post, author Zheng Yuanjie wrote, "Though you left the world in a dumpster, you are not trash." The country's growing income disparity is a traditionally hot-button topic among Chinese Internet users, and the contrast here could not be clearer. Such a cruel disjunction of images prompted one user to say, "Five children had to die, while all the power and money was busy being 'godfather.'" Tea Leaf Nation contacted the now-famous girl in the paper dress via Weibo, but has received no reply as of this writing. The only public response she has made to her new found fame has been an oblique post quoting two lines from a Ming Dynasty poem by Tang Bohu, with the implied meaning: Whether you're wealthy or poor, everyone eventually dies. So what's important are wine and flowers, and the leisure to enjoy them.     |
| The Crooked Cost of a Chinese Education Posted: 22 Nov 2012 05:56 AM PST Dan Levin of The New York Times details the culture of corruption that has grown rife in China's education system, where parents oftentimes must bribe school officials to secure enrollment in and success for their children at the best schools in the country:
© Scott Greene for China Digital Times (CDT), 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us  |
| China Capital Account Restrictions Loosened for Foreign Investors Posted: 22 Nov 2012 04:34 AM PST Want to know how difficult it is to teach China foreign investment law? Less than two months ago I told my students about capital account restrictions and the influence of hot money and financial speculators on the approval process for cross-border capital flows. That information is now out of date:
Good news for some of my clients, but now I have to supplement my class lecture. The fun, it never ends. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
| Huawei Might Need Some PR Help in the UK Posted: 22 Nov 2012 02:01 AM PST From the Telegraph:
{sigh} Once again, I feel sorry for Huawei.
Was it a smart move to make UK political contributions? If you have business there, it certainly makes a lot of sense, and (of course) everyone else, including Huawei's competitors, are doing it. This is unfortunately the way things get done these days in developed countries where bribery is legal. And what, according to a lot of critics, was Huawei's big problem in overseas markets? For years, folks said that Huawei, and a lot of other Chinese companies, did not understand local practices. So now Huawei is doing just that, and they get burned for it. This kind of thing looks great on paper, and can be a very effective strategy. But then the information gets out to the public, and what was once a great move blows up in your face and becomes a PR problem. Seriously, this is rather sad. © Stan for China Hearsay, 2012. | Permalink | No comment | Add to del.icio.us |
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